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This thesis analyzes how the United States Army and Marine Corps comply 
with Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies and Procedures," which mandates the effective integration of human 
considerations into the acquisition process. 
Despite a common purpose, the Army and Marine Corps human systems 
integration (HSI) programs have evolved distinctive policies, procedures, and 
methodologies, tailored to the Services' unique operational and organizational 
environments. To evaluate program effectiveness, this thesis performs a 
comparative analysis of the HSI procedures employed by each Service in the 
acquisition of major and non-major ground combat weapon systems. Specifically, 
the thesis constructs an HSI Attributes Matrix, contrasting the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) with the Armored Gun System (AGS), and 
the Short Range Anti-tank Weapon (SRAW/Predator) with the Advanced Anti-tank 
Weapon System - Medium (AAWS-M/Javelin). 
Extrapolating generalizations from case analyses, this thesis identifies the 
policies, procedures, and methodologies which are most effectual in integrating 
human considerations into systems acquisition. Finally, the thesis recommends 
modifications to the Marine Corps' HSI program to improve the acquisition 
process and thereby, better satisfy the operational requirements of the Fleet Marine 
Force. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the United 
States Army and Marine Corps comply with Department of Defense 
Directive 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and 
Procedures," which mandates the effective integration of human 
considerations into the acquisition process. Through 
comparative analysis, this thesis seeks to identify the 
policies, procedures, and methodologies which are most 
effectual in integrating human considerations into systems 
acquisition. Subsequently, the objective of this thesis is to 
establish recommendations to enhance the current Marine Corps 
HSI program. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Following World War II, military technological 
superiority became a central tenet of the United States 
national security policy. Faced with the threat of 
numerically superior conventional Soviet forces, the U.S. 
military, from the 1960's through the 1980's, increasingly 
relied on technology to modernize its forces and generate 
greater combat power. 
This trend continues into the 1990's. With the end of 
the Cold War, the Services now confront a new array of 
challenges such as military down-sizing, force reorganization, 
budgetary reductions, and the increasing costs of manpower and 
training. The DoD budget is now in its tenth consecutive year 
of real decline. Since 1990 alone the defense budget 
authority has suffered a 35 percent decrease in real terms, 
dropping from $337.3 billion to $252.2 billion (in FY 95 
constant year dollars). Procurement has sustained the largest 
reductions. From 1990 to 1995 procurements shrank by 54 
percent or $50.4 billion. Such trends are projected to 
continue into the new century. Therefore, charged to "do more 
with less," the Armed Forces are again compelled to seek 
technological solutions to their manpower dilemmas. 
In the face of fiscal privation, the Services are 
aggressively pursuing force modernization programs. The Army, 
in partnership with the Marine Corps, is advancing an 
expansive technological modernization plan, entitled "Force 
XXI." Through digitization of battlefield command, control, 
and communication functions, the program seeks to develop "a 
new force for a new century," according to General Gordon R. 
Sullivan, the Army's Chief of Staff. He states that Force XXI 
will "synthesize the science of computer technology" and "use 
command and control technology to leverage the power of the 
information age." (Sullivan, 1994, p.26) Concurrently, the 
Navy and Marine Corps are actively pursuing technological 
innovations to expand their littoral warfare capabilities in 
accordance with the Navy and Marine Corps White Paper "... From 
the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," 
published on 30 September 1992. 
Advanced technology, though, is a dual-edged sword which 
can either multiply or attenuate a combat force. While 
offering the potential to enhance performance and mission 
capability, it can significantly increase system complexity 
and scope, both operationally and logistically. In addition, 
failure to address human factors in the acquisition of 
advanced technology weapons systems and equipment can result 
in sub-optimal system performance. Historical accounts abound 
of weapon systems which errantly increased manning and skill 
requirements, lacked adequate training programs, threatened 
the health and safety of maintenance personnel, or failed to 
achieve projected performance levels when employed by the 
operator.1  in 1981, a landmark General Accounting Office 
Examples of such incidence include: 1) The Stinger 
missile system which originally required the gunner to perform 
18 sequential steps to fire the weapon,  2)   the UH-60 
(GAO) report attributed 50 percent of all military equipment 
failures to human error (GAO, 1981, p. 27) . The report 
confirmed that the effectiveness of U.S. forces could be 
significantly increased through improved weapon system design. 
Further, it stressed the immediate need for the integration of 
manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) considerations into 
the acquisition process. 
Cognizant of the problem, the Department of the Navy in 
1977 initiated the Hardware Procurement and Military Manpower 
(HARDMAN) program to improve its management of MPT 
requirements generated during the design of new combat 
systems. HARDMAN was to develop models and databases to 
analyze new systems designs in terms of their human resource 
needs. Similarly, in 19 84, the U.S. Army inaugurated an 
expanded program, entitled Manpower and Personnel Integration 
(MANPRINT), to overcome system design problems and improve 
human performance and equipment reliability. 
In December 1988, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
formally instituted the manpower, personnel, training, and 
safety (MPTS) concepts. DoD Directive 5000.53, entitled 
"Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Safety in the Defense 
Acquisition Process," established MPTS criteria for all 
Services. The directive was superseded in February 1991 by 
DoD Directive 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies 
and Procedures," which mandates that "human considerations 
shall be effectively integrated into the design effort for 
defense systems to improve total system performance and reduce 
costs of ownership." The Directive's objective is to identify 
Blackhawk helicopter which required 24 mechanics per platoon - 
- six times more than the lowest manpower estimate, 3) the 
Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which suffered severe 
performance degradation because drivers were not trained in 
basic map reading, and 4) the Aegis missile cruiser on which 
misinterpretation of man-machine interface displays resulted 
in the destruction of a civilian airliner. 
for acquisition decision-makers the human factors 
considerations which will affect the cost and operational 
effectiveness of a given weapon system. 
Although DoD Directive 5000.2 outlined the requirement 
for human systems integration, the method of execution was 
left to the discretion of each Service. Since their 
respective inceptions, the Army and Marine Corps HSI programs 
have evolved along divergent paths. Each Service refined its 
HSI policies, procedures, and methodologies according to the 
unique operational requirements and constraints imposed by 
their organizational environments. Yet ultimately, the 
effectiveness of each program is reflected in the operational 
performance of the combat systems it designs and develops. 
The Army is presently the lead service for the design and 
development of 58 percent of the Marine Corps acquisition 
category (ACAT) I and II programs.2 Therefore, seven major 
Marine Corps combat systems, each costing DoD in excess of 
$1.2 billion in FY 1980 dollars, are automatically developed 
under the guidance of the Army's MANPRINT program.3 Of the 
remaining Marine Corps ACAT III and IV programs, 16 percent or 
14 programs are procured under Army direction employing 
MANPRINT procedures. Based on this operational inter- 
dependence and governmental pressures to improve, consolidate, 
and streamline acquisition procedures, the Marine Corps can 
Programs are assigned ACAT ID and IC designation based 
on projected RDT&E and procurement costs in excess of $200 
million and $1 billion, respectively, in FY 1980 constant 
dollars. ACAT II, III, and IV programs cannot exceed maximum 
cost thresholds of $75 million for RDT&E and $300 million for 
procurement in FY 1980 dollars. 
The Army is designated lead service for the following 
systems: 1) Avenger Missile (Stinger), 2) Advanced Field 
Artillery Data System (FireFlex), 3) MLRS, 4) Advanced Anti- 
tank Weapon - Medium (Javelin), 5) Single Channel Ground and 
Airborne Radio System, 6) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Close 
Range), and 7) Unmanned Ground Vehicle. 
benefit significantly by critically evaluating both HSI 
programs to determine how best to achieve DoD's goal of 
improved operational performance at reduced cost of ownership. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
• Outline the historical development of the Army and 
Marine Corps HSI programs; 
• Conduct a comparative analysis of current HSI policies 
and procedures utilized by both services; 
• Identify the significant benefits and difficulties 
incurred by both programs; 
• Explore opportunities for modification to the Army and 
Marine Corps HSI programs to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the acquisition process. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis poses the question: How can human systems 
analysis be better integrated into the United States Marine 
Corps acquisition process in order to improve the operational 
effectiveness of the Fleet Marine Force? 
In addressing the primary question, the following 
subsidiary questions were considered: 
1. What are the objectives of the Department of Defense 
human systems integration requirements imposed on the 
military service components by DoD Directive 5000.2? 
2. What policies, procedures, and organizational infra- 
structures currently exist within the Marine Corps to 
perform human factors integration? 
3. How is Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) 
analysis organized and utilized in the United States 
Army? 
4. How has human systems integration/analysis been 
utilized in the acquisition of major and non-major Army 
and Marine Corps ground combat weapon systems? 
5. What modifications, if any, should be made to Marine 
Corps human systems analysis policies and/or 
organizational structures to improve the acquisition 
process and better satisfy the operational requirements 
of the Fleet Marine Force? 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis performs an evaluative analysis comparing how 
the Army and Marine Corps HSI programs comply with DoD 
regulations mandating the effective integration of human 
considerations into the acquisition process. Limited by the 
lack of centralized Service HSI data bases, this thesis 
extrapolates generalizations regarding entire HSI programs 
based on the detailed analysis of representative sample cases. 
Accordingly, this thesis critically evaluates Army and Marine 
Corps HSI procedures as applied to the acquisition of one 
major (ACAT I) and one non-major (ACAT II-IV) weapon system 
from each Service. 
The  thesis  first  establishes  a  baseline  of  HSI 
requirements for all military acquisition programs as set 
forth in DoD Instruction 5000.2.  This baseline establishes 
the measures of effectiveness against which the Services' HSI 
programs are evaluated.   Secondly, the thesis traces the 
historical development of the Army and Marine Corps HSI 
programs to determine the internal and external factors that 
influenced their current structures.   The institutional 
commitment and organizational infra-structure which support 
each program are also examined.  Finally, through document 
review and structured interviews of program management 
personnel, a HSI Attributes Matrix (HSIAM), compares the 
strengths and deficiencies of each program as judged against 
the HSI baseline established by DoD. The matrix, presented in 
Appendix A,  evaluates and scores the extent to which 
acquisition programs comply with DoD requirements relevant to 
human systems integration. 
Based on the results of the comparative analysis, the 
thesis proposes modifications to the Marine Corps' HSI program 
in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
acquisition process. Through better inclusion of the Marine 
in the acquisition process, this thesis seeks to increase the 
operational effectiveness of -the Fleet Marine Force by 
improving the total system performance of Marine Corps weapon 
systems. 
The information presented in this thesis was obtained 
from (1) a literature review of current texts, periodicals, 
laws, directives, and regulations regarding human factors 
integration in the military procurement process, and (2) 
interviews with U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and DoD personnel 
involved in the systems acquisition process. Literature 
references were obtained from the materials held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the Defense Logistics Studies Information 
Exchange (DLSIE), the Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC), the U.S. Army MANPRINT Directorate, the U.S. Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) , and the Department of 
Defense. Interviews were conducted both in person and via 
telephone and are referenced in Appendix B. 
F.  SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The primary focus of this thesis is to increase the 
operational effectiveness of the Marine Corps operational 
forces through improved integration of human factors analysis 
into the systems acquisition process. This objective is 
achieved by performing a comparative analysis of the policies 
and procedures of the Marine Corps human systems analysis 
program and the Army MANPRINT program. Due to its limited 
nature, the thesis confines its investigation to the 
acquisition of major and non-major ground combat weapon 
systems. The acquisition of aviation and automated 
information systems is excluded from examination. 
Specifically, the thesis contrasts the HSI procedures employed 
in the procurement of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV) with the Armored Gun System (AGS) , and the Short-Range 
Anti-tank Weapon (SRAW/Predator) with the Advanced Anti-tank 
Weapon System - Medium (AAWS-M/Javelin).    These weapon 
systems were chosen for comparison based on their commonality 
in form,  fit,  function,  and procurement schedules.   In 
addition, the AAAV and AGS are both under development through 
a common contractor, United Defense Limited Partnership. This 
provides a unique opportunity to obtain objective third-party 
assessments  from  civilian HSI  practitioners  intimately 
involved with both Army and Marine Corps procurement programs. 
Research is further restricted to only the Army and 
Marine Corps HSI programs.  Navy and Air Force programs are 
referenced only for background information or in instances 
where they directly influenced Army or Marine Corps policies 
or procedures. 
This thesis assumes that the reader understands the basic 
principles and current policies governing systems acquisition 
and program management, as well as the DoD, Army, and Marine 
Corps organizations involved therein. Further, it assumes 
that the reader has only a limited knowledge of human systems 
integration and will therefore explain HSI concepts and 
procedures in detail. 
G.  ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II. Evolution of Human Systems Integration in 
DpDj. This chapter provides a historical overview of 
significant events in the development of the DoD HSI program 
as delineated in DoD Directive 5000.2. it outlines and 
examines the HSI requirements imposed on the military services 
by DoD Directive 5000.2. 
Chapter III.  The Marine Corps Human Factors Analysis 
Program:  This chapter traces the development of the current 
human factors analysis program within the Marine Corps. The 
chapter identifies the internal and external forces which 
influenced the evolution of the human factors support 
structure at Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, VA. The 
chapter also examines the organizational structure and 
relationships which affect the procurement process. 
Chapter IV. The Army MANPRINT Program; This chapter 
identifies and describes the functions and capabilities of the 
U.S. Army's MANPRINT methodology. It outlines the development 
and current status of the Army's MANPRINT support structure. 
The chapter analyzes the Army's policies and procedures for 
initiating, executing and employing MANPRINT analysis. 
Chapter V. Marine Corps Human Systems Integration Case 
Analysis: This chapter analyzes the human factors 
integration/analysis functions performed by the Marine Corps 
during the procurement of a major and non-major ground combat 
weapons system. Specifically, the chapter examines the 
acquisition of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
and the Short Range Anti-Tank Weapon (SRAW/Predator). It 
highlights the significant benefits and difficulties incurred 
by the current operational procedures and organizational 
relationships. 
Chapter VI. Army Human Systems Integration Case 
Analysis: This chapter investigates the human factors 
integration functions performed by the Army during the 
procurement of a major and non-major ground combat weapons 
system. Specifically, the chapter examines the acquisition of 
the Armored Gun System (AGS) and the Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon 
System - Medium (AAWS-M/Javelin). It critically analyzes the 
benefits and deficiencies of the HSI procedures utilized by 
the Army to glean recommendations for the improvement of the 
Marine Corps acquisition process. 
Chapter VII. Comparative Analysis: This chapter 
contrasts policies, procedures, and practices of the Army's 
MANPRINT program with the Marine Corps' HSI program. 
Utilizing the qualitative HSIAM scores, the chapter compares 
the capability of each Services' HSI program to effectively 
apply, support, and execute HSI. 
Chapter VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations: This 
chapter summarizes the conclusions derived from the 
comparative analysis. The chapter proposes recommendations to 
improve the integration of human considerations within the 
Marine Corps acquisition process. 
H.  TERMINOLOGY 
The field of human systems integration has steadily 
evolved and expanded over the last ten years. So too has its 
language. Since HSI is an inter-disciplinary process, it 
incorporates terminology from a wide variety of management and 
technical disciplines. To alleviate confusion, terms that are 
not commonly known are explained in the body of the text. 
Whenever possible terms are defined according to DoD standard 
terminology. 
The terms human factors integration and human systems 
integration are used synonymously in the course of this text. 
Integration of "human factors" in weapons system design and 
development is defined as the simultaneous and continuous 
consideration of six inter-related dimensions which effect 
human and system performance.  The six dimensions are: l) 
human factors engineering; 2) manpower; 3) personnel; 4) 
training; 5)  safety, and 6)  health hazards.   Reference 
Appendix C for definitions and topical areas covered by each 
dimension.  For this study, a distinction is made between 
human systems integration and human factors analysis.  HSI 
implies a cross-functional, synergetic examination of human 
factors considerations, while human factors analysis denotes 
segregated evaluations. 
Finally, numerous military abbreviations and acronyms are 
10 
used throughout the thesis. Those that are not commonly known 
are explained upon first usage. Refer to Appendix D for a 
list of acronyms and their meanings. 
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II.  EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN DOD 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of systems acquisition within the military 
services is characterized exclusively by three principle 
parameters -- cost, schedule, and performance. Program 
Managers are formally educated and culturally influenced to 
believe that these factors are the primary focus of their 
efforts and the criteria for their professional success. For 
PMs, cost considerations predominate the acquisition equation. 
By defining the limits of schedule and performance, cost 
delineates the playing field in which the PMs must compete. 
Budgetary constraints coupled with the transient nature 
of the acquisition work-force and the lack of incentives to 
the contrary have conspired to further narrow the PMs' focus 
to initial development and procurement costs. Managers are 
encouraged, if not specifically directed, to minimize program 
costs while maximizing performance and maintaining the 
procurement schedules during their limited tenure in program 
management. For military officers that period is normally 
limited to three to four years of a 12 to 15 year procurement 
cycle for a system that may be employed for decades. The 
consequence is an organizational culture in which PMs are 
incentivized to sacrifice long-term life-cycle considerations 
to achieve immediate short-term returns in cost, schedule, or 
performance. Therefore, only limited consideration has been 
traditionally given to the life-cycle costs incurred by 
manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, 
system safety, and health hazards. 
This organizational attitude continues to permeate the 
acquisition work-force and stands in stark contrast to studies 
proving that life-cycle costs normally exceed the initial 
development and procurement costs. Figure 2-1 demonstrates 
the distribution of life-cycle costs over the standard 
13 
acquisition and post-production phases. Typically, 60 percent 
of systems' costs are incurred during the operations and 
support phase of the systems life-cycle. The Office of 
Management and Budget (0MB) demonstrated the breadth of these 
costs by defining life-cycle costs as "the sum of the direct, 
indirect, recurring costs, and other related costs incurred or 
estimated to be incurred, in the design, development, 
operation, maintenance and support of a major system over its 
anticipated useful life." (Executive Office, 1976, p.3) In 
essence, it includes all costs associated with a system from 
cradle to grave. 
As early as 1964, E. G. Fouch, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, identified 
this institutional deficiency.  He stated: 
Heretofore we have given major attention to the 
cost of acquiring weapons systems...in terms of 
development and investment. We have now come to 
realize that the maintenance and operating costs 
over the life span, for the most part, far exceed 
development and investment costs. We are therefore 
thinking in terms of total cost of effective use 
and ownership. (Giordano, 1966, p.197) 
Experience has shown that a major portion of the 
projected life-cycle cost for a given system stems from the 
consequences of decisions made during the early phases of the 
program planning and system conceptual design. Studies 
indicate that while a typical program will expend only 10 
percent of its developmental budget in the Concept Exploration 
and Definition phase, the decisions made therein will account 
for 70 percent of a system's life-cycle costs. (GAO, 1981, 
p. 15) Figure 2-2 illustrates the timing and effect of design 















Figure 2-1 Life-cycle costing in systems acquisition. 
(U.S. Navy, 1988, p. 2-1) 
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Figure 2-2  Schedules of decisions affecting life-cycle 
cost. (NSAI, 197, p. 62) 
So, while the greatest proportion of costs may result from 
activities occurring down-stream in the system life-cycle, the 
greatest opportunity for influencing these costs is realized 
during the initial phases of the acquisition process. 
Because both the Army and Marine Corps are manpower 
intensive services, the preponderance of these system life- 
cycle costs are attributable to "people-costs." General Carl 
E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, in his 
testimony before the House of Representatives Armed Services 
Committee on 31 March 1993, emphasized this point by stating 
that "the Marine Corps is people; we operate people" Both 
services annually expend over 75 percent of their budgets on 
manpower costs. General Mundy illustrated this expenditure as 
follows: 
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Some 77 cents out of every dollar you [Congress] 
provide directly to the Corps is used to buy and 
support people; 6 cents purchases our ground 
weapons and equipment; the remaining 17 cents goes 
toward training, operating, and maintaining 
readiness and our bases. (Mundy, 1993, p. 29) 
Therefore, for the Marine Corps, "people-costs" equate to 
approximately $6.7 billion of an $8.97 billion yearly budget. 
Of the Army's 1994 budget of $61 billion, approximately $45.75 
billion will be consumed by manpower expenses. Tables 2-1, 2- 
2, and 2-3 present the DoD, Army, and Marine Corps annual 
budgets for fiscal years 1994 and 1995. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
BUDGET AUTHORITY BY TITLE 
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Table 2-1 Department of Defense budget. 
(West, 1994, p. 22) 
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DEPARTMENT OP THE ARMY 
TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY BY TITLE 
(Cur rent: Dollars, in Billions) 
FY 94     FY 95 
Military Personnel 


















 5.3 :: 
0.8 
::  : 1.3 ::: 
TOTAL $61.0 $61.1 
Table 2-2  Department of the Army budget. 
(West, 1994, p. 24) 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY BY TITLE 
(Current Dollars, in Billions) 
FY 94    FY 95 
Military Personnel $6.12 $6.13 
Operations and 
Maintenance 1.94 2.00 
Procurement 0.44 0.56 
Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation 0.21 0.16 
Military Construction,Navy 0.13 0 06 
Family Housing 0.13 0.16 
TOTAL $8.97   $9.07 
Table 2-3  Marine Corps budget. (HQMC, 1994, p. 5-5) 
The Department of Defense recognized the implications of 
the combination of these factors in the development of its HSI 
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policies. In order to effectively minimize life-cycle costs, 
specifically manpower costs incurred during the operations and 
support phase, Program Managers are required to perform up- 
front analyses. of human factors considerations during the 
initial phases of the acquisition cycle, thereby supporting 
informed decision-making. Yet, despite this logic, the DoD 
HSI policies face persistent opposition from an organizational 
culture in the acquisition community which champions short- 
term cost, schedule, and performance objectives to the 
exclusion of human factor considerations and the detriment of 
long-term life-cycle cost savings. 
In an effort to examine the current HSI requirements 
imposed upon the military services, it is first advisable to 
trace the evolution of DoD's HSI policy by highlighting the 
significant historical events and figures which influenced its 
development. 
B.  BACKGROUND 
1.  Problem Identification 
In response to the numerically superior Soviet forces 
confronting the U.S. during the Cold War, the Armed Forces 
increasingly relied on technology as a force multiplier. In 
the 1970's and 1980's, the acquisition of technologically 
advanced weapons systems allowed the Services to compensate 
for the introduction of the all-volunteer force, widening 
personnel shortages, and escalating manpower costs. Yet, the 
failure of many technological advances to increase combat 
effectiveness to levels projected during systems design 
increased both Congressional and DoD dissatisfaction with 
existing acquisition procedures. 
As early as the mid-1960's, major human factors programs 
in the Air Force, Navy, and Department of Transportation had 
attempted to address the situation. Without exception, 
however, these efforts to incorporate human factors as a 
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primary consideration into government policy for technological 
procurement were marginal at best. (Booher, 1990, p. 5) 
No specific DoD-wide guidance on manpower planning for 
new systems even existed until August 17, 19 78 when the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published a memorandum 
titled "Manpower Analysis Requirements for Systems 
Acquisition." Until then, military specifications, standards 
and handbooks on human factors and human engineering had dealt 
exclusively with human physical characteristics and design 
interface. A GAO report later described the manuals' short- 
comings as follows: 
Although they furnish a basis for design of the 
immediate interface between man and machine, they 
do not provide the broader manpower data (for 
example, skill levels, proficiency, availability, 
rotation rates, cost, and so forth) necessary to 
evaluate alternate designs to determine the optimum 
design for minimum cost of ownership and maximum 
effectiveness. (GAO, 1981, p.31) 
In his statement before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on 14 March 1979, Dr. William J. Perry, then-Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 
acknowledged the dangerous communications gap that had 
developed between systems developers and the user. This gap, 
he observed, led to systems that were largely technology 
driven and poorly united to the operational need because the 
user did not know how to state his need in terms of available 
technology. Dr. Perry further stated that DoD research and 
development programs had applied technology to enhance 
performance without adequately considering its impact on the 
user in terms of support costs and the number and skill levels 
of military personnel. According to Dr. Perry, the results 
were evidenced by a number of operating systems with low 
readiness and requirements for expensive retrofits or 
modifications. 
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2.  GAO Report to Congress 
The U.S. General Accounting Office in January 1981 
established a milestone in the evolution of DoD's HSI policies 
when it produced a scathing report criticizing the Services' 
procurement procedures. The GAO report, titled "Effectiveness 
of U.S. Forces Can Be Increased Through Improved Weapons 
System Design," attributed 50 percent of military equipment 
failures directly to human error. Limitations such as skill 
levels, proficiency, availability, environmental stress, and 
fatigue of the personnel who operate and maintain military 
systems were cited as contributing to human induced systems 
failure. The report stressed the need to integrate manpower, 
personnel and training (MPT) considerations into the material 
acquisition process. To illustrate the point, the report 
cited a myriad of existing human factors problems existing 
within the Army, Navy and Air Force to include: a tank hatch 
that a soldier, clothed for cold-weather, could not fit 
through; a major shipboard fire control system that could not 
be adequately manned, and the Dragon anti-armor missile that 
when fired startles the shooter resulting in misses. As an 
example, the Dragon system sustained a 60 percent loss in 
performance efficiency when removed from laboratory conditions 
and employed by regular soldier's under normal operating 
conditions. 
The GAO report targeted the acquisition work-force's 
organizational culture as a culprit in propagating the 
problem.  The report observed that: 
The pressures to attain specific performance goals, 
such as speed, range, and firepower, within the 
tight time and cost constraints have often led 
management to trade-off or otherwise not give 
adequate attention to the long term ownership 
considerations.  (GAO, 1981, p. i) 
Management, it concluded, had little incentive to either 
21 
invest development funds or to trade-off technical performance 
to improve the supportability of a system because it is very 
difficult to quantify the benefits of such actions. One 
serious problem affecting ownership considerations in the 
acquisition process noted by the report was the lack of 
continuity in program management. Military officers were 
assigned to program management billets about every three to 
four years. Hence, the report concluded that the program 
manager is most concerned about what happens on his "watch" 
and thus less inclined to place emphasis on factors such as 
supportability, human reliability, and quality assurance where 
the benefits are realized when the system is deployed (GAO, 
1981 p. 57.) 
The GAO identified the most prominent detractors from the 
effectiveness of deployed systems: 1) human factors; 2) 
logistic support, and 3) quality assurance. The report 
identified the following human factors deficiencies: 
• Human_ factors specifications, standards, and handbooks 
used in designing and developing systems and equipment 
do not adequately address human limitations. 
• There are no common methodologies and data sources for 
use by system designers in forecasting skill levels of 
future military personnel. 
• DoD testing policies and procedures do not tend to 
identify and resolve potential human-induced failures 
during the developmental stages of the acquisition 
process. 
The GAO report did acknowledge that the Department of Defense 
recognized the need for improved personnel planning and human 
factors analysis. In particular it referenced two on-going 
initiatives. The first was the Navy's Military Manpower 
Versus Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN) Program, established in 
1977, to develop methodologies for determining manpower 
requirements associated with systems being developed or 
procured.  The second was the Army Material and Readiness 
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Command's 1978 instruction to Program Managers and Development 
Commands to prepare human factors engineering analysis for 
presentation at the preliminary review of each Army Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) milestone review. Both of 
these efforts will be addressed in later chapters of this 
thesis. 
Despite DoD's initiatives, the General Accounting Office 
recommended that Congress direct greater attention during its 
deliberations on the DoD budget to such matters as human 
factors, logistics support, and quality assurance 
considerations in the design and development of weapon 
systems. Congress responded in Title 10, U. S. Code, Section 
2434, "Independent Cost Estimates; Operational Manpower 
Requirements," by imposing the requirement for a Manpower 
Estimate Report (MER) of each acquisition program. The report 
mandates that the military components analyze the impact on 
manpower and service end-strength in the procurement of new 
systems. 
The Department of Defense concurred with the GAO's 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In commenting, 
DoD emphasized the need for continuing interaction between 
system designers and manpower planners and the development of 
common manpower methodologies. In this way, DoD formally 
acknowledged a requirement for human systems analysis in the 
weapon system acquisition process and established a foundation 
for further HSI policies. 
In December 1988, the Secretary of Defense took the next 
formal step by embracing the manpower, personnel, training and 
safety (MPTS) concepts. DoD Directive 5000.53, "Manpower, 
Personnel, Training and Safety in the Defense System 
Acquisition Process," was approved establishing MPTS criteria 
that must be addressed by all DoD components in cooperation 
with industry. The directive stated DoD objective as follows: 
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The Department  of Defense  shall maximize  the 
operational effectiveness of all systems, whether 
being procured initially or being refurbished, by 
ensuring those systems can be effectively operated, 
maintained and supported by well qualified and 
trained people.  To do so, human capabilities and 
limitations must be fully considered early in the 
system's design process.   Such MPTS concepts, 
requirements and goals shall be developed in a 
consistent manner, communicated to industry, and 
evaluated  in  contract  proposals,  and weighed 
positively and substantially as criteria for source 
selection. 
While DoD Directive 5000.53 was a meaningful step in the 
evolution of human systems integration within the Department 
of Defense, it failed to achieve that goal. The new policy did 
not stipulate the integration of MPTS considerations, merely 
that each discipline be evaluated in accordance with 
appropriate directives. Many acquisition practitioners 
continue to equate the "stove-piped" evaluation of MPTS 
criteria with HSI. However, in 1991, the DoD 5000 Series 
ushered in an expanded role and definition of human systems 
integration, establishing the second milestone on the 
evolutionary path of HSI policies. 
C.  DOD "5000 SERIES" ACQUISITION REGULATIONS 
1.  Background 
The 1981 GAO report heralded the growing dissatisfaction 
with the efficiency and effectiveness of the DoD acquisition 
process. Increasingly, the acquisition process came under 
more intense and critical scrutiny from both the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Headlines proclaiming the 
exorbitant and sometimes ridiculous costs of systems 
procurement kept the Department of Defense directly focused in 
the spotlight of public and media attention. 
Four landmark events traced the path of Federal 
acquisition reform: 1) The Carlucci Initiatives; 2) The 
Packard   Commission;   3)   The   Goldwater-Nichols   DoD 
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Reorganization Act, and 4) The National Security Review 11 - 
Defense Management Report. 
Under direction of the in-coming Reagan Administration, 
the Carlucci Initiatives, published on 27 July 1981, set-forth 
32 initiatives to improve the acquisition process. The major 
finding of the review was that readiness could be enhanced, 
costs reduced, and procurement schedules shortened by 
decentralized control of the acquisition process. 
Similarly, on 3 0 June 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management published "A Quest for 
Excellence, Final Report to the President." The Commission, 
headed by businessman and former Deputy Defense Secretary 
David Packard, took one year to study the existing defense 
management and organization. The Commission revealed and 
reported on the negative effects of over-regulation, inter- 
service competition, lack of funding stability, and product 
over-specification. To improve the acquisition process, the 
Commission's recommendations included 1) shortening lines of 
communication, 2) identifying who is in charge (and 
responsible), 3) enlisting smaller, high-quality staffs, and 
4) emphasizing innovation, productivity, and smart business 
practices. 
The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act, enacted 11 
September 1986, echoed the same opinions. Instead of 
assigning responsibility to organizational bureaucracies, the 
Act identified and assigned responsibility to specific 
individuals. The Act outlined acquisition responsibilities to 
such positions as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Service 
Secretaries. Furthermore, the Act directed a major reduction 
in headquarters' staffs and congressionally mandated reports. 
The National Security Review 11 - Defense Management 
Report, issued on 12 June 1989, provided a process for 
selectively   implementing   the   Packard   Commission 
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recommendations and the Goldwater-Nichols requirements. The 
report provided a final catalyst for a two-year project to 
revise DoD acquisition regulations which culminated in the 
publication of the DoD "5000 Series." 
2.  Policy Objectives 
On 23 February 1991, the Department of Defense issued its 
most comprehensive acquisition reform policy to-date -- the 
"5000 Series" of acquisition regulations. The policy consists 
of three publications: 1) DoD Directive 5000.1 -- Defense 
Acquisition; 2) DoD Instruction 5000.2 -- Defense Acquisition 
Management Policies and Procedures, and 3) DoD Manual 5000.2M 
-- Defense Acquisition Management Documentation and Reports. 
Combined, these documents cancel more than 60 previous DoD 
directives, instructions, manuals, and memorandum. The three 
policy documents aspire to the following objectives: 
1. Impose a uniformed and disciplined management approach 
that procures systems which satisfy user needs. 
2. Implement the findings from the Defense Management 
Report; 
3. Consolidate and streamline procurement, in order to 
reduce procurement schedules; 
4. Integrate three major programmatic systems: the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; the 
Requirements Generation System, and Acquisition 
Management; 
5. Optimize total system performance with reduced life- 
cycle ownership costs. 
The fifth objective is the cornerstone of the DoD's new HSI 
policies. First, the policy expands the definition of a total 
system to include not merely prime mission equipment, but also 
1) the personnel who operate and maintain the system, 2) the 
logistics support structure for the system, and 3) other 
operational support elements affecting the system. Secondly, 
the policy cites ownership costs as a major consideration, 
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thereby shifting program focus from an initial cost basis 
(acquisition costs) to a life-cycle cost basis. Since "people 
costs" are the most expensive component of life-cycle costs, 
the "5000 Series" then strives to ensure that human factors 
are considered during all phases of the acquisition process. 
3.  DoD Policy 
The new DoD policy on human systems integration is 
established in DoD Instruction 5000.2, Part 7, Section B, 
Human System Integration, which replaced DoD Directive 
5000.53, "Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Safety (MPTS) in 
the Defense System Acquisition Process."  The policy states: 
Human considerations ... shall be effectively 
integrated into the design effort for defense 
systems to improve total system performance and 
reduce costs of ownership by focusing attention on 
the capabilities and limitations of the soldier, 
sailor, airman, or Marine. 
The human factors objectives, the policy continues, must be 
traceable to readiness, force structure, affordability, and 
wartime readiness. 
The policy delineates six human considerations to be 
integrated by program management: 1) human factors 
engineering; 2) manpower; 3) personnel; 4) training; 5) system 
safety and 6) health hazards. Appendix B defines the HSI 
terminology utilized in the 5000 Series. Human factors, and 
system safety, health hazards and environmental impact are 
also addressed separately in Part 6, Engineering and 
Manufacturing, sections H and I, respectively. To ensure 
compliance with the policy guidance, DoD Instruction 5000.2 
standardizes HSI documentation contents and formats for ACAT 
I programs process. Part 2, paragraph C.3 of the directive 
stipulates that acquisition procedures and documentation may 
be tailored for ACAT II through IV programs subject to the 
approval of the milestone decision authority. 
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The human factors objectives for systems are initially 
established at Milestone I, Concept Demonstration Approval, 
and subsequently refined and updated at successive milestone 
decision points.  From the outset, human system constraints 
are addressed in two basic requirement documents: the Mission 
Needs Statement  (MNS)  and the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD). The MNS establishes the manpower, personnel, 
training,  and safety constraints which may impact the 
development  of  a  system to  satisfy the user's  need. 
Reaffirming the MNS constraints, the ORD establishes MPTS 
objectives and thresholds. In addition, the ORD specifies the 
manpower and training methodologies to be used. The Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) also addresses human performance 
issues.  The TEMP provides data to validate that manpower, 
personnel, training, systems safety, and health hazard design 
requirements have been met. 
The heart of DoD's human systems integration policy is 
the Human System Integration Plan (HSIP) which is contained in 
the Integrated Program Summary (IPS) . The IPS is the primary 
decision document used for milestone review. The IPS 
summarizes the program status, identifies risk areas and plans 
for abating them, and provides a basis for cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives and thresholds. 
4.  The Risk Assessment Annex 
The Risk Assessment Annex is Annex D of the Integrated 
Program Summary. The annex is a portion of a program's 
overall risk management strategy which attempts to identify 
and manage areas of vulnerability or concern. Annex D 
describes the threat, technology, design and engineering 
support, manufacturing, cost and schedule risk assessment for 
all known or potential risks. The annex identifies the system 
component(s) or subsystem(s) which have moderate or higher 
risk.  The Annex is required to: 
28 
1. Summarize potential cost, schedule, and design risks 
that result from human systems integration factors; 
2. Highlight current human systems cost drivers. Discuss 
the manpower impact of the most promising alternative 
system(s) as compared to its predecessor or comparable 
systems; 
3. Discuss major cost, schedule, and performance trade- 
off decisions to be made by the Milestone Decision 
Authority for current or subsequent milestones. 
5.  HSIP Requirements 
Within the Risk Assessment Annex is the Human System 
Integration Plan. The HSIP requires the performance of seven 
functions: 
1. Identify critical human systems factors that have a 
significant impact on readiness, life-cycle cost, 
schedule, or performance. It should include potential 
cost, schedule, and design risks and trade-offs which 
concern human systems integration factors and plans to 
manage and reduce program risks; 
2. Discuss the manpower impact of the new system as 
compared to its predecessor or comparable system(s) and 
state the sources of the manpower resources for the new 
system; 
3. Discuss requirements for new occupational specialties, 
requirements for high quality personnel or "hard-to-fill" 
military and civilian occupations and how these personnel 
requirements will be met; 
4. Describe how human factors engineering will be applied 
to the system design effort; 
5. Summarize how safety and health hazard lessons learned 
are being applied to the new system; 
6. Address the training requirements and effectiveness of 
the new training system. It should include requirements 
for new or additional training resources and identify 
critical points in the training schedule; 
7. Discuss the impact of fielding the new system will 
have on unit readiness and whether the training base is 
adequate to meet surge and mobilization requirements. 
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Appendix C shows the prescribed format for the HSIP. 
6.  Policy Intent 
The driving force behind the HSI policy was DoD's 
intention for Program Managers to perform trade-off analyses 
between the six disciplines in an integrated manner to achieve 
enhanced total system performance while reducing life-cycle 
costs. Nina Richman-Loo, Program Analyst, HSI Division, 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, confirms that previous decisions regarding 
manpower, personnel, and training were separately evaluated or 
"stove-piped"  within  the  Services.     She  states: 
...although these disciplines were affected by 
acquisition and were impacted by acquisition, they 
had no play in the acquisition process. So, rather 
than having all these different 'stove-piped' 
activities, human systems integration attempted to 
bring all of these important players together and 
form an interface with the acquisition community. 
DoD's intention to evaluate and integrate the disciplines 
through trade-off analyses is further illustrated by the HSI 
model provided in DoD Instruction 5000.2, Part 7, Section B, 
and depicted in Figure 2-3. 
Finally, by locating the HSIP within the IPS rather than 
within the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP), DoD also 
signalled its intention to segregate and balance HSI and 
logistical concerns. HSI was established as a distinct 
segment of the risk management, rather than being grouped 
under logistical oversight. 
7.  Policy Reform 
In accordance with on-going acquisition reform and the 
Clinton administration's initiative to "reinvent government," 
Defense Secretary William J. Perry is leading an offense 
against the use of military standards and specifications in 
the military procurement process. In the last 15 years, more 
than 25 blue-ribbon panels and academic studies have 
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Figure 2-3  Department of Defense human systems integration 
model. (DODI 5000.2, 1991, p. B-2) 
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recommended ending the use of MIL-SPECS. Dr. Perry, a former 
Stanford University national security expert and defense 
industry executive, was involved in many of them. On 29 June 
1994, Perry set forth his policy. He directed the Armed 
Forces to acquire as many products and components as possible 
from the commercial marketplace. Commercial purchases are to 
be the rule, and procurement by MIL-SPEC is to be by exception 
only. 
Secretary Perry's directive states that acquisition 
officials must specify performance criteria for military 
equipment, rather than dictating exacting military 
specifications and standards. The initiative, Perry says, 
will save billions of dollars a year, and "fundamentally 
change the way we do business ... turning the present system 
upside down.» (Mintz, 1994, p. A29) Some purchases will still 
follow MIL-SPEC rules, such as highly classified programs and 
those requiring highly specialized components. 
The new policy will have significant repercussions on the 
establishment, direction, and supervision of human factors 
issues throughout the DoD procurement process. Previously, 
human factors practitioners relied extensively on MIL-STD- 
1472D, Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, 
Equipment, and Facilities, and MIL-STD-1800, Human Factors 
Engineering Performance Requirements for Systems, to delineate 
system design guidelines. With the curtailment of military 
specifications, standards, and Data Item Descriptions (DID), 
procurement officials will have to rigorously define and track 
the individual performance standards their system is to 
achieve. Performance criteria will have to be identified 
early in the development process for inclusion in contract 
negotiations. The risk of exclusion or omission of human 
factors criteria is heightened, according to a Human Factors 
Engineering Consultant to United Defense, L.P., in 
organizations which have not institutionalized systematic 
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approaches to human systems integration. 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Reform has also established three Process Action Teams to 
examine the acquisition process, acquisition documentation, 
milestones, and oversight. The recommendations of these teams 
are projected to further consolidate and streamline the 
current HSI procedures of the individual Services. 
D.  SUMMARY 
Human systems integrations is still in its infancy within 
the Department of Defense. DoD's HSI policies grew from the 
failure of the military services to adequately address MPTS 
issues during the rapid force modernization efforts of the 
Cold War. Two documents serve as landmarks in measuring the 
maturation of these policies; first is the GAO's critical 1981 
report, entitled "Effectiveness Can Be Increased Through 
Improved Weapon System Design," and second is the DoD 5000 
Series. 
The GAO report criticized DoD's production of military 
systems that could not be adequately operated, maintained, or 
supported. The report credited the blame to the 
organizational culture in which pressures to attain specific 
performance goals within tight time and cost constraints often 
led management to trade-off or otherwise not give adequate 
attention to long-term ownership considerations. Following 
its publication, DoD moved to strengthen and balance human 
considerations against cost, schedule, and performance 
criteria in the development of weapon systems. 
Responding to Congressional calls for acquisition reform, 
the 5000 Series formalized DoD's HSI requirements throughout 
the Armed Forces. DoD mandated that Program Managers 
establish and execute a Human Systems Integration Plan to 
adequately address the six human factors disciplines. The 
policy's intent was to eliminate "stove-piped" staffing of 
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human considerations, in favor of full integration of the 
disciplines. The policy sought to establish a forum for the 
identification, documentation, and informed consideration of 
human issues. 
To what degree DoD has achieved its policy objectives can 
be best measured by evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Service HSI programs developed and operating under its 
guidance. To this end, Chapters III and IV will examine the 
HSI policies, procedures, and organizations of the Marine 
Corps and Army, respectively. Chapters V and VI will then 
analyze the effects of these HSI programs on the procurement 
of major and non-major ground combat weapons in both Services. 
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III. THE MARINE CORPS HUMAN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps' unique acquisition policies, 
procedures, and organizational structure are the result of 
numerous internal and external forces. First and foremost, as 
a component of the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps is 
subject to the acquisition policy guidance set forth by both 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
the Navy. Secondly, due to funding and organizational 
constraints, the majority of the Marine Corps' major 
acquisition programs are conducted in coordination with the 
U.S. Army and Navy. Thus, the Marine Corps is formally and 
informally influenced by the operating procedures of its 
sister Services. Finally, the Marine Corps acquisition 
process is molded by the decisions of the Service's senior 
acquisition officials, as well as the normal day-to-day 
operating procedures and relationships established in the 
execution of acquisition responsibilities. Consequently, 
before the Marine Corps' HSI program can be evaluated in 
application, the forces which influenced its development and 
current status must first be identified and analyzed. 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
1.  The U.S. Navy HARDMAN Program 
As early as 1962 the Department of the Navy recognized 
the role of human factors within the acquisition process with 
the publication of MIL-H-22174. By 1965, the Navy initiated 
a formal human factors program with the publication of MIL-H- 
81444, which mandated human factors engineering plans and 
specified programs. However, in the late-1970's the focus of 
the Navy's HSI efforts shifted to the reform of its manpower, 
training and personnel (MPT) bureaucracy, which was assessed 
by the Salzer Study in 1976 as being the "weak sister" of the 
Service's management structure. The subsequent evolution of 
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the Navy's MPT program provides a historical backdrop to the 
Marine Corps' HSI program, as well as a unique case study of 
ineffectual HSI program implementation. 
In response to Congressional pressure and a growing 
concern that technological innovations were outpacing MPT 
capabilities, the Navy contracted for a Military Manpower 
Versus Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN) Study in 1977. The 
HARDMAN study documented that "there has been a continuing 
concern on the part of Navy planners with respect to their 
capability to adequately anticipate as well as meet the 
manpower and training requirements associated with ... 700 
different Navy projects involving approximately $90 billion in 
procurement" (Weedle, 1983, p.124). Therefore, the goal of 
the research was to analyze the compatibility of the manpower 
and training requirements determination functions with the 
Weapons Systems Acquisition Process (WASP), the 
institutionalized setting in which all man/machine or 
capital/labor tradeoffs must occur. (CNO, 1977, p. l) 
The study concluded that manpower/hardware trade-offs 
occurred too late in the acquisition process, and that key 
participants lacked incentives with respect to determining and 
ensuring visibility for manpower and training requirements. 
In an effort to rectify these conditions, the study presented 
the following recommendations: 
• Establishment of a HARDMAN Project Office to ensure 
manpower issues are properly integrated into the WSAP; 
• Development of hardware /manpower trade-off capabilities 
to support early identification of manpower 
requirements; 
• Implementation of analytical tools and review 
procedures to support HARDMAN functions; 
• Institution of a reporting and control system for 
HARDMAN functions. 
The study resulted in the development of the Military 
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Manpower/Hardware Integration (HARDMAN) Master Plan in 1979, 
and a draft HARDMAN program in 19 83. The program's goal was 
the formation of models and data bases to analyze new system 
designs in terms of their human resource needs. In order to 
save research and development time and money, the necessary- 
analytical tools were derived from an earlier program, 
entitled Coordinated Human Resource Technology (CHRT), 
sponsored by the Air Force Human Resource Laboratory. The 
Navy methodology capitalized on the lessons learned from the 
CHRT project, added greater dimension to its analytic 
capability, and tailored its products to the technical and 
managerial information needs of the acquisition work-force. 
Following contractor testing of HARDMAN on nine weapon 
system development programs from March 1983 to May 1985, the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approved implementation of 
HARDMAN throughout the Navy for all new major and non-major 
programs originating after 1 October 1985. OPNAVINST 5311.7 
of 12 August 1985 directed HARDMAN use on all programs, ACAT 
I through IV. The HARDMAN program required Program Mangers 
to: 
• Complete a HARDMAN MPT Concept Document describing how 
personnel would operate a typical weapon unit; 
• Complete a HARDMAN MPT Resource Requirements Document 
detailing the number and skills of personnel needed to 
use and maintain the weapon during its life-cycle; 
• Establish a HARDMAN Advisory Board to validate the MPT 
estimates and advise the project manager on suggested 
design concept changes; 
• Make trade-offs between hardware designs and personnel 
number and skills. 
Despite its initial promise, the HARDMAN program failed 
to achieve the successful integration of MPT considerations 
into the acquisition process. The Auditor General of the Navy 
reported in 1987 that of 75 programs selected for audit, only 
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two were fully using HARDMAN. Nineteen of 20 ACAT I and II 
projects reviewed had received Milestone I approval without 
completing HARDMAN. The report concluded that the HARDMAN 
program was ineffective because of its limited use and 
incomplete development, and consequently the MPT problems it 
was designed to address remained unsolved. (Auditor General, 
1988, p. i) 
Program managers were criticized in the report for not 
employing the HARDMAN program to perform trade-off analyses 
before the Navy had become deeply committed to a specific 
weapon system design. In response, the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) stated that HARDMAN produced an excess and 
redundant burden on PMs, and that the documentation was 
perceived as not required. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 
personnel stated that they were unaware of the requirement, 
while Naval Space Systems Command (SPAWAR) personnel cited 
lack of program awareness or confusion about HARDMAN's 
importance prior to concept development. Despite the 
requirements of OPNAVINST 5311.7, many PMs expressed the 
belief that HARDMAN did not apply because their programs were 
up-grades or modifications of older systems, "off-the-shelf" 
or non-developmental systems, or ACAT III or IV projects. 
The results of the Auditor General's report and 
subsequent interviews with DoD acquisition personnel emphasize 
lack of commitment by senior Naval officials as a key factor 
in the ineffectual implementation of the HARDMAN program. The 
study criticized the Chief of Naval Operations specifically on 
two points: first, for not integrating HARDMAN into the key 
Navy acquisition instructions, and secondly, for not 
formalizing administrative controls to monitor HARDMAN use. 
In short, the study chastises the Navy for providing "lip- 
service" to the HARDMAN program by failing to provide guidance 
or incentives for its performance. The implications of the 
study are that the HARDMAN program was not actively supported, 
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promoted, or enforced by senior Naval officials, and therefore 
was never institutionalized into the acquisition process. 
Research interviews reveal that this situation remains 
unchanged. Numerous acquisition personnel emphasized that to 
date no senior Naval official has actively championed the 
HARDMAN program or similar HSI efforts. One senior HSI 
practitioner stated that the HARDMAN program lacked "high- 
level visibility and proponency, which is absolutely 
essential." HARDMAN, he noted, has become merely a 
bureaucratic exercise, predisposed to fail. 
On-going attempts to revise the HARDMAN program and to 
obtain organizational commitment currently continue. A report 
prepared for the CNO in April 1994 by the Naval Aviation 
Maintenance Office documents the current efforts to streamline 
the suite of nine HARDMAN methodology manuals into a more 
accessible Training Planning Process Methodology (TRPPM). 
Although HARDMAN does not encompass safety and health hazards 
issues, as DoD Instruction 5000.2 requires, the report 
nonetheless states that at present the only documented 
procedures the Navy has which will fulfill the DoD 
requirements are contained in the HARDMAN Methodology. 
Optimistically, it states that if HARDMAN methodology 
procedures are timely and aggressively applied with the proper 
spirit and intent, they would fulfill the requirements of DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, produce an MPT-efficient system, and 
provide a valuable audit trail. Yet realistically, it warns 
that if the procedures are compromised or not enforced it is 
questionable whether the DoD requirements will be met and the 
resulting weapon system's MPT requirements may be less than 
optimum. 
While the HARDMAN program began as a proactive and 
innovative effort to address critical MPT issues in the 
procurement of increasingly technical weapon systems, its full 
potential was never realized.   The program lacked the 
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necessary commitment of senior management to foster its 
advancement and service-wide institutionalization. 
Consequently, HARDMAN, while providing an effective 
methodology for MPT analysis, failed to mature into a human 
systems integration program. 
2.  Foundation of the Marine Corps HSI Program 
The Marine Corps' HSI efforts evolved from the shadows of 
the HARDMAN program.  In 1987, the Marine Corps received a 
critical report from the GAO, entitled "Improvements Needed in 
Processes for Determining Manpower Requirements."  With the 
Marine Corps expending $5.3 billion or approximately 58 
percent of its total budget on personnel costs in fiscal year 
1987, the report argued that the Marine Corps needed to 
determine its manpower requirements in as systematic a manner 
as possible.  Instead, the GAO found that the Marine Corps 
procedures used to determine manpower requirements lacked 
adequate rigor and that there existed insufficient oversight 
of the manpower program. The report cited that too often 
manpower standards were based on the judgment of Marine Corps 
officials or on formulas of undeterminable origin.   One 
recommendation emanating from the report was that the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps issue guidance governing the 
development  and  application  of  manpower  determination 
processes and require systematic management oversight.  DoD 
concurred with this proposal. 
In its efforts to control expanding MPT issues in the 
acquisition process, the Marine Corps availed itself to the 
Navy HARDMAN program, and tailored it to suit the Marine Corps 
requirements and organizational structure. The HARDMAN 
methodology became and continues to be the focal point of the 
Marine Corps HSI program. Because it addresses and integrates 
two of the major issues confronting senior Marine Corps 
officials over the last two decades -- manpower management and 
training effectiveness -- HARDMAN analysis has received the 
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lion's share of attention from among the HSI disciplines. Due 
to this emphasis, HARDMAN has become a cultural icon for HSI 
within the Marine Corps' organizational culture. Even though 
human factors engineering, and health hazards and system 
safety analyses are performed separately, numerous acquisition 
personnel continue to equate HARDMAN methodology with the 
execution of human systems integration. During numerous 
interviews, Marine Corps acquisition personnel used the terms 
HARDMAN, HSI, and MANPRINT interchangeably to describe methods 
of fulfilling DoD's HSI requirement. 
Like the Navy, the Marine Corps has yet to have a senior 
Marine official champion the cause of human systems 
integration within the acquisition process. Hence, in keeping 
with the findings of the Navy Auditor General's report, the 
Marine Corps acquisition community still lacks clearly defined 
guidance and incentives for the performance of HSI. Whereas 
the DoD established its HSI requirements in February 1991, the 
Marine Corps did not issue its implementation order, Marine 
Corps Order 5000.22, until August 1994. In the interim, HSI 
requirements were applied at the discretion of and according 
to the interpretation of the Program Manager or supporting 
Logistical Engineering Manager (LEM) . Therefore, to clarify 
the Marine Corps HSI policies and procedures, the next two 
sections will construct a model of the current HSI program 
based on an analysis of the agencies and organizational 
relationships involved therein. 
C.  ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW 
1.  General 
Responding to the evolutionary DoD acquisition process, 
the Marine Corps began the formalization of its combat 
development process (CDP) in November 1987, with the creation 
of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the 
Marine  Research,  Development,  and  Acquisition  Command 
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(MCRDAC). MCRDAC was subsequently redesignated as the Marine 
Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) in 1992. 
Publication of the revised DoD 5000 Series provided 
guidelines to the Services to more closely link the functions 
of requirements determination and material acquisition. 
Subsequently, according to MCO P3900.15, "Marine Corps Combat 
Development Process, " the Marine Corps modeled its process for 
the development of doctrine, organization, training and 
education, and facilities and support requirements after the 
process mandated by the DoD 5000 Series. 
The organizational structure for the Marine Corps 
acquisition process is based on a triad of inter- 
relationships. The organizational elements are Headquarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC), MCCDC, and MARCORSYSCOM. Figure 3-1 
highlights the key functions and inter-relationships of each 
of these organizations in the material acquisition process. 
At the intersection of their responsibilities is the mission 
to efficiently and effectively man, equip, and fund the 
operations of the Fleet Marine Force. The following two 
sections briefly outline the organizational roles of HQMC and 
MCCDC as they affect the acquisition process, while the third 
section details the operational responsibilities and 
procedures of MARCORSYSCOM. 
2.  Headquarters Marine Corps 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps holds ultimate 
responsibility for the combat development acquisition process. 
Within the acquisition process, HQMC is primarily responsible 
for program development and integration, logistics and 
facilities management, and manpower management. In is in the 
role of manpower and personnel manager that HQMC influences 
human systems integration. Specifically, it is the Deputy 



















Figure 3-1 Functional inter-relationship of HQMC, MCCDC, 
and MARCORSYSCOM. (U.S.M.C., 1993, P. 7) 
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who acts as the Commandant's representative in performing 
Marine Corps-level structure sponsorship functions. The DC/S 
M&RA's responsibilities include the following: 
1. Manages the Table of Manpower Requirements data base; 
2. Assists CG MCCDC and COMMARCORSYSCOM in developing 
manpower and personnel requirements in support of the 
systems acquisition process; 
3. Provides input as required by CG MCCDC on manpower 
related issues developed during the CDP; 
4. Coordinates with CG MCCDC on Joint Service 
considerations related to manpower issues in the Marine 
Corps Master Plan and other internal Marine Corps plans. 
Previously, HQMC was also responsible for Marine Corps ground 
safety analysis. In October 1993, this function was assumed 
by the Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, VA. 
3.  Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
Located at MCB Quantico, VA, MCCDC was restructured from 
elements of MCRDAC in late 1987. The CG MCCDC is responsible 
to the CMC for the implementation, execution, and management 
of the combat development process. General responsibilities 
include coordination with HQMC, MARCORSYSCOM, field command 
and Marine Reserve Forces on matters pertaining to combat 
development. Relevant to this study are the following 
development responsibilities: 
1. Determine, staff, and validate operational 
requirements for doctrine, organization, training and 
education, equipment, and facilities and support; 
2. Monitor the execution of the programs designed to 
achieve war-fighting capabilities; 
3. Assist COMMARCORSYSCOM in the focus of long-range 
research and development of equipment. 
Initially,   MCCDCs   functional   responsibilities  were 
consolidated into three organizations: the Training and 
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Education Center, the Warfighting Center; and the Support 
Center. The first two organizations were directly involved in 
the requirements determination/validation and acquisition 
process. The Warfighting Center acted as the operational 
proponent of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). It was tasked with 
the development of the ORD and Concept of Employment documents 
for new weapons systems. Alternately, the Training and 
Education Center conducted the development of related training 
requirements and plans in reaction to the evolution of 
tactical and equipment changes identified by the Warfighting 
Center. This included the creation of training packages, 
identification of formal schools and associated facility 
support, management and oversight of the schools and their 
courses of instruction, and development of individual training 
standards. 
Upon assuming command of MCCDC in 1991, Lieutenant 
General Charles C. Krulak reorganized the MCCDC. The 
organizational structure of the command was reconfigured from 
three to ten sub-units. Figure 3-2 illustrates the current 
organizational structure. Five organizations now report 
directly to the CG MCCDC on requirements determination and 
validation and the acquisition process: Training and Education 
Division; Doctrine Division; Warfighting Development and 
Integration Division; Requirements Division, and Concepts and 
Plans Division. The effects of this reorganization still 
impact the Marine Corps HSI program as practitioners reconfirm 
and realign operational relationships and responsibilities. 
Several program management and support personnel interviewed 
for this research expressed confusion or doubt concerning 
which agency actually represented the needs of the operational 
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Marine Corps  Combat Development Command 
organizational  structure.    (U.S.M.C.,   1993, 
P-   36) 
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4.  Marine Corps Systems Command 
Marine Corps Systems Command bears primary responsibility 
for oversight and management of the acquisition process. The 
command is chartered with the responsibility of taking the 
requirement validated by MCCDC and producing the appropriate 
weapon system or equipment. MARCORSYSCOM oversees the 
contractual, analytic, and planning requirements for system 
development, procurement, and fielding. Further, it 
coordinates with other services which may have "lead Service" 
responsibilities for development of multi-Service systems. 
The responsibility, authority, and accountability for all 
Marine Corps acquisition programs resides with the Commander 
MARCORSYSCOM. She plans and manages Marine Corps acquisition 
programs and implements DoD acquisition policy within the 
Marine Corps. The Commanding General reports directly to the 
CMC. As the Program Executive Officer for the Marine Corps, 
she also reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN, RD&A) regarding 
acquisition matters.  Specific responsibilities include: 
1. Serve as sole organization responsible for the 
execution of program management during the RD&A process 
and for life-cycle management of all ground tactical 
weapon systems and equipment; 
2. Coordinate with CG MCCDC to ensure that acquisition 
programs are developed to fulfill validated requirements; 
3. Provide the Life-Cycle Cost Analysis, projecting the 
total cost to the Government of a system, to include the 
cost of development, acquisition, operation, support, and 
where applicable, disposal. 
Figure 3-3 depicts the current organizational structure 
designed to support the Commander in the execution of her 
duties. The responsibilities of the agencies directly 
involved in the performance of human systems analysis are 
summarized below. 
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Under the direction of the Executive Director, the 
Program Analysis and Evaluation Office (PA&E) provides support 
to the Commander in her role as Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) by conducting assessments of acquisition programs and 
processes. Further, the PA&E Office provides support to the 
Commander in her role of COMMARCORSYSCOM by assisting in the 
preparation of programs for review by ASN (RDA) and by acting 
as the focal point for implementing ASN acquisition policy. 
The office is tasked with the following functions: 
1. Manage the Program Review process with the Command. 
Conduct follow-up review to ensure the accomplishment of 
taskings by the Commander; 
2. Coordinate the conduct of Marine Corps Decision 
Meetings, to include the preparation of the Integrated 
Program Assessment; 
3. Maintain centralized records documenting the progress 
of each program in achieving milestone decisions; 
4. Assist PMs in developing acquisition strategies and in 
tailoring these strategies and related program 
documentation. 
The PA&E office maintains oversight authority to ensure that 
material requirements documents accurately describe achievable 
and testable hardware solutions to mission deficiencies. 
Within MARCORSYSCOM there are 11 program management 
offices organized by operational area of system employment and 
further sub-divided into project teams. The mission of the PM 
is to plan, budget, execute and administer the RD&A, fielding, 
and life-cycle support of assigned equipment and weapon 
systems. Forty-one common functions are assigned to the PMs. 
They are personally tasked to "insure that human factors and 
man-machine interface are integral parts of system design." 
Within the program offices an Integrated Logistics Support 
(ILS) Manager is responsible for the oversight of ILS issues 
within the separate projects. 
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The PM, Ground Weapons, maintains oversight 
responsibility for 20 separate procurement programs/ 
projects.4 The PM is assisted in his duties by seven 
Assistant PMs (APM) responsible for infantry weapons, anti- 
armor weapons, tank systems, fire support systems, directed 
energy systems, amphibious/raid systems, and maintenance. The 
PM, Ground Weapons, is unique among MARCORSYSCOM PMs in that 
he maintains a designated billet for a MANPRINT Specialist to 
perform human systems integration and coordination on joint 
Army-Marine Corps acquisition programs. The billet is manned 
by a Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) trained in U.S. Army MANPRINT 
principles and procedures. Presently, no replacement is 
slated to fill this billet upon its vacancy in September 1994. 
Matrix support for the execution of human systems 
analysis is divided between two MARCORSYSCOM organizations: 
the Program Support Directorate (PS) and Program Manager, 
Training Systems (PM, SST). 
The Program Support Directorate is available to the PMs 
for logistical, technical, and analytical expertise, service 
and support. Figure 3-4 diagrams the organizational structure 
of PS. The MARCORSYSCOM Organizational Manual P5400.1A does 
not formally mention or assign responsibility for human 
factors engineering within the PS Directorate. Instead, human 
factors engineering is loosely assigned to general engineers 
assigned within the Product Assurance and Maintenance 
Engineering Section of the Systems Engineering Branch. These 
personnel are responsible for the reliability and 
maintainability of selected weapons systems and equipment. 
The systems safety and health hazards functions are housed in 
the Configuration Management and Systems Safety Section. 
These personnel are responsible for the disciplines of systems 
4
 At the time of this research the PM, Ground Weapons, 
managed two ACAT I programs, eight ACAT III programs, and ten 
ACAT IV program. 
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safety engineering, safety certification, and environmental 
and pollution prevention. 
Manpower, personnel, and training support is afforded to 
the PMs on an as requested basis through the Program Manager, 
Training Systems. Figure 3-5 illustrates the Training Systems 
Program Management Office's organizational structure. The 
Manpower and Training Branch is tasked to support the PMs by 
performing the following functions: 
1. Validate program personnel requirements by MOS and 
grade through coordination with HQMC, MCCDC, and the FMF; 
2. Evaluate the impact of maintenance and operational 
concepts on the planner number of operators and 
maintainers; 
3. Evaluate the cost and effectiveness of the training 
concept; 
4. Ensure that necessary personnel and equipment for 
schools to properly train operators and maintainers are 
identified; 
5. Validate life-cycle training costs; 
6. Ensure training development is in accordance with the 
MCCDC Systems Approach to Training through close 
coordination with MCCDC, formal schools, and the FMF in 
the training development process. 
The Manpower and Training Branch is composed of four Training 
Logistical Engineering Managers (LEM), two Manpower LEMs and 
a Branch Head. Prior to October 1993, the Branch was an 
organizational sub-unit within the PS Directorate. However, 
in 1993, a Structure Planning Group was directed by the 
Commander, MARCORSYSCOM, to review program management and 
support offices performing like functions for possible 
consolidations. The Group's recommendation, which was 
subsequently implemented, was to reorganize the Manpower and 
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Figure 3-5 Training Systems Program Management Office 
organizational structure. (MARC0RSYSC0M, 
1994, p. 2-7) 
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The objective of the action was to increase the organizational 
emphasis on training and training systems. Thus, the Training 
Systems Program Office is tasked with a dichotomous mission: 
management of the acquisition of non-standard training 
equipment and performance of program MPT evaluations. To 
date, no effort has been made to identify or track the 
benefits or drawbacks resulting from this consolidation. 
Despite the capabilities of the PS Directorate and the 
Manpower and Training Branch, the PMs are under no requirement 
to utilize these command assets. With the exception of Legal 
Council, the PMs may obtain technical support from whatever 
internal or external sources they deem necessary. Policy 
Statement No. 1-90 limits the PMs "only by their mandates to 
stay within approved funding and personnel ceilings; to stay 
within the law and the policy of higher authorities; and to 
use resources wisely and efficiently without duplication or 
conflict of interest." (CG MCRDAC, 1990 p. 1) This policy 
statement clearly expresses the underlying philosophy of the 
Marine Corps acquisition process. It states that "it is 
essential the Program Managers have full authority, 
responsibility and accountability for all aspects of their 
programs." (CG MCRDAC, 1990, p. 1) 
D.  COMBAT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
1.  Identification of Need 
Once a warfighting deficiency has been assessed as 
requiring a material solution, a mission needs statement (MNS) 
is drafted by the CG MCCDC. It is then staffed, forwarded for 
approval to the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(ACMC), and returned to MCCDC for registration in the 
Requirements Catalog. 
At Milestone I the operational requirements document 
(ORD) is developed, specifically defining the system's 
requirements necessary to address the material deficiency. A 
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cost-and-operational-effectiveness analysis (COEA) is 
considered in the development of the ORD. Other analyses may 
also be required to include a reliability, availability, and 
maintainability analysis, a mission profile analysis, and a 
combat active replacement factor analysis. Drafted and 
staffed by the CG MCCDC, ORDs then are approved by the ACMC. 
An ORD provides the vehicle for the solution to enter the 
acquisition system at either the MARCORSYSCOM for Marine Corps 
funded programs or one of the Navy System Commands for Navy 
funded programs. CG MCCDC then works in coordination with 
COMMARCORSYSCOM and, for Navy programs, DC/S Plans, Policy and 
Operations (PP&O) for the life of the program to ensure that 
acquisition decisions consistently reflect warfighting 
requirement priorities. 
SECNAVINST 5400.15 assigns responsibility of the life- 
cycle management of Marine Corps weapons and equipment to the 
COMMARCORSYSCOM. The system life-cycle originates when an 
acquisition program is initiated and continues until the 
system is retired from the inventory. Life-cycle management 
applies to a system over its entire life, with emphasis on 
strengthening early decisions which shape costs and utility. 
Life-cycle management includes the acquisition of additional 
systems, the acquisition of spare parts, configuration control 
of the fielded systems, modification of the systems, 
acquisition/modification of requisite training devices that 
support fielded systems, the collection and analysis of 
maintenance data, and disposal of the system once it is 
retired from inventory. 
2. Acquisition Management Profile 
During the period of this study, the COMMARCORSYSCOM was 
responsible for the acquisition of 99 systems and the 
modification of two existing systems. In addition, the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program was being 
conducted under direct-reporting procedures to the Assistant 
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Secretary of the Navy. Figures 3-6 through 3-9 graphically 
depict the division of current Marine Corps procurement 
programs by acquisition category and lead Service. 




Frequency  Distribution CN=1DD3 
\ / / /\\\\\ 
ACAT  Category 
Figure 3-6  Frequency distribution of Marine Corps 
acquisition programs by ACAT category. 
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TOTAL ACQUISITION PROGRAMS CACAT I - I V} 
Distribution by  Lead  Service CN=1Q03 
AIR   FORCE CN=33   C3.0?O 
ARMY   CN=S13   C^IOSO 
NAVY   CN="0   C1 -0*0 
USMC  CN=7SJ   C75.09O 
Figure 3-7  Total Marine Corps acquisition programs 
distributed by lead service. 
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MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
ACAT   l/li   Distribution  CN=123 
AIR   FORCE   CN=2} 
USMC   CN=2J   C16.7SQ 
NAVY   CN=13   C8.3SK3 
ARMY  CN=7J   C58.39Q 
Figure 3-8  Marine Corps ACAT I/II acquisition programs 
distributed by lead service. 
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MARINE CORPS ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
ACAT   I 11/IV   Distribution   CN=aS3 
AIR   FORCE  CN=13   C11»0 
ARMY   CN=143   05.9*0 
NAVY  CN=D3   CD.O«i 
USMC CN=73J  C83. OSO 
Figure 3-9 Marine Corps ACAT III/IV acquisition programs 
distributed by lead service. 
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Of special note is the fact that 21 programs are being 
procured by the U.S. Army as lead Service, and are thereby 
directed in their HSI efforts by the MANPRINT program. 
3.  Human Systems Integration Procedures 
During the course of this research it became apparent 
that the Marine Corps did not possess published policies, 
directives, or instructions for the performance of human 
systems analysis.  Because the organizational philosophy of 
MARCORSYSCOM considers each program unique, and thus allows 
Program Managers the authority to tailor the acquisition 
process to the particular needs of their programs, no HSI 
standard operating procedures currently exist. 
Not until the publication of MCO 5000.22, "Implementation 
of Defense Acquisition Management Policies,  Procedures, 
Documentation and Reports," in August 1994, did the Marine 
Corps clarify its implementation of the requirements set forth 
by DoD Instruction 5000.2 and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) 
Instruction 5000.2A. The order made no refinements to Part 7, 
Section B, Human Systems Integration, and therefore mandated 
application of HSI to all ACAT categories, I through IV. Prior 
to this reaffirmation of policy, the consensus among program 
management and support personnel was that HSI did not apply to 
non-major programs or was not applicable to the same degree. 
Hence, little or no human systems analysis was conducted on 75 
current Marine Corps unique non-major procurement programs. 
For programs that did implement human factors analysis, 
analysis and HSIP development were normally contracted to 
civilian contractors. The cost to the PM for an HSIP is 
estimated at $90,000. Since the Marine Corps operates no 
defense technology laboratories, the PMs are compelled to rely 
on other Department of Defense laboratories, such as the Naval 
Air Warfare Center or the Army Human Research Lab, or similar 
commercial facilities for the conduct of HSI research. 
Presently, the Logistics Appraisal is the only review 
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process operated within MARCORSYSCOM to evaluate program 
consideration of human factors issues. Conducted prior to 
Milestone I, II, and III decision reviews,5 the appraisal's 
stated purpose is to provide a systematic method for ensuring 
that logistics are adequately planned, managed, and executed 
during each phase of an acquisition program. Appraisals are 
conducted by one of two methods; the Logistics Assessment 
Review (LAR) or the Logistics Review Group (LRG). The LAR is 
a condensed appraisal conducted by the Integrated Logistics 
Support Management Team (ILSMT) in two to three weeks. 
The LRG is a formal appraisal conducted by an independent 
assessment team in four to five weeks. The Logistics Review 
Group (LRG) is co-chaired by the Director, PS, and a 
representative from CMC (Logistics). The assessment team is 
headed by a Program Support senior logistician and consists of 
HQMC logistics personnel, Manpower, Personnel, and Training 
LEMs, Program Support engineering representatives, and Marine 
Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA, support personnel,. 
In the first stage of an appraisal program acquisition 
documentation related to logistics issues are staffed to the 
various members of the assessment team. The group 
subsequently meets to discuss, resolve, and classify the 
findings of their independent reviews.6 The appraisal 
results in a "certification" that the program is logistically 
5
 The point when a recommendation is made and approval 
sought regarding starting or continuing (proceeding to next 
phase) an acquisition program. Milestones are 0 (Concept 
Studies Approval) , I (Concept Demonstration) , II ( Development 
Approval), III (Production Approval), and IV (Major 
Modification Approval). 
6
 Findings can receive one of three classifications: 1) 
Critical -- will cause non-certification of the program unless 
corrected; 2) Major -- will not cause non-certification by 
itself but an accumulation of these could, and 3) Minor -- 
errors, such as format, verbiage, typographical mistakes, 
minor technical errors, etc. 
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supportable, otherwise a Program of Action and Milestones 
(POA&M) is issued for the correction of deficiencies noted 
during the review. An executive summary is then forwarded to 
the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, for review and 
presentation to the Acquisition Decision Authority. In 
theory, failure to achieve certification due to HSI findings 
can halt or delay program progression in the acquisition 
cycle. Personal interviews and review of recent LARs, 
revealed no record of Milestone Approval being withheld or 
delayed. 
As Milestone Decision Authority, the COMMARCORSYSCOM 
personally reviews each program prior to authorizing Milestone 
Approval.  The PM or Project Officer presents his program's 
status and relevant issues at a Marine Corps Program Decision 
Meeting (MCPDM) prior to each milestone.  Coordinated by the 
Director, PA&E, the MCPDM includes the presentation of an 
Independent  Program Assessment,  summarizing the program 
reviews performed by both internal and external agencies. 
MCPDM attendance is tailored according to the magnitude of the 
program.  At a minimum, key participants typically included 
COMMARCORSYSCOM, the PM/PO, the PA&E Director, and the PS 
Director.   The MCPDM provides a formal  forum for the 
discussion of program strengths and deficiencies.   The 
Commander's Milestone Decision and subsequent taskings are 
then disseminated in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) . 
The Director, PA&E, is responsible to conduct follow-up review 
to ensure the accomplishment of Commander's MCPDM taskings. 
E.  SUMMARY 
While acknowledging the need for consideration of human 
issues in the acquisition process, the Marine Corps has 
applied limited effort to the development of an HSI program. 
Following the Navy's lead, the Marine Corps adopted the 
HARDMAN methodology to correct identified MPT deficiencies. 
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However, lacking further proponency by senior Marine Corps 
officials, the HSI program expanded only marginally beyond its 
initial MPT foundation, and then primarily in response to the 
requirements levied by DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
Competing with cost, schedule, and performance, human 
systems integration is the responsibility of the Program 
Manager. MARCORSYSCOM does not maintain a consolidated HSI 
organization to support, supervise, or review the performance 
of HSI. Instead, cognizance for the HSI disciplines is 
divided between the Program Support Directorate and the 
Manpower and Training Branch. Further, PMs are under no 
obligation to seek nor utilize their input. Instead, human 
systems analysis, when applied, is accomplished through the 
"stove-piped" staffing of acquisition documents for review. 
The sole constraint imposed on Program Managers is the 
requirement to obtain program certification from the PA&E 
Directorate prior to MCPDM and Milestone Approval. Based on 
LAR findings and documentation reviews, certification only 
partially addresses the six HSI disciplines. 
With only limited organizational guidance, oversight, and 
support, the effectiveness of the Marine Corps' HSI program is 
contingent on the initiative and efforts of the Program 
Management Office. Because of its decentralized nature, the 
HSI program can best be evaluated in the light of its 
application to specific acquisition programs. Thus, following 
a parallel review of the Army's MANPRINT program in Chapter 
IV, this thesis will analyze the AAAV and Predator programs to 
extrapolate generalizations on the inherent strengths and 
weaknesses of the Marine Corps' current HSI program. 
63 
64 
IV.  THE U.S. ARMY MANPRINT PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Army's HSI program, MANPRINT, like its Marine 
Corps counterpart, was born from Congressional, DoD, and 
Service dissatisfaction with the inability of technologically 
advanced modernization efforts to achieve projected levels of 
performance. But, whereas the Marine Corps' HSI program was 
built on the framework established by DoD Instruction 5000.2, 
the Army's MANPRINT program was the foundation on which the 
DoD framework was constructed. 
Prior to testing its current application, the soundness 
of the MANPRINT structure must first be analyzed. In 
developing a blueprint of the MANPRINT program, the internal 
and external factors which influenced its development will be 
outlined. Then, its current policies, procedures, and 
organizational infrastructure will be examined to identify its 
structural strengths and flaws. 
B. BACKGROUND 
From the 1960's through the 1980's, the Army initiated a 
major modernization effort in response to the Soviet Cold War 
threat. Hundreds of new and technologically complex weapon 
systems were introduced to generate increased combat power 
despite fiscal and manpower constraints. However, greater 
reliance on technology precipitated two persistent problems. 
First, overall system performance often failed to achieve 
predicted standards when employed in operational use. For 
example, the Dragon anti-armor missile system, which was 
designed for 90 percent chance of first-round hit, was 
actually producing only 30 to 50 percent accuracy when 
integrated with a soldier. Secondly, the replacement of a 
fielded weapon with a more technologically complex system 
frequently generated requirements for increased numbers of 
higher-skilled soldiers to both operate and maintain the 
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System. Consequently, the Army was compelled to recruit 
higher-skilled personnel, expand training programs and 
training funding, and increase force end-strength. In the 
1960's, Dr. John Weisz, Director, U.S. Army Human Engineering 
Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, identified the 
problem, asserting that: 
We can no longer afford to develop equipment and 
merely hope that the necessary manpower can be 
found to man it and/or be trained to man it in a 
relatively short time. Cost of training and, 
especially, time available for such training on a 
mass basis may not permit such selection and 
training under wartime conditions (Adams, 1989, 
p.24). 
Awareness of the detrimental situation expanded 
throughout the 1970's. The Army Material and Readiness 
Command responded in November 1978 by instructing program 
managers and development commands to prepare human factors 
engineering analysis for presentation at the preliminary 
review of each Army Selected Acquisition Review Council 
(ASARC) milestone. 
In 19 80, Generals Walter T. Kerwin and George S. 
Blanchard raised concerns about mobilization, readiness, and 
sustainability brought on by the increases in weapons 
complexity. They concluded that human performance assessments 
were often not integrated and made too late to influence the 
weapons systems acquisition process. The following examples 
illustrate the human systems integration deficiencies 
confronting the Army during that period: 
1. One Army division could have as many as 47 different 
types of generators, yet the Army had no MOS for 
generator mechanic; 
2. The proliferation of highly sophisticated computers in 
new weapon systems was so extreme that the Fire Control 
Computer Repairmen, MOS 34G, were tasked with the 
maintenance of 31 different systems; 
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3. From 1978 to 1982, the unit manpower requirement for 
the Patriot air defense system had grown by over 15 
percent from 608 to 705 personnel. 
As initial fielding of the major modernization programs 
progressed, the Army personnel community experienced problems 
in their ability to recruit the number and quality of 
personnel necessary to maintain the force. While recruiting 
levels improved in 19 80's, a need still existed to recruit 
more and higher "quality" people who would be able to operate 
and maintain the new systems with their increased automation 
and complexity. This demand for quality gained Congressional 
interest due to the funding levels required to recruit and 
retain such personnel. 
Simultaneously, training plans associated with the new 
systems also showed a significant increase in the projected 
training necessary for both new accessions and current 
personnel in the transition to new systems. The resultant 
increase of training time caused the personnel overhead 
account to grow despite fixed end-strength constraints. 
Congressional pressure for acquisition reform emerged 
from the GAO's 1981 report criticizing the Army's management 
and lack of progress in integrating MPT issues into the 
acquisition process. A Soldier-Machine Interface study and 
several Army Science Board studies reconfirmed these results 
and provided an additional impetus for change. 
C.  MANPRINT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
In 1982, General Maxwell R. Thurman, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), directed the U.S. Army Research 
Institute to investigate the development process of several 
previously fielded weapon systems and conclude what the Army 
could have done differently to better integrate manpower and 
training issues. The initiative, known as the Reverse 
Engineering Project, studied the development of four systems: 
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1) the Pedestal-Mounted Stinger (PMS) ; 2) the UH-60 Black Hawk 
helicopter; 3) MLRS, and 4) MI BITE. The evaluation 
demonstrated that the integration of manpower, personnel, and 
training (MPT) issues early in the design process could have 
made a significant difference. 
Armed with these findings, General Thurman initiated the 
MANPRINT7 program to accomplish integration: "We must make 
smart decisions by considering the man-in-the-loop, early and 
continuously in the material acquisition process." In 1983, 
an Army Science Board task force was commissioned to determine 
how people issues should be integrated into the acquisition 
process. They initially recommended six areas of human 
systems considerations or "domains" for the program. Four of 
these, human factors engineering, manpower, personnel, and 
training, were directed at enhancing soldier performance The 
remaining two, health hazards and system safety, were targeted 
to prevent degradation of soldier performance. 
Since its inception, the MANPRINT program has expanded 
its roles and responsibilities within the Army acquisition 
process. In 1991, responding to numerous complaints that such 
Automated Information Systems (AIS) were not being designed to 
maximize soldier-system performance, the Army included such 
systems under MANPRINT management. 
The lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm prompted 
the Army to establish a seventh domain: soldier survivability. 
Incidence of fratricide, as well as the increases in enemy 
detection and recognition capabilities, and the expanding 
lethality and range of modern weaponry reaffirmed the 
requirement to enhance soldier survivability. The Army Chief 
of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, stated that the Service 
The term "MANPRINT" was created by General Richard H. 
Thompson, CG, AMC, in 1984. Prior to that time, soldier- 
machine interface (SMI) or human factors, manpower, personnel, 
and training (HMPT) were used to refer to the general issue! 
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could not accept casualties which could be prevented by proper 
research, development, and acquisition. In 1992, the DCSPER, 
Lieutenant General Thomas P. Carney, officially instituted 
soldier survivability as the seventh MANPRINT domain. 
The Army MANPRINT program continues to evolve as new HSI 
policies and procedures are implemented or refined. Espousing 
its firm commitment to human systems integration, the Army, 
through the efforts of the MANPRINT Directorate, actively 
seeks to expand the use of the MANPRINT philosophy throughout 
DoD. A 1994 report published by the Hay Group, under contract 
to the MANPRINT Directorate, stated that the Army followed a 
strategy which utilized organizational bureaucracy to 
institutionalize the program and build in resiliency. 
(Blackwood, 1994, p. 20) To this end, the report stated, the 
Army reassigned its lead MANPRINT Action Officer, Colonel 
Blackwood, to the Strategic Planning Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition). During the course of this 
assignment, the report asserted, he lobbied the OSD manpower 
community which eventually lead to the publication of DoD 
Directive 5000.53,"Manpower, Personnel, Training and Safety 
(MPTS) in the Defense System Acquisition Process," on 30 
December 1988. The directive mandated that each Service have 
an HSI program. 
Nina Richman-Loo, a former MANPRINT practitioner and 
current Program Analyst, HSI Division, OSD, contests this 
conclusion. She attributes the emergence of a defense-wide 
HSI program to several other factors. These factors include 
the recommendations of the senior human factors technologist 
in the Defense Research and Engineering Directorate, the 
Congressional requirement for Manpower Estimate Reports for 
major defense systems, and the receptiveness of FM&P senior 
officials to adopt a new mission that addressed human 
interfaces in defense systems acquisition. In addition, the 
newly established "Manpower, Personnel, Training and Safety" 
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program took its Congressional mandate and expanded upon it to 
provide an umbrella for the Service HSI organizations which 
all addressed MPTS to some degree.   While acknowledging 
Colonel Blackwood's positive influences, she contends that the 
MANPRINT model was adopted by DoD because it was the only 
viable program at that time. "The Navy did not have a program, 
and IMPACTS (Air Force) was struggling, so MANPRINT was chosen 
as the foundation for the DoD HSI program," she said.  A 
Marine Corps HSI practitioner summarized the action by 
stating, "Basically, DoD took the Army's MANPRINT program, 
painted it purple, and republished it as part of the 5000 
Series." 
D.  THE MANPRINT PROGRAM 
1.  Conceptual Overview 
MANPRINT is a comprehensive management and technical 
effort designed to optimize total system performance by 
focusing on soldier performance and equipment reliability. 
MANPRINT seeks to influence systems design throughout the 
acquisition process by coordinating efforts to ensure that a 
cost-effective, safe, operable, maintainable, and reliable 
system is developed within the constraints of available human 
and economic resources. An iterative process tailored to the 
nature of the acquisition program, MANPRINT endeavors to 
achieve the following objectives: 
1. Enhance the operational effectiveness of the total 
system; 
2. Influence soldier-material system design for optimum 
total system performance; 
3. Ensure systems, through their employment, conform to 
the capabilities and limitations of the soldier; 
4. Assist the Army trainer in determining, designing 
developing, and conducting sufficient/necessary training; 
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5. Improve control of life-cycle costs of soldier- 
material systems; 
6. Provide MANPRINT data for the development of required 
technical manuals and training devices; 
7. Ensure that system engineering is consistent with 
safety and health standards. 
To do so, MANPRINT continuously integrates seven human factors 
consideration or "domains" throughout the material acquisition 
cycle.  The seven current domains are: 
• Manpower: The number of human resources, both men and 
women, military and civilian, required and available to 
operate and maintain Army systems. 
• Personnel: The aptitudes, experiences, and other human 
characteristics necessary to achieve optimal system 
performance. 
• Training: The requisite knowledge, skills, and 
abilities needed by the available personnel to operate 
and maintain systems under operational conditions. 
• Human Factors Engineering: The comprehensive 
integration of human characteristics into system 
definition, design, development, and evaluation to 
optimize the performance of human-machine combinations. 
• System Safety: The inherent ability of the system to 
be used, operated, and maintained without accidental 
injury to personnel. 
• Health Hazards: The inherent conditions in the 
operation or use of a system (e.g. shock, recoil, 
vibration, toxic fumes, radiation, noise) that can 
cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job 
performance of personnel. 
• Soldier Survivability: The characteristic of a system 
that can reduce fratricide; as well as reduce 
detectability of the soldier; prevent attack if 
detected; prevent damage if attacked; minimize medical 
injury if wounded; and reduce physical and mental 
fatigue. 
While traditional design approaches addressed human 
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considerations  after technological  development,  MANPRINT 
places the soldier and his needs into the systems acquisition 
loop from the start.   Figures 4-1 and 4-2 contrast the 
traditional and MANPRINT methodologies.  To optimize total 
system performance, MANPRINT seeks to identify and execute 
trade-offs between and among the performance variables early 
and continuously in the acquisition cycle. However, to achieve 
this goal and ensure effective man-material  interface, 
MANPRINT must be accorded equal priority with all other system 
characteristics,  such as technical management and cost. 
Ultimately, the essence of MANPRINT is found in the ability of 
the Army and industry to answer the question: Can this soldier 
with this training perform these tasks to these standards 
under these conditions? 
THE TRADITIONAL DESIGN 
APPROACH 





Figure 4-1 Traditional systems design approach. 
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Figure 4-2 MANPRINT approach to defense systems design. 
2.  Organizational Structure 
To achieve its ambitious HSI objectives, the Army has 
developed an elaborate network of MANPRINT support 
organizations. The organizational structures, 
responsibilities, and relationships which govern the MANPRINT 
program are outlined in Army Regulation 602-2, "Manpower and 
Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) in the Material Acquisition 
Process," and will be reviewed in this section. 
The inclusion of MANPRINT into the acquisition process 
begins with the Program Executive Officers. The PEOs are 
tasked to include in all PM charters the responsibility for 
executing the MANPRINT program. PEOs are required to monitor 
and rate the PMs execution of MANPRINT responsibilities and to 
subsequently consider the rating in performance appraisals. 
By establishing institutional mandates and incentives for HSI, 
the Army expands the PMs responsibilities beyond the 
traditional parameters of cost, schedule, and performance. 
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Direct responsibility for the implementation, support, 
and execution of the MANPRINT effort is assigned to the 
Project/Product Managers. Among the PM's responsibilities are 
the following: 
1. Provide adequate support for effective MANPRINT effort 
implementation and maintenance; 
2. Initiate requests for the conduct of MANPRINT domain 
assessments; 
3. Conduct MANPRINT reviews to determine the status and 
adequacy of MANPRINT efforts; 
4. Annotate the status and adequacy of MANPRINT efforts 
in program documents and brief at milestone decision 
reviews; 
5. Establish MANPRINT as a separate major area in the 
source selection process. 
To perform the myriad of assigned MANPRINT functions, the PM 
is tasked to provide a MANPRINT manager. Typically, an 
Assistant PM (APM) is assigned joint responsibility for 
logistics and MANPRINT. 
Within  the  Department  of  the  Army  Headquarters 
responsibilities are distributed to the following offices: 
• Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs) (ASA(MRA) ) ; 
• Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, 
and Acquisition) (ASA(RDA)); 
• Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, 
Communications, and Computers (DISC4); 
• Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG); 
• Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT); 
• The Surgeon General; 
• Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 
(DCSOPS); 
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• Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER); 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to review the 
MANPRINT responsibilities of each of these organizations, it 
is essential to understand the functions of the DCSPER office. 
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel holds primary 
Department of the Army staff responsibility for the MANPRINT 
program. Supported within his command by the MANPRINT 
Directorate, the DCSPER develops, coordinates, and 
disseminates MANPRINT program policy and guidance to all Army 
commands and agencies. This includes approving policy, 
guidance, and formats for all MANPRINT related documents. 
Charged to ensure that MANPRINT is addressed early and 
continuously in the development of total system performance 
requirements, the DCSPER exercises oversight responsibilities 
of the MANPRINT efforts for all major and Level I non-major 
acquisition programs. In this capacity, the DCSPER prepares 
MANPRINT assessments in preparation for milestone decision 
reviews. The assessment responsibilities of the DCSPER will 
be covered in greater detail in subsequent sections. 
Other major Army commands (MACOM) crucial to the 
execution of the MANPRINT program are the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Army Material Command (AMC) . 
The MANPRINT process is initiated by the Commanding General, 
TRADOC. As the combat developer representing the needs of the 
operational end-user, the CG, TRADOC, is required to ensure 
that requirements documents include adequate specification of 
MANPRINT requirements. To accomplish this objective, a 
MANPRINT Joint Working Group (MJWG) is established by the 
proponent school or center three to six months prior to the 
operational and organizational plan. TRADOC then coordinates 
and provides MANPRINT information to the material developer 
for execution in all material programs. This includes 
documenting in the System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMMP) the 
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requirements for material developer's MANPRINT related efforts 
such as MPTS descriptions, human factors engineering 
assessments, health hazard assessments, and logistic support 
analyses. The SMMP and MJWG will be discussed in detail later 
in this chapter. 
Representing system operators and maintainers, the CG 
TRADOC is responsible for inputing into the acquisition 
process population data on the system's users and maintainers. 
Therefore,  CG,  TRADOC,  is  tasked  with  the  following 
responsibilities: 
1. Develop target audience descriptions for use by 
combat, training, and material developers and 
contractors; 
2. Ensure that MANPRINT data is collected during user 
testing for which TRADOC is responsible; 
3. Provide support to AMC in developing and maintaining 
the automated MANPRINT data base; 
4. Prepare Manpower, Personnel, and Training input to 
MANPRINT assessments and reviews. 
As the representative for the Service's schools, the 
Commanding General is tasked with conducting MANPRINT training 
for Army Staff agencies and major Army commands, as well as 
ensuring that MANPRINT concepts are applied to training and 
training systems. Employment and doctrinal decisions made by 
TRADOC are required to be analyzed for resource and human 
performance implications. Finally, CG, TRADOC, provides 
assistance to AMC in the preparation of MANPRINT assessments 
on non-major level II and III programs in preparation for 
milestone decision reviews. 
As the material developer, the Army Material Command 
procures material systems to satisfy operational requirements 
identified by the combat developer. As such the CG, AMC, is 
directly responsible for the implementation of MANPRINT 
policies and procedures at the program level. Hence, the CG, 
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AMC, assumes numerous MANPRINT responsibilities to include the 
following: 
1. Develop, coordinate, and implement standards and 
procedures for all MANPRINT domains in all material and 
training device designs; 
2. Ensure that MANPRINT training is provided to all 
Project, Program, and Product Managers, as well as all 
scientists, engineers, and contract management personnel 
involved in the development process,- 
3. Include MANPRINT as a separate major area in the 
source selection process; 
4. Provide the MANPRINT manager for all AMC-developed 
material systems; 
5. Ensure that technical trade-off analyses include human 
performance and reliability considerations; 
6. Develop human factors approaches, methodologies, and 
models; 
7. Fund contracted MANPRINT studies and methodologies and 
ensure that ODCSPER approved MANPRINT methodologies have 
been applied to appropriate systems; 
8. Provide system safety assessment and management input 
to MANPRINT assessments throughout the life-cycle of 
material system development and acquisition. 
Acting in the capacity of DCSPER for non-major programs, AMC 
is further responsible for the preparation of MANPRINT 
assessments for post-Milestone I Decision Reviews. 
To fully comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the 
above listed organizations, it is necessary to trace the 
MANPRINT process from its initiation by the combat developer 
through final milestone decision approval by the ASARC. 
3.  The MANPRINT Process 
The nucleus of the MANPRINT process is the MANPRINT Joint 
Working Group (MJWG) which is formed and initially chaired by 
the combat developer at the outset of any program. MJWG 
membership is tailored by the proponent combat developer based 
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on the nature of the program. As a minimum, a MJWG will have 
an expert from each MANPRINT domain and representatives for 
the material developer.8 The role of the MJWG is to develop 
and maintain the System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMMP). 
Throughout the acquisition process, the MJWG identifies and 
manages MANPRINT issues, while providing oversight to ensure 
that MANPRINT is carried out. 
The SMMP is a planning and management guide which 
documents MANPRINT goals, constraints, concerns, and questions 
throughout the acquisition process. By identifying required 
HSI tasks, analyses, trade-offs, and decisions, the SMMP 
provides continuity to the MANPRINT effort. It produces a 
formal audit trail which tracks MANPRINT issues throughout 
development and fielding. The SMMP is the only MANPRINT source 
document and record. Appendix F presents a generic System 
MANPRINT Management Plan format. 
The SMMP is initiated by the combat or training developer 
when the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) identifies a battlefield 
deficiency requiring the development of new or improved 
material. A living document, the SMMP is continually revised 
and updated as changes emerge, a system's design progresses, 
and/or system trade-offs are made. For the Army, the SMMP 
fulfills the requirements delineated in DoD Directive 5000.2 
for the Human System Integration Plan. 
During source selection, the Army mandates that "MANPRINT 
will be a separate major area of the same visibility as 
technical,  management,  and cost and will be evaluated 
Suggested membership for the MJWG includes 
representatives for the following organizations: 1) Combat 
Developer; 2) TRADOC System Manager; 3) Training Developer; 4) 
Safety Office; 5) Director of Evaluation and Standardization; 
6) Proponency Office(s); 7) Preventive Medicine Service; 8) 
Human Engineering Laboratory; 9) MATDEV ILS/MANPRINT Manager; 
10) Army Research Institute; 11) Supporting Proponent School, 
and 12) Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Integration, U.S. 
Army Total Army Personnel Command. 
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throughout all aspects of design, development, integrated 
logistics support, and program management" (AR 602-2, 1994, p. 
12). MANPRINT requirements are required to be addressed in 
the system's statement of work and specifications. The 
specifications are to describe how the system is to look and 
act to the user and how the requirements will be verified. 
Offerors are instructed to address MANPRINT in every 
applicable portion of their offers. Further, all Requests for 
Proposals (RFP) require the submission of a MANPRINT 
Management Plan as part of the contractor's proposal. 
To determine the status and adequacy of MANPRINT efforts 
MANPRINT reviews and assessments are conducted in accordance 
with DoD Directive 5000.53 and Army Regulation 70-1, "Systems 
Acquisition Policy and Procedures." Initial program review 
for both major and non-major programs is the responsibility of 
the applicable program sponsor.9 In the review process, 
critical human issues are identified and discussed for each 
domain. Conclusions are then drawn and solutions are 
recommended as required. MANPRINT review results are 
documented in the program decision documents and subsequently 
briefed at the Milestone Decision Review. 
A MANPRINT assessment is also performed for all programs 
prior to Milestone Decision Review. The objective of the 
assessment is two-fold: 1) determine the status and adequacy 
of MANPRINT efforts, and 2) present any unresolved MANPRINT 
issues or concerns to the decision-makers at the appropriate 
decision points. In performing an assessment, the assessor 
reviews the pertinent MANPRINT documentation for 
inconsistencies, incorrect assumptions, unresolved questions, 
or glaring errors. Identified issues are then classified as 
either positive, critical, or major based on their projected 
9
 For ACAT I and II programs, the Program Manager is 
responsible for the MANPRINT review. For ACAT III and IV 
programs, the Project Officer conducts the review. 
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impact.10 Each domain is then assigned a color code, red, 
amber, or green, according to the severity and/or abundance of 
issues.11 
The ODCSPER, supported by the MANPRINT Directorate, is 
responsible for the preparation of the MANPRINT assessment for 
all major and Level I non-major defense programs, as well as 
Army-designated acquisition programs. The first step in the 
assessment process is the production of domain reports, which 
are consolidated into a MANPRINT Integration Report by Human 




An accomplishment attributable to MANPRINT 
in action and supports the MANPRINT 
community mission. 
An issue which is highly likely to degrade 
operational mission performance or place 
a serious burden on Army resources. 
An issue which is moderately likely to 
either degrade operational mission 




MANPRINT color codes: 
Amber 
Green 
A domain contains a critical issue or a 
combination of major issues and concerns, which, 
taken in concert are highly likely (greater than 
50 percent probability) to produce the same 
effect as a critical issue. 
A domain contains a major issue of a combination 
of concerns which, taken in concert, are highly 
likely to produce the same effect as a major 
issue. 
A domain contains no issues or concerns, or one 
or several concerns exist which, taken in 
concert, are unlikely to produce the same effect 
as a major issue. 
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Research Engineering Directorate (HRED), Army Research 
Laboratory.12 The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Plans, Force Integration and Analysis within the U.S. Total 
Army Personnel Command then prepares a MPT Force Level 
Assessment. The assessment is based on the evaluation of 
program documentation and discussions with subject matter 
experts to include the system MJWG. The process culminates 
with the development of a system MANPRINT Assessment by the 
MANPRINT Directorate, DCSPER. 
For non-major programs, acquisition categories III and 
IV, responsibility for the assessment is delegated to HQ, AMC, 
TRADOC, or applicable MACOMs. Figures 4-3 and 4-4 depict the 
organizational responsibilities for the conduct of MANPRINT 
reviews and assessments. 
The final decision on MANPRINT issues is delivered during 
the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council's Milestone review 
of each major program. Modeled after the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB), the ASARC is co-chaired by the Army Acquisition 
Executive (AAE) , the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASARDA) , and the Vice 
Chief of the Army. Council membership is tailored according 
to program issues, with representatives selected from the DA 
and Secretariat staffs. One year prior to the review, an ad- 
hoc working committee is chartered to identify issues, and 
establish the ASARC calendar and agenda. During the following 
year, pre-briefings and a pre-ASARC are conducted to develop 
and hopefully remedy program issues. 
12
 The following organizations are responsible for 
producing domain assessment reports: 1) TRADOC reviews MPT 
issues; 2) HRED reviews human engineering issues; 3) the Army 
Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA) reviews health hazards; 4) 
the Army Safety Center (ASC) reviews system safety, and 5) the 
ARL Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate (SLAD) 
reviews soldier survivability issues. 
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<-- MS I --> MS II --> V 
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HQDA 




AS ARC AS ARC 
MANPRINT REVIEWS 
Prescribed by AR 602-2: 
PM has discretion on how 
the review is conducted. 
Can task proponents and/ 
or MSCs for data/input. 
MAJOR SYSTEM 
Program sponsor is 
Material Developer until 
designation of PM. 
Functional review 
presented at ASARC to 
include MANPRINT; no 
prescribed format. 
MANPRINT ASSESSMENT 
ODCSPER coordinates input 
from the six domains for 
presentation at ASARC. 
U.S. Army Personnel 
Integration Command does 
MPT Assessments from 
available data. 
Directed by AR 602-2. 
figure 4-3 MANPRINT reviews and assessments for major and 
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MANPRINT REVIEWS   NON-MAJOR SYSTEM 
Prescribed by AR 
602-2; PM has 
discretion on how 
review is 
conducted. 
Program sponsor is Material 
Developer until designation 
of PM. PM presents functional 
review at IPR; no prescribed 
format. 
MANPRINT ASSESSMENT 
Directed by AR 
602-2. 
HQ, AMC to assess all six domains 
for MS reviews with TRADOC 
input on MPT. 
Figure 4-4 MANPRINT review and assessment for non-major 
level II and III systems (AR 602-2, 1994, 
p. 15). 
Unresolved or critical concerns are ultimately forwarded to 
the ASARC for settlement. 
At the ASARC, council members are given the opportunity 
to "vote" or air concerns about the program. A regular member 
of the ASARC, the DCSPER represents the MANPRINT domains. He 
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is responsible for highlighting major outstanding HSI 
concerns. Although the AAE holds the final decision 
authority, the opinions and recommendations of the council 
members are weighed before granting Milestone Approval. If an 
issue is deemed critical, the AAE, on the advice of his 
council members, may withhold approval. Otherwise, the AAE 
may authorize conditional approval based on the Program 
Manager's timely and adequate resolution of remaining issues. 
4.  Program Implementation 
In contrast to the Navy's HARDMAN program, MANPRINT 
provides an excellent case study of effective HSI program 
institutionalization. Accordingly, a synopsis of the 
procedures employed by the Army in implementing and sustaining 
the MANPRINT program is provided in the following section. 
This review is intended to acquaint the reader with the 
critical factors necessary to institutionalize a successful 
HSI program. 
Although many documented examples supported the idea and 
need for human systems integration, the MANPRINT program was 
nonetheless initially confronted by organizational reluctance 
to embrace its concepts. The first obstacle encountered was 
the traditional incentive for Program Managers to sacrifice 
long-term life-cycle costs (ownership costs) to achieve short- 
term acquisition cost (capital investment) savings. Rewarded 
for advancing systems within tight schedule and cost 
constraints, many PMs viewed MANPRINT as an unnecessary 
increase to R&D and investment costs, and a roadblock to 
timely fielding. 
Bureaucratic entrenchment was the second obstacle 
MANPRINT encountered. Acquisition personnel feared that 
MANPRINT would create a large policy organization resulting in 
a "paperwork bureaucracy» rather than actually changing the 
Army's approach to acquisition policy. Within the 
bureaucracy, controversy arose as organizations perceived 
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MANPRINT as an infringement on their areas of responsibility. 
Safety activities regarded MANPRINT as a potential competitor. 
The integrated logistics support (ILS) community fought 
implementation by claiming that what MANPRINT sought to 
influence was already performed by the existing ILS program. 
Further, there was resistance to allowing the personnel 
community, which previously had not been an active player in 
the acquisition process, a means to influence systems 
decisions. "Overall, the various 'ilities' of the acquisition 
process had been in competition so long they found it 
difficult to combine to form an interdisciplinary approach 
which worked for a common goal." (Blackwood, 1994, p. 4) 
The MANPRINT program next encountered opposition to the 
inclusion of MANPRINT requirements into Requests for Proposal 
and source selection criteria. As the single document which 
represents the government's requirements to industry, the RFP 
was acknowledged as the foundation of any successful MANPRINT 
implementation efforts. From the outset, industry made it 
clear to the Army leadership that if MANPRINT procedures were 
a requirement in the RFP they would respond accordingly. 
However, implementation problems arose because the Army's RFP 
review process was not well understood or disciplined. For 
example, a review of the RFP for the Light Helicopter 
Experimental (LHX) revealed that approximately 30 percent of 
the known and approved system requirements were not included 
into the RFP (Blackwood, 1994, p. 17). The Army recognized 
that the RFP had to: 1) incorporate MANPRINT tasks in the 
statement of work; 2) include deliverables for those tasks, 
and 3) list MANPRINT as a factor in source selection. 
Recognizing that "if there is no MANPRINT in the RFP, then 
there is no MANPRINT," the Army enacted regulations mandating 
the inclusion of MANPRINT requirements into RFPs (Blackwood, 
1994, p. 17). 
The inclusion of MANPRINT in source selection provoked 
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greater debate since it directly affected industry, expended 
resources, and restricted the authority to waive the 
requirement. As a result the acquisition community 
forecasted that MANPRINT would increase program costs even 
though there was little evidence or support from industry on 
this contention. The projected operating budget savings, 
though, were not challenged. Ultimately, the controversy 
required the intervention of senior leaders, who chose to 
enforce the inclusion of MANPRINT in the source selection 
process. 
A 1989 study by the British Army identified six key 
factors in the MANPRINT program's success. The factors 
included: 1) organizational commitment; 2) training and 
education; 3) industry involvement; 4) enforcement of MANPRINT 
concepts; 5) early influence in the acquisition process, and 
6) the development of analytic research tools. 
The first and most important component of the program's 
success was senior officer commitment to the mission of 
MANPRINT. The British study cited that to successfully 
establish a MANPRINT program "there must be at least one very 
senior officer who has real influence in the acquisition 
process to take responsibility for the MANPRINT domains, and 
who also has staff to ensure assessments and trade-offs are 
made at the appropriate times." (Wolverson, 1989, p. 3) 
The efforts Generals M. R. Thurman and R. M. Eaton, who 
served successively as DCSPER, were instrumental in the 
institutionalization of MANPRINT. "The personal interest by 
the DCSPER in 'marketing' the program ensured that the program 
had a visible champion" (Blackwood, 1994, p. 13) . However, by 
the fall of 1985, the need for a Senior Executive Service 
(SES) civilian to promote the MANPRINT effort was recognized. 
It was determined that a high level civilian would provide 
continuity and visibility to both the Army and industry . Dr. 
Harold R. Booher, an engineering psychologist, formerly with 
86 
the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, was chosen to head the MANPRINT 
Directorate. To date, the MANPRINT program continues to enjoy 
strong advocacy from the Army's senior leaders, as evidenced 
in the course of this research. 
To derive and sustain support from within the acquisition 
community, several pilot programs were selected to display 
MANPRINT's potential. The key pilot program was the Light 
Helicopter Experimental (LHX), retitled the Comanche. This 
project was selected because of its visibility, need, and 
industry involvement. The selection of the Army's most 
visible program to initiate MANPRINT demonstrated to the 
acquisition work-force the tremendous commitment of the key 
senior leaders. In conjunction, an active campaign was 
implemented to inform other senior leaders of MANPRINT's 
activities and accomplishments. 
The second key to MANPRINT's successful establishment was 
Service-wide training and education. The MANPRINT Directorate 
confronted the problem of educating the Army and making sure 
that the program was understood. MANPRINT training courses 
were developed to inform key players from both Army and 
industry as to what their individual responsibilities were. 
The first MANPRINT Staff Officer Course (MSOC) was 
conducted in January 1986. The course was expanded in 1987 to 
include specific training for General Officers and SES 
civilians, as well as mid-level managers. Military graduates 
of the three-week MSOC course received an additional skill 
identifier so they could be tracked for future acquisition- 
related assignments and career development. 
The Army currently offers three courses: a nine-day 
MANPRINT Action Officers Course, a two-day MANPRINT for 
Managers Course, and a four-day MANPRINT Major Automated 
Information Systems Review Council Course. Resident and 
mobile training team (MTT) courses are taught by the Army 
Logistics Management School, Fort Lee, VA. MANPRINT training 
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is also extended to industry representatives. 
A deliberate attempt was made to communicate with all 
Army personnel about the MANPRINT program. A monthly MANPRINT 
Bulletin was established and published starting in July 1986. 
In addition, MANPRINT Practitioner Conferences are held 
annually, and MANPRINT Point-Of-Contact lists are published 
quarterly. To communicate its message to the general public, 
the MANPRINT Directorate also actively seeks press coverage. 
The third critical element was industry involvement. The 
Army regards MANPRINT as an Army-industry partnership. To 
ensure that soldier considerations are incorporated at the 
earliest phases of system development, MANPRINT is included in 
systems requirements documents and the source selection and 
design processes as detailed earlier. U.S. defense industries 
are growing increasingly aware of the MANPRINT requirements 
and have adapted to meet them. 
The fourth key point in the successful implementation of 
the MANPRINT program was enforcement. The British study 
asserts that the process must be made mandatory to ensure 
initial compliance and promote institutionalization. 
Utilization of MANPRINT is mandated by AR 602-2, and echoed in 
DoD's HSI requirements set forth in DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
However, it is enforced by the authority of the DCSPER, as a 
member of the ASARC, to present MANPRINT issues before the 
council and to vote against Milestone Approval if MANPRINT 
concerns are not adequately addressed.13 
The British study also recognizes that the MANPRINT 
process must be initiated early on in the acquisition cycle to 
most cost-effectively influence system design. "Front-end 
analysis" is a fundamental tenet of both the Army's MANPRINT 
While not negatively impacting any recent acquisition 
programs, MANPRINT concerns were a factor in the termination 
of the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (Aquilla) program following 
Test and Evaluation Review. 
88 
program and DoD's HSI requirements. Finally, the study notes 
the need to develop analytic tools to identify and quantify 
the risks and costs associated with potential systems. The 
U.S. Army possesses an extensive catalogue of U.S. Army 
research tools to include HARDMAN III MPT analysis, JACK 
vehicle accommodation analysis, CREWCUT combat vehicle 
workload analysis, Vision Path analysis, anthropometric 
analysis, Partitioning analyses, and Control and Display 
analysis. 
5.  Program Success 
Since its establishment, the MANPRINT program has been 
credited for a myriad of performance and life-cycle 
improvements to new, Non-developmental Items (NDI) , and 
fielded systems. Without this evidence of improved system 
performance and/or cost savings, sustainment of the MANPRINT 
process would have been difficult. Amidst organizational 
downsizing, it is doubtful MANPRINT could have survived 
without a demonstrated pay-off. (Blackwood, 1994, p. 19) 
From the outset, the MANPRINT program showed results. 
The Howitzer Improvement Program (HIP) was the first product 
improvement program as well as major weapons system to specify 
MANPRINT analyses as part of the contractor specifications. 
The results indicated the program's potential benefits and 
savings to the Army and its soldiers. The HIP program's 
MANPRINT achievements included the following: 
• Reduction in crew size from five soldiers to four; 
• Decreased predicted mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) from 4.1 
hours to 1 hour; 
• Redefined loader assist maintenance concept of 
isolating the electric, hydraulic, and mechanical 
system which reduced the lowest replaceable unit 
weight; 
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• Development  of a system operable by all mental 
categories; 
• Reduction of life-cycle costs savings by more than $6 
million. 
The MANPRINT's capstone success was the development of 
the T800 engine for the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter program. 
Developed by Light Helicopter Turbine Engine Company (LHTEC), 
the T800 engine was the first major system to apply the 
MANPRINT from the beginning. The Army asserts that "by 
adhering to the MANPRINT principles, LHTEC effectively 
identified, improved (maximized), and integrated critical 
aspects of the human-machine relationship into the T800 engine 
design, and did this with the constraints of cost, schedule, 
and available technology." (DeGarmo, 1993, p. 19) Notable 
achievements included the following: 
1. Reduction of manpower through the elimination of labor 
intensive tasks by: 
(a) the development of innovative design which 
reduced the number and complexity of engine 
parts; 
(b) using modular components; 
(c) increasing system reliability; 
(d) improving diagnostic, repair, and replacement 
capabilities. 
2. Increased technical performance without increased 
requirements for maintainer mental capabilities; 
3. Reduction of the number of user-level tools from 134 
to six common hand tools. 
According to one civilian manager, "MANPRINT forced use 
to look more closely at the needs of the soldier in the year 
2000.» To demonstrate the engine's capacity to be maintained 
by the future generation of Army soldiers, the contractor 
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"jury-tested" a mockup engine with a high school industrial 
arts class. After three hours of general training, the 
students successfully performed typical maintenance tasks 
within time limit specifications« 
Another program lauded for its effective implementation 
of MANPRINT principles was the Pedestal-Mounted Stinger (PMS) . 
Employing analysis of system design and testing data, 
corrections were incorporated to the detection, 
identification, tracking and firing sequences. Consequently, 
the probability of a successful launch and hit was improved 
from 0.816 to 0.918. The MANPRINT process was credited with 
producing a 10 percent increase in battlefield performance. 
To obtain the same increase in effectiveness using 
"uncorrected" systems was estimated to have cost $60 million 
in additional hardware and crews. 
The final demonstration of MANPRINT's success was its 
acceptance by the international defense community. Based on 
the finding of its 1989 study, the British Army formally 
adopted the MANPRINT program. Subsequently, the program was 
expanded to encompass the whole British Ministry of Defense. 
The French and German Ministries of Defense likewise 
shared a concern for the effects of failure to integrate human 
factors considerations into the procurement process. Both 
nations have directed the implementation of programs similar 
to MANPRINT. Additionally, NATO Defense Research Group Panel 
8, which considers the defense applications of human and bio- 
medical sciences, has established a Research Study Group on 
Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Safety Integration. 
Combined, these efforts illustrate the growing awareness of 




With increasing reliance on technology as a force 
multiplier, the Army recognized a growing disparity between 
its soldiers and the equipment they were expected to operate 
and maintain. Hence, the MANPRINT program was initiated to 
optimize total system performance through the consideration of 
soldier capabilities and limitations during the acquisition 
process. 
From its inception, the MANPRINT program received the 
patronage of the Army's senior leaders. Strengthened and 
protected by this support, the MANPRINT program, unlike its 
sister Service counterparts, was able to successfully 
institutionalize the systematic integration of human issues 
into the acquisition process. Centrally managed by the 
MANPRINT Directorate and supported by an extensive 
organizational infrastructure, the program standardized the 
Army's HSI procedures while ensuring proper application 
through the establishment of formal incentives, training, and 
oversight. 
By regulation, Program Managers are required to employ 
MANPRINT procedures. Their efforts are then evaluated by the 
MANPRINT assessment and review process, and reflected in their 
performance reports. Integration is achieved through the 
Joint MANPRINT Working Group, and subsequently documented in 
the System MANPRINT Management Plan. Through the MJWG a forum 
is established to provide visibility and continuity to human 
issues. If not adequately addressed, critical issues can 
ascend through the MANPRINT hierarchy to the ASARC for final 
resolution. 
The ultimate testimony to MANPRINT's organizational 
success was the incorporation of its fundamental principles 
into DoD's HSI policies. However, to definitively measure 
MANPRINT's effectiveness at human systems integration, its 
policies and procedures must be evaluated at the acquisition 
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program level. Hence, Chapter VI will analyze the application 
of MANPRINT within the AGS and AAWS-M programs. From this 
evaluation, generalizations will be drawn for comparison to 
the Marine Corps' current HSI program. 
93 
94 
V.  MARINE CORPS HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION CASE ANALYSES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Corps acquisition process is founded on two 
underlying tenets: first, that each acquisition program is 
unique and should be managed accordingly, and second, that the 
Program Manager, who is ultimately responsible for the system, 
should have minimal restrictions placed on his authority. The 
impact of these philosophies reverberate throughout the Marine 
Corps HSI program. The HSI Attributes Matrix contained in 
Appendix A provides the raw data utilized to quantify these 
effects. A synopsis of the results is presented in Table 5-1. 
HSI ATTRIBUTES            AAAV 
Score Percent. 
SRAW 
Score  Percent. 
A. Organizational Policy 27     11.3 24 10.3 
B. Organizational Oversight 25     10.0 20 8.0 
C. Organizational Support 17      8.5 15 7.6 
D. Program Application 86     25.5 62 18.2 
TOTAL PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 155    55.3 121 44.1 
Table 5-1  Total Marine Corps HSIAM effectiveness values by 
HSI attribute category. 
This chapter analyzes the effectiveness scores assigned 
to the AAAV and Predator programs. First, the methodology 
employed in assigning qualitative effectiveness scores in the 
HSIAM is reviewed. Secondly, after reviewing the current 
status of both programs, the chapter amplifies the information 
and insights used in the assignment of individual response 
scores. Employing the HSIAM scores as a gauge, the chapter 
evaluates the manner and degree to which HSI is performed 
within Marine Corps major and non-major acquisition programs. 
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Finally, conclusions are drawn from the HSIAM's aggregate mean 
scores as to the overall effectiveness of the HSI program for 
later comparison with the Army MANPRINT program. 
B.  QUALITATIVE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The HSI Attributes Matrix was designed to measure the 
extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have established HSI 
programs to execute the requirements set forth in DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, Part 7, Section B, and enumerated in 
Chapter II.  The matrix was developed after reviewing the 
current body of knowledge on human systems integration within 
the Department of Defense.   First,  to derive relevant 
dimensions of measurement,  the factors critical to the 
effective  implementation  of  HSI  were  identified  by 
investigating comparable previous efforts, as described in 
Chapters II, III, and IV.  Four key factors were identified: 
1) organizational14 policy; 2) organizational oversight; 3) 
organizational support, and 4) Program Management knowledge 
and application of HSI principles and procedures.  Secondly, 
within the framework of these four broad categories, specific 
questions were constructed to measure the degree to which each 
function was performed. 
Questions were arbitrarily weighted by the researcher 
based on the extent to which they impacted implementation of 
DoD's policies regarding human systems integration. Weights 
ranged from two to six percent of the total score. Individual 
item scores and percentages then were tallied to produce 
category totals, and ultimately an overall HSI effectiveness 
grade for each program in the two Services. The qualitative 
evaluation scale used for scoring is addressed in the next 
14 
To standardize the matrix questionnaire while 
accounting for Service-unique institutional structures, the 
term "organizational» is used here to refer to the actions of 
the Service and/or its Acquisition Command(s). 
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section. Sensitivity analysis was performed on both the 
category and individual response values to ensure that no 
single factor unduly influenced the outcome of the analysis. 
Responses to the matrix .questions were derived from 
interviews with program management personnel, and/or 
examination of program, Service, and DoD documentation 
pertaining to the individual program's HSI policies and 
procedures. Subsequently, the USAF "Qualitative Evaluation 
Model" was used to assign numerical values to the appropriate 
qualitative factors. The model assigns score values from zero 
to ten based on the performance of the test sample in 
comparison to an established standard. Table 5-1 exhibits the 




8 Well above standard 
7 Above standard 
6 Slightly above the standard 
5 Same as standard 
4 Slightly below standard 
3 Below standard 
2 Well below the standard 
1 Unacceptable 
0 Of no value 
Standard:  l. Comparable to the average of similar 
items. 
2. Comparable to the item being replaced by 
the item under test. 
Table 5-1 Air Force qualitative evaluation model, 
(Simon, 1974, p. 12) 
The standard for evaluation was based on the 
consolidation of two baselines: 1) the HSI requirements found 
in DoD Instruction 5000.2, and 2.) the average of similar Armed 
97 
Forces HSI programs. This evaluation further recognized and 
accounted for the effects of program tailoring of HSI efforts 
based on ACAT designation. Each program was judged against 
the standard HSI effort applied to programs of a similar 
nature and magnitude. 
C.  PROGRAM OVERVIEWS 
1.  The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program 
The Advanced Amphibious Assault Program is the Marine 
Corps' only current ACAT I D acquisition. Its objective is to 
obtain the most cost-effective, operationally suitable, and 
affordable system which can lift the surface assault elements 
of a Marine Expeditionary Force from amphibious ships located 
over-the-horizon (OTH) to inland objectives. In accordance 
with the Navy/Marine Corps "Forward. .. From the Sea" doctrine, 
the system must provide forcible entry capability and serve as 
the principal means of tactical surface mobility for the 
Landing Force during subsequent combat operations ashore. 
(DRPM, AAA, p. 3, 1994) 
The AAAV is to replace the current family of Assault 
Amphibious Vehicles (AAV7A1) with state-of-the-art technology 
that will fulfill the mission need of the Marine Corps during 
the FY 2000 to FY 2020 time frame. Incorporating advanced 
composite armor and new weapons, the AAAV is expected to 
defeat future threat light-armor vehicles frontally at ranges 
of at least 1500 meters while on the move and under conditions 
of darkness and adverse weather. In addition, the AAAV will 
include a powerful propulsion system designed to dramatically 
increase the vehicle's speed on land and at sea. The AAAV is 
required to be operated and maintained by a crew of three 
Marines, and possess the lift and carrying capacity for 18 
combat-loaded Marines. 
Originally scheduled to begin development in 1992, the 
AAAV program was delayed while Marine and Navy officials 
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sought to reduce the degree of technical risk associated with 
the program and to determine its funding. Schedules now call 
for a four-year demonstration program, with a single prototype 
being produced by 1998. The Marine Corps plans to purchase 
1,013 AAAVs with initial operational capability planned for 
2005 and full operational capability by 2011. Table 5-2 
displays the projected total life-cycle cost of the AAAV 
program by phase in millions of Base Year 1993 dollars. 
General Dynamics Lands Systems Division of Sterling Heights, 
MI, and United Defense, Limited Partnership of Santa Clara, 
CA, are each presently working under $15 million contracts to 
test engine technology concepts. 
The AAAV program possesses a unique organizational 
structure. The Program Manager holds direct reporting 
authority to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 
Development, and Acquisitions (ASN,RD&A) . Simultaneously, he 
maintains a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with MARCORSYSCOM 
for the provision of formalized contracting, budgeting, and 
Phase            Cost Phase Duration 
(BY93$M) (from contract award) 
D&V               272 49 months 
E&MD (less LRIP)    407 69 months 
LRIP              562 48 months 
Production       3,578 78 months 
*0&S              4,198 20 years 
Disposal            12 48 months 
TOTAL           $9,029 44 years 
♦Includes $2,286 for existing USMC personnel 
Table 5-2 AAAV acquisition program life-cycle cost 
estimation. 
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legal support. The use of other MARCORSYSCOM agencies is at 
the discretion of the Program Management Office (PMO). Other 
interaction and information transfer with MARCORSYSCOM is on 
an informal basis only. 
In November 1994, the AAAV program was reviewed by the 
Joint Requirements Council and approved as a valid military 
requirement. The program is currently scheduled for Milestone 
I MCPDM review in January 1995 and subsequent Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) review in April 1995. 
2.  The Short-Range Anti-tank Weapon Program 
The Predator, Short Range Anti-tank Weapon, is a 
lightweight, anti-armor rocket developed to replace the AT-4 
Rocket and the Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon 
(SMAW). The system is designed to provide dismounted infantry 
units with the capability to destroy next generation advanced 
armor threats. The man-portable, 18 pound Predator 
incorporates "fire and forget" technology, a soft-launch 
capability, and a top attack (fly-over, shoot-down) profile. 
The Predator Program is currently a unilateral Marine 
Corps ACAT III procurement, although a joint Memorandum of 
Agreement exists with the Army to share technology and program 
support. The Program Manager anticipates that due to Army 
interest the program will rise to ACAT II designation during 
production. 
In December 1990, upon completion of a six-month concept 
exploration phase, the system's operational requirement was 
validated and the program entered a 30-month demonstration and 
validation phase. Following the successful completion of 
flight tests verifying prototype designs and the fabrication 
of critical components, the Predator Program entered the 
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase in June 
1994. A contract was awarded to Loral Aeronutronic, 
commencing a 44-month EMD phase to be completed by January 
1998. Procurement is scheduled to begin during 1999 at a cost 
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of $4,000 per unit. Program costs include $120 million for 
research and development and $200 million for procurement 
appropriations. 
D.  ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
Within HSIAM Category A, the AAAV and the Predator 
programs averaged slightly-above standard (5.6) and standard 
(5.1) scores respectively, for organizational commitment to 
HSI as indicated by their Service's and/or Acquisition 
Command's policies, procedures, and incentives. Reaffirming 
the fundamental tenets of the Marine Corps acquisition 
community, both programs however scored strongly (8 and 9) 
with respect to the empowerment of Program Managers to 
efficiently manage their programs. 
1.  Proponency and Policy 
The matrix scores for this category and the historical 
review conducted in Chapter III both demonstrate that human 
systems integration has received little formal support from 
senior Marine Corps acquisition officials. While 
acknowledging HSI as a DoD requirement, no senior Marine 
leader has yet to champion the cause of HSI. During the 
course of this research, efforts to discuss HSI issues with 
senior military officials were continually redirected to 
subordinate staff members for resolution. 
The lack of senior leadership commitment to HSI is 
evidenced by the limited guidance provided to acquisition 
practitioners. Not until August 1994, one-and-a-half years 
after the publication of SECNAVINST 5000.2A and over three 
years after the issuance of DoD 5000.2, did MARCORSYSCOM issue 
its guidance on the implementation of DoD's HSI policies. MCO 
5000.22, "Implementation of Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies, Procedures, Documentation, and Reports," contributed 
only marginally to defining the roles, and responsibilities 
required for the performance of HSI.  Through a Points-of- 
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Contact (POC) chart, MCO 5000.22 assigned responsibility for 
HSI execution to the PM and responsibility for support to the 
Program Support Directorate, the Training Systems Program 
Management Office, and the Marine Corps Tactical Systems 
Support Activity (MCTSSA). 
In the absence of senior-level guidance, subordinate 
command organizations were also found to lack formal policies 
clarifying HSI execution. No PMO or support organization 
interviewed could produce documentation outlining its standard 
HSI procedures. As a consequence, the command is compelled to 
rely extensively on its civilian work-force to provide 
continuity and consistency to the performance of HSI. 
The conflicts inherent in this approach were self-evident 
prior to the publication of MCO 5000.22 when Program Managers, 
Project Officers, and Logistical Engineering Managers (LEM) 
each interpreted and applied the dictates of DoD Instruction 
5000.2 differently.  One staff member explained the situation 
from a LEM's perspective. First, he said, »there is no unit- 
level SOP or desk-top procedures, and it is unlikely that a 
LEM would have a face-to-face turnover."  Lacking guidance, 
the LEMs consequently interpret their responsibilities based 
on personal experience, understanding of the HSI process, and 
a review of available directives.  »It is basically a seats- 
of-the-pants operation," he asserted.  Yet, he continued, 
almost immediately upon entering the command LEMs are required 
to make support decisions based on their billets. "As Marine 
Officers,» he said, »we will make the decisions, but we don't 
have to live with those decisions because it is probably 
three, four or five years before the effects are felt." This 
situation is expanded upon in a later discussion of the 
failure of non-major programs to develop HSIPs. 
Compounding this situation and providing further 
resistance to the development of systematic HSI procedures is 
the acquisition community's inherent belief that each program 
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is unique and should be managed accordingly. HSI roles, 
responsibilities, and procedures are developed individually 
for each program. As a result, greater variability is 
introduced into the application of HSI among Marine Corps 
programs, according to such factors as the PM's knowledge and 
experience, and the support agencies' competence and 
consistency. The issue of diversity is addressed in 
subsequent sections. 
Also absent from the Marine Corps' procurement process 
are formal incentives to promote HSI. The COMMARCORSYSCOM is 
not formally directed to consider the PM's execution of HSI 
responsibilities during performance appraisals. While no 
policy delineates exact evaluation criteria, PMs are generally 
not judged on their system's capabilities, performance, or 
life-cycle costs. Instead, due to the PMs' short tenure and 
the consequences of prior program decisions, fitness reports 
normally consider only the PM's overall job performance and 
competence as a Marine Corps officer. 
MARCORSYSCOM imposes no other requirements on its PMs to 
perform HSI beyond those outlined in DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
By policy, PMs are under no obligation to seek or accept the 
counsel of MARCORSYSCOM HSI practitioners. In an internal 
customer satisfaction survey in 1991, PMs were asked to rate 
their interaction with Program Support. On a scale from 0 
being minimum interaction to 5 being maximum interaction, the 
average of all respondents was 1.9. Several survey responses 
displayed the frustration of support personnel at the absence 
of incentives. One protested that "PM's ignore Program 
Support and other requirements and get away with it!" Another 
recommended more vigorous application of Logistics Appraisals. 
"This will at least cause PMs to halfway consider LEM 
recommendations." No current data is available regarding how 
many PMs utilized MARCORSYSCOM's HSI resources, to what 
extent, or to what effect. According to one practitioner, the 
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only incentive for PMs to effectively execute HSI is "their 
desire to do the job right." 
2.  Program Manager Autonomy 
What the Marine Corps HSI process lacks in bureaucratic 
guidance, systematic procedures, and institutionalized 
incentives, it offsets by empowerment of its Program Managers. 
Ultimately responsible and intimately knowledgeable, PMs are 
given wide latitude in the management of their programs. This 
authority is further relegated to POs in the management of 
their projects. Besides legal and fiscal constraints, only 
two checks were identified which restrict the PM's authority: 
1) ORD thresholds, and 2) the Milestone Decision Review 
process. The effectiveness of these media in reigning the 
PM's actions will be examined in the next section. 
The goal of this laissez faire command philosophy appears 
to be to optimize the program efficiency and effectiveness. 
However, one acquisition practitioner contends that the lack 
of institutional restrictions is sustained by the "Golden 
Rule." "He who has the gold rules, and the PMs have the power 
of funding," he observed. Notwithstanding, Marine Corps PMs 
enjoy a broad degree of autonomy in the execution of their 
duties to include the performance of HSI. 
E.  ORGANIZATIONAL OVERSIGHT 
In the category of organizational oversight, the Marine 
Corps was graded as slightly-below standard (4.5). The AAAV 
Program earned an average score of standard (5) , while the 
Predator Program obtained an average score of slightly-below 
standard (4). The cause was twofold: l) the narrow 
involvement of the user/maintainer proponent in the 
acquisition process precipitated by current HSI procedures and 
organizational relationships, and 2) the limited visibility 
afforded into the HSI decision-making process by current 
documentation procedures. 
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1.  User Proponent Visibility 
The qualitative evaluation scores demonstrate that the 
proponent for the end-user has limited involvement and thus, 
oversight of the system design and development process. By- 
Marine Corps Order, MCCDC is designated the proponent for the 
system operator in the material acquisition cycle. Through 
operational thresholds documented in the ORD, the MCCDC 
Requirements Division provides guidelines to the PM for system 
development. During the acquisition process, the designated 
Requirements Officer is advised of the program's status during 
Milestone Reviews. A member of the AAAV Program Office 
illustrated this narrow window of visibility when he said: 
At Dem/Val we will have to closely coordinate with 
MCCDC to say 'We are the Combat Developers for you, 
we only have this much money and this much 
technology. You have to make the trade-offs. How 
is the Marine Corps going to off-set the ability to 
do this or that?' 
Since MCCDC is the only agency authorized to modify the 
ORD or approve waivers, it is also incumbent upon PMs to 
inform MCCDC when an ORD threshold will be breached. Beyond 
this, PMs have no formal requirement to apprise Requirements 
Officers of HSI decisions or trade-offs made during system 
design and development. The degree to which MCCDC is informed 
of system design decisions is left to the discretion of each 
PM. 
The question of who ultimately represents the needs of 
the system operator was a point of contention among many of 
those interviewed. One Project Officer went as far as 
stating: 
Within the Marine Corps there is no proponent of 
the field Marine as there is in the Army with the 
schools. They [TRADOC] speak for the soldier. It 
there are proponents in the Marine Corps, the don't 
stand up and make it known. 
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Other acquisition practitioners acknowledged that 
although by doctrine Requirements Division owned the 
responsibility, the function is actually being performed by 
other organizations, specifically the Program Support 
Directorate or the Program Management Offices. One 
practitioner stated: 
No one else is that interested. The Requirements 
personnel lay out the requirements, but once the 
requirements are defined, unless you go to them 
with a problem, they have other things to worry- 
about -- more requirements to write. It is up to 
us [Program Support] to keep it [HSI] in our mind, 
and get out there and talk to the Marines who will 
be using the equipment. 
Conversely, a PMO staff member argued that it is the PM 
who is the ultimate proponent for the Marine in the 
acquisition loop.  He stated: 
We have such a wide base of experience in this 
organization [Program Management Office] in rank 
and knowledge... If we see something wrong we go 
out and try to fix it. It's not required, and we 
get chewed out a lot about taking on responsibility 
because other people won't do it. 
This controversy over who represents the needs of the Marines 
in the acquisition cycle is, in and of itself, testimony to 
the inadequate involvement of the operator proponent. 
Not actively informed or involved in the HSI decision- 
making process, MCCDC Requirements Officers are thus unable to 
effectively influence system design. Because visibility is 
afforded to the user proponent only at Milestone Reviews or 
when requirement thresholds are to be breached, it is the ORD 
which ultimately defends the needs of the system operators and 
maintainers. Therefore, the capability of the system to 
address human issues is based on the integration of HSI 
requirements into the ORD.  Yet, as detailed in Chapter III, 
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the ORD is staffed, rather than integrated, between the HSI 
disciplines, and thus HSI parameters and/or trade-offs may or 
may not be adequately identified. 
2.  HSI Audit Trail 
The absence of a traceable audit trail further precludes 
visibility into the HSI decision-making process. MARCORSYSCOM 
does not require the documentation or tracking of HSI trade- 
offs. No formal audit trail is typically maintained unless 
requirement thresholds are expected to be breached. Otherwise 
major trade-offs are documented at the discretion of the PM. 
Often times decisions are documented only to safeguard against 
later external challenges or accusations. 
Neither the AAAV nor the Predator programs currently 
maintain a system to audit HSI issues. The AAAV PMO however 
requires that competing contractors supply data deliverables 
which identify, weigh, and rationalize the HSI trade-offs made 
during systems design. Internally, the AAAV Program relies on 
In-Process-Review (IPR) notes to track HSI issues brought 
forward for debate. The Program's MPT Specialist confirmed 
that "there is not always a clear audit trail," other than the 
performance of trace studies, such as JACK and CREW-CUT 
prototyping, to resolve identified deficiencies. 
A critical report by the DoD Inspector General's Office 
in June 1993 best illustrates the failure of the ORD to 
adequately address human issues and the inability of the audit 
trail to substantiate Marine Corps contentions. Following an 
extensive pre-Milestone I audit, the IG's Office published 
Audit Report 93-116, "Acquisition of Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicles." The report cited studies by the U.S. Army 
Research Institute of Environmental Medicine in 1981 and the 
U.S. Army Natick Research and Development Center in 1986. 
Both studies supported the need for a cooling system to 
prevent performance degradation of troops wearing Mission 
Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) clothing while embarked 
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aboard armored vehicles in extreme climatic conditions. The 
report contends that MCCDC was aware of the need for an 
environmental control system in the Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle, but had failed to include a performance 
characteristic to satisfy the deficiency in either the AAAV 
draft ORD or Required Operational Capability (ROC). 
The audit report concluded that the oversight would 
require the design of the vehicle chosen for the AAAV Program 
to be modified to incorporate an environmental control system 
so that Marines could effectively use the vehicle in hot, NBC 
conditions. The Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering 
Center estimated the inclusion of such a system to 
individually cool the troops would increase the cost per 
vehicle by $20,000 to $40,000. If the entire troop 
compartment were cooled, the Army Institute estimated that the 
costs per vehicle could increase by as much as $250,000. 
(Inspector General, 1993, p. 21) 
Although the ASN(RD&A) concurred with the report, the 
AAAV PMO contends that the requirement for a cooling system 
was included. However, instead of specifically requiring the 
contractors to provide an air-conditioning unit, the program 
office stated the requirement in operational terms. According 
to a program staff member: 
We gave the temperature range and the mission, and 
said this is how the Marine needs to operate 
without any degradation of his performance. You 
[the Contractor] come up with the material 
solution. 
Finally, lacking a detailed audit trail, the Program Office 
had to gather IPR notes and internal facsimile messages to 
prove that heat considerations were included in HS I 
discussion. 
108 
3.  HSI Review and Assessment Process 
Subject to both DoD oversight and voluntary MARCORSYSCOM 
review, the AAAV Program obtained a slightly-above standard 
score (6) for the effectiveness of its HSI assessment 
procedures. With only MARCORSYSCOM review, the Predator 
Program was rated as standard (5) . For both programs, though, 
institutional oversight is confined to Milestone Reviews. A 
support staff member outlined the risks inherent in this 
approach: 
If the PM has not done it [HSI] so well, you 
correct the problem as best as you can. Sometimes, 
though, you are in a position where it is too late 
to correct the problem before it is fielded. If 
you determine not to buy the system or delay the 
procurement, your money is then at risk. 
He equates the current program review process with traditional 
quality control techniques wherein inspections are conducted 
at the end of a production line instead of during the 
production cycle. He concludes that the "corporation," 
(MARCORSYSCOM) is assuming that the production-line (the 
Program Manager) has analyzed the incoming data correctly. 
As discussed in Chapter III the sole evaluation of HSI 
disciplines currently occurs during Logistics Appraisals, the 
results of which are forwarded to PA&E for inclusion during 
Milestone Review. The Program Support Directorate, which 
holds cognizance over the logistical certification process, 
acknowledges the difficulty in reviewing and rationally 
assessing program documentation and decisions if not formerly 
involved in the development process. If the reviewing 
official does not know the previous trade-off decisions made 
by the PM "it is very easy to ask questions that are 
superficial or perfunctory, questions that do not make any 
sense because we don't know the background," observed an HSI 
practitioner. If not actively involved, the PS Directorate 
can only review the documentation for form and content without 
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assessing the rationale behind the decision-making process. 
The correction of HSI issues was found to be enforceable 
within MARCORSYSCOM's review procedures. At least six-months 
prior to Milestone Review the findings of the LAR or LRG are 
submitted to the appropriate PM for response. In turn, the PM 
submits the actions he anticipates to be necessary to correct 
the problem. Major findings are subsequently tracked to 
ensure that the corrective actions are taken. 
4.  Feedback Mechanisms 
The Marine Corps was found to possess an informal, yet 
effective feedback mechanism for the evaluation of human 
issues during the acquisition cycle. Both programs earned 
praise from external sources for their extensive and effective 
use of user-juries early in the procurement process. An HSI 
consultant to United Defense, Limited Partnership, observed 
that the Marine Corps traditionally provides experienced users 
who are knowledgeable of the predecessor systems and dedicated 
to the trial process. 
To aid in this effort the Predator Program was only one 
of four programs to employ the services of a Marine Corps 
MANPRINT Specialist. The Specialist was used primarily to 
assemble, organize, and supervise Marines in the performance 
of hands-on evaluations (user-juries) of system prototypes. 
Marines assigned to The School of Infantry and The Basic 
School's Instructor Company were provided opportunities to 
handle the Predator prototype and provide comments to improve 
design. Following system tracking tests performed at 
Dahlgren, VA, the Marines provided several constructive 
recommendations: 
1. Redesign the eye-plate to be adjustable to accommodate 
better eye placement during gas-mask firing. 
2. Redesign hand-grip placement for ease of firing. 
3. Reduce protective padding to minimize system bulk. 
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In addition, the MANPRINT Specialist stressed the need for 
design testing to accommodate "Marine-specific" tasks, such as 
shipboard transportability and salt-water immersion. "We use 
the MANPRINT Specialist for a sanity check," said one staff 
member. Despite his efforts, no documentation could be found 
recording the MANPRINT Specialists HSI recommendations nor 
tracking their inclusion in the Predator's design process. 
One acquisition practitioner defended the Marine Corps' 
informal feedback mechanism by illustrating its use in the 
development of pump-jets for outboard motors. Two former 
Reconnaissance Marines approached the Ground Weapons PM 
complaining about injuries incurred by standard outboard motor 
blades. The PM then initiated design efforts to resolve the 
problem, which resulted in the development of shielded pump- 
jets. 
Despite the apparent willingness of PMs to accommodate 
the expressed needs of systems operators, systematic 
procedures could not be found for identifying safety trends 
from the Fleet Marine Force. Had the Reconnaissance Marines 
not voiced their concerns to the PM, it is unlikely that the 
current safety analysis procedures would have detected or 
communicated the problem. This deficiency is further 
illustrated in the next section dealing with organizational 
support. 
F.  ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT 
Category C of the HSIAM demonstrates that the Marine 
Corps has yet to develop a strong functional support 
organization to control or supervise HSI within the 
acquisition process. Overall, the Marine Corps was rated as 
slightly-below standard (4) , by virtue of both the AAAV and 
Predator programs earning slightly-below standard scores (4.2 
and 3.8 respectively). Additionally, the evaluative scores 
reflect the autonomy granted to Program Managers in the 
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determination of how and when HSI will be addressed during the 
procurement process. Finally, the scores demonstrate that 
although the PMs are tasked with HSI performance, they and 
their staffs are afforded limited training commensurate with 
those duties. 
1.  HSI Support Resources 
The Marine Corps acquisition community does not possess 
the requisite resources necessary to support HSI for major 
programs. Several AAAV staff members confirmed the lack of 
HSI expertise required for ACAT I and II programs. They 
credited this to the fact that the predominance of 
MARCORSYSCOM's procurement efforts are directed toward ACAT 
III and IV programs. Expressing a common sentiment, one 
practitioner asserted that non-major programs do not require 
the same degree of HSI expertise. 
Unable to be adequately supported, the AAAV program was 
compelled to rely on external HSI sources. Seeking to obtain 
the best support available, the program enlisted the services 
of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWCTSD) , Orlando FL, 
originally the Naval Training Systems Center, and the U.S. 
Army Human Resources and Engineering Directorate, ARL. 
As a non-major system, the Predator program was able to 
effectively employ the services of the System Command's 
Program Support Directorate. While the Predator program has 
maintained good relations and received adequate support from 
PS, interviews with other staff personnel revealed persistent 
problems with the HSI support structure. 
To better serve their constituency, the Program Support 
Directorate between 1991 and 1992 conducted three major 
surveys of customer satisfaction within the PMOs. While each 
survey exhibited support improvement, the final survey 
identified the following five areas of concern, listed in 
descending order of priority: 
• Timeliness of Support; 
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• Staff Program Knowledge; 
• Personnel Continuity; 
• Proactive Involvement; 
• Communications. 
Criticisms leveled at PS in the 1991 survey responses included 
the following: 
• "As a matrix organization, PS very easily dons the 
mantle of overwork and does not provide support in a 
timely fashion." 
• "To be effective, PS personnel must become more 
involved with the PMs' programs; just sitting at their 
desks reviewing documents for programs which are 
completely unfamiliar to them is a non-workable 
situation." 
• "Very little attempt on PS's part to keep abreast of 
programs and monitor status." 
• "The support provided by the LEMs needs to be more of 
a ' team' effort. Many times I feel that there is a 
'we-them' relationship." 
Such criticisms still echo through some program offices. 
One program staff member challenged the allegiance of PS 
personnel to individual programs. Another PO complained that 
the recent reorganization of the MPT functions into the 
Training Systems Program Office had severed the PMs' direct 
link to the LEMs. He explained, "The support we have received 
since the LEMs merged into PM, Training Systems, has been 
reduced quite an extent. Their allegiance is now with PM, 
Training Systems, and not our program." 
A second criticism which persists is that Program Support 
lacks consistency in the assignment of personnel to assist 
programs. Program staff members cited that frequently the 
support personnel designated to attend working groups is not 
the same person who subsequently reviews program documents 
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when staffed for comment. As one practitioner noted in the 
1991 survey, »Placing a warm body to fulfill a requirement 
slows, if not inhibits, a productive meeting/review." For 
this reason, many PMs turn to civilian contractors for support 
consistency and more timely products. 
The Program Support Directorate is cognizant of the 
charges levied against it. The Director acknowledges the 
inefficiencies inherent in any matrix support system, such as 
staffing limitations and performance time. However, he also 
recognizes the organization's contradictory role both of 
supporting PMs while protecting the best interests of the 
Marine Corps. Due to this, he theorizes, some PMs are 
reluctant to use PS. Because they may not receive the answers 
they want, the PMs turn to contractors for support. 
To better support the needs of the Program Management 
Offices, a major reorganization effort is presently underway 
within the PS Directorate. The initiative will include the 
consolidation of all program Logistics Mangers under the 
direction of PS by April 1995. The PS Director predicts that 
within one year this action will improve the consideration of 
HSI issues while relieving PMs of burdensome logistical 
responsibilities. 
One senior HSI practitioner supports continued 
realignment of the command after the Naval Air Systems Command 
model. Under that system, PMs manage only programmatic issues 
such as acquisition strategies, planning, documentation, 
whereas the "ilities," such as MPT, training systems, and 
weapons systems engineering, are handled through a common 
support agency. In summarizing NAVAIR's procedures, he stated 
that the "ilities" to include HSI are then handled by "the 
corporation, not by the product line." The result is 
increased process consistency. In this way, proponency for 
the end-user is maintained within the corporate support 
structure. Even when support responsibilities are contracted 
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to commercial enterprises, the results are still channeled 
back through a common support organization. 
2. HSI Forums 
The forums utilized to address HSI issues varied greatly 
between the AAAV and Predator programs. The AAAV Program used 
the open forums provided by the In-Process-Reviews to voice 
and resolve HSI trade-offs. Periodically scheduled throughout 
the acquisition cycle, IPRs address each subsystem of the 
program, thereby allowing each HSI discipline an opportunity 
to express concerns. The AAAV program is unique in that it 
requires economic analysis to be presented concurrently with 
the discussion of HSI alternatives. 
Like other non-major programs, the Predator Program 
possesses no forum to specifically address HSI issues. 
Instead, the PM plans to handle all "ilities," including 
issues related to the six HSI disciplines, within the ILSMT. 
This action further subordinates human issues to logistical 
issues. The PM expects the Test Integration Working Group 
(TIWG) to also address some HSI-related issues. The TIWG, 
which has yet to be organized, is intended to prepare the 
system for operational testing and subsequently for deployment 
training. The Predator Program's lack of an integrated forum 
to examine human concerns is displayed in its below-standard 
matrix score. 
3. HSI Education 
Within the Marine Corps acquisition community, HSI 
education is limited. The only educational requirement 
currently placed on program staff or support personnel is 
attendance at an introductory Project Officers Course. The 
five-day orientation course presents a cursory overview to 
MARCORSYSCOM acquisition procedures and organizations. The 
HSI disciplines are briefly reviewed during a tour of the 
Program Support Directorate. 
Human Systems Integration is also presented in the 
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Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) Program Managers 
Course curriculum. During the course, DoD Instruction 5000.2 
HS I requirements and current HSI procedures are reviewed. The 
AAAV DRPM and Logistics Manager, as well as the Predator PM 
have all attained DSMC Level I certification. The Marine 
Corps's access to the course has been restricted by DSMC's 
policy to grant attendance priority to major program 
personnel. At the request of the MARCORSYSCOM Commander, this 
policy is presently being reexamined. To compensate, one HSI 
practitioner, acknowledging the need for enhanced HSI 
training, recommended that all future PMs send at least one 
staff member to the Army's MANPRINT management course. 
G.  PROGRAM APPLICATION 
1. Overview 
Category D, Program Application, examined how effectively 
HSI was understood, supported, and executed within each 
individual Program Management Office. This category exhibited 
the largest variance of qualitative evaluation scores within 
the HSIAM. The Marine Corps earned superior scores for its 
Program Managers' commitment to satisfying the needs of the 
system operator with the AAAV and Predator programs received 
outstanding (9) and well-above-standard (8) scores. 
Reflecting the factors which influenced its development, the 
Marine Corps HSI program received consistently strong scores 
(6.5, 6.5, and 7) for documentation of MPT issues, while 
simultaneously applying descending emphasis on human factors 
engineering (5), system safety (4), and health hazards (4). 
2. Program Management Commitment 
The strength of the Marine Corps HSI program is found in 
the commitment of its Program Managers to satisfying the needs 
of system operators and maintainers. Within the acquisition 
community there exists an organizational culture which 
emphasizes the consideration of the Marine end-user during 
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system development. While not mandated by policy, this 
determination to develop user-friendly systems within the 
limits of fiscal constraints was evident during interviews 
with program personnel. 
According to one acquisition practitioner, MARCORSYSCOM 
is more operator-oriented than any other system command 
organization. He credits this condition to the high ratio of 
military to civilian personnel in the acquisition work-force. 
Military personnel which comprise 60 percent of the work- 
force, he asserts, understand the need to "Marine-proof" 
equipment because of their occupational backgrounds, and 
therefore demonstrate an inherent concern for human factors 
issues. He observed that "because the PMs and POs may have to 
used the gear, it is important to them that it [HSI] is done 
right." Current Marine Corps policy allows military 
acquisition work-force personnel to alternate between 
operational and acquisition billets on subsequent tours of 
duty. Acquisition practitioners retain their primary MOS and 
remain affiliated with that field throughout their careers. 
A MANPRINT practitioner comparing Marine and Army 
practices echoed this opinion. He observed that, in general, 
Marine Corps PMs possess greater operational awareness and 
provide greater user expertise to the design and development 
process. This operational knowledge and demand for 
operational performance, he said, is relayed to contractors 
during routine interactions. This conviction was reaffirmed 
by a civilian HSI consultant to United Defense, L.P. 
Within the AAAV Program, HSI reaps the benefits of the 
DRPM's strong advocacy of logistical considerations. 
According to one staff member, the Program Manager places 
tremendous emphasis on logistics, under which HSI is 
addressed. The Predator Program Manager also displayed ardent 
commitment to the consideration of the Marine end-user. His 
statement acknowledging the difficulty in translating the 
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user's requirements to the system design engineers evidenced 
his concern: 
The initial design concept came from engineering 
putting the design together in a logical sequence, 
but that may not always be best for the Marine. To 
the engineer who designed it, arm placement is not 
that important, but to the Marine who has to hump 
or use it to save his life a few inches can make a 
big difference. 
Powered by the strength of the PM's commitment, the 
Marine Corps HSI program is consequently personality 
dependent. The application of HSI is driven by the PM's 
knowledge, commitment, and experience. Because of PM autonomy 
and procedural decentralization within MARCORSYSCOM, the 
emphasis placed on HSI is proportional to how attuned the PM 
is to the nuances of the acquisition process. Illustrating 
this fact, an AAAV Program staff member conceded that the PMO 
is growing "increasingly suave" of HSI considerations as the 
program progresses. 
The effect of this situation is greater variance in the 
degree and effectiveness of the HSI execution. A Program 
Support member summarized the situation by stating: 
We [MARCORSYSCOM] have a diffusive effort. We have 
seven PMs and 75 Project Officers all going out at 
different points on the compass. If plotted on a 
statistical control chart, we would be all over the 
page. 
Because the process lacks consistency, confidence in the 
PM's or PO's performance also becomes personality dependent. 
Unable to be intimately involved or informed on each of the 
programs, the PEO is therefore compelled to make decisions 
based solely on the PM's performance record. 
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3.  HSI Comprehension 
While committed to the needs of the systems operators and 
maintainers, the PMOs did not display a correspondingly strong 
understanding of HSI principles. As a major program supported 
by a multi-Service staff, the AAAV program demonstrated a 
sound understanding of HSI concepts. Both the NAWCTSD and 
HRED representatives brought to the program extensive 
knowledge of HSI based on previous operational experience with 
the Army's MANPRINT process. The narrower appreciation of HSI 
exhibited within the Predator Program was more typical of the 
understanding demonstrated throughout MARCORSYSCOM. 
Significant portions of the acquisition command did not 
appear to thoroughly understand the relationship between MPT 
and HSI. Numerous persons interviewed expressed the belief 
that the performance of a HARDMAN MPT model was equivalent to 
the performance of HSI. Others confused HARDMAN with 
MANPRINT. One LEM assigned to support HSI errantly stated 
that "a HARDMAN analysis is the Navy equivalent of the 
MANPRINT for the Army." 
The evolution of this belief is clearly seen in the 
historical development of the current HSI program, as outlined 
in Chapter III. Although it was a fundamental building block 
in the construction of DoD's HSI requirements, HARDMAN, 
itself, never evolved into a comprehensive HSI program. 
The history of the AAAV Program illustrates how this 
misconception has propagated and has subsequently resulted in 
the failure of Marine Corps programs to balance or integrate 
HSI disciplines. Since the AAAV Program originated prior to 
publication of the DoD "5000 Series," the PMO initially 
complied all of its human factors issues under the heading of 
a HARDMAN program. Internally, the program office defined 
HARDMAN to include not only MPT but also human factors 
engineering, safety, and health hazards. A staff member notes 
that "initially the program had a Data Item Description (DID) 
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that we called HARDMAN assessment, which was really our 
MANPRINT structure- . . we more or less used the term HARDMAN to 
camouflage that we were doing MANPRINT work." This action was 
taken because at the time the program was under NAVSEA 
direction, and the program staff deemed that it would be 
difficult to process a MANPRINT DID. 
By continuing to equate HARDMAN with HSI, acquisition 
practitioners are neglecting to fully integrate all six HSI 
disciplines, as evidenced by the inadequacy of program 
documentation discussed in the next section. Interviews also 
showed that many of those who did understand the components of 
HSI, did not appreciate the requirement for integration. 
Several practitioners expressed the mistaken belief that the 
separate analysis of each discipline satisfied the intent of 
DoD's HSI policies. 
4.  HSI Support Structure 
Neither the AAAV Program nor the Predator Program possess 
a staff member specifically assigned to the management of HSI. 
Within the Predator PMO, which consists of four personnel: the 
Program Manager (0-5) ; two Assistant-PMs (0-3) , and a civilian 
ILS Manager (GS-13), the Program Manager retains control of 
HSI issues. 
Lacking formal HSI training, the PM relies extensively on 
the support of the prime contractor, other independent 
contractors, the Program Support Directorate, and the Training 
Systems program office to perform HSI analyses. Additionally, 
the program employed the services of a MANPRINT Specialist, 
whose duties were restricted primarily to the organization and 
supervision of user-juries. Ultimately, the PM was 
responsible for the evaluation and integration of the HSI data 
provided by these agencies. His expertise for this task is 
derived from his knowledge of user needs gained from previous 
operational experience in the FMF. 
In contrast, the AAAV Program boasts a more highly 
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evolved HSI support structure. Responsibility for HSI control 
and coordination is delegated to the Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) Manager. Untrained in HSI techniques, the ILS 
Manager, nonetheless, demonstrated functional knowledge of 
HSI-related issues gained from prior logistical experience. 
As noted earlier, the AAAV Program was required to employ- 
external sources to build an effective HSI management team. 
The Naval Air Warfare Center supplied the program with a MPT 
Specialist, an Instructional Systems Specialist, and two 
Economists for the performance of MPT and economic analysis. 
The U.S. Army's Human Resources Engineering Directorate, ARL. 
has assigned an Individual Systems Design Method Team Leader 
from the Integrations Methods Branch, MANPRINT Division to the 
program. Primarily tasked with system analysis modeling, he 
is responsible to NAWCTSD for human factors engineering. 
The weakest link within the HSI support structure is 
system safety. System safety analysis is tasked to a member 
of the PMO. His responsibility is to coordinate safety issues 
with MARCORSYSCOM and Naval Air Warfare Center. Safety 
information is then compiled and forwarded to the ILS Manager 
for integration and management. The AAAV Program is only now 
in the process of developing an institutionalized safety team, 
to include the Naval explosive warfare experts from both the 
Naval Warfare Systems Center and MARCORSYSCOM. 
In October 1993, the Naval Safety Center assumed 
responsibility for tracking Marine Corps ground system safety. 
Despite the fact that annually the Marine Corps sustains 
approximately $1,620,000 in injury costs and $515,000 in 
property damage due to operational accidents, effective 
communications between the Naval Safety Center and the Marine 
Corps acquisition community have yet to be established. To 
date the only interface the AAAV Program has had with the 
Center is through the receipt of monthly bulletins and tracked 
vehicle incident reports. 
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Also exhibited within the AAAV Program is the tendency of 
Marine Corps safety programs to focus exclusively on system 
safety, vice individual Marine safety. The same holds true 
for survivability. The AAAV Program Survivability Division is 
responsible for the survivability of the vehicle from NBC, 
fire, ballistic, and armor threats, but not for the 
survivability of embarked crew or passengers. The underlying 
premise appears to be that system safety and survivability 
equate to personnel safety and survivability. Fratricide, 
though, is specifically addressed by the AAAV Program, but is 
divided between the Survivability and the Combat Systems 
Divisions. 
5.  Program Documentation 
Analysis of program documentation highlights the areas in 
which the Marine Corps places the emphasis of its HSI effort. 
Specifically, documentation analyses by Marine and DoD 
oversight agencies show the importance affixed to MPT issues 
and the descending significance applied to human factors 
engineering, systems safety, and health hazards. 
The AAAV Program Human  Systems  Integration Plan, 
developed under the direction of the NAWCTSD MPT Specialist, 
demonstrates this tendency. A courtesy review of the program 
documents by the MARCORSYSCOM Program Analysis and Evaluation 
Office revealed that the HSIP did not adequately comply with 
DoD policy. The basis of the HSIP was determined to be a MPT 
Plan developed in 1989,  following the guidance of DoD 
Directive 5000.53.   Instead of reformatting the plan in 
accordance with DoD Directive 5000.2 and SECNAVINST 5000.2A, 
a cross-referencing matrix to the new format requirements was 
inserted to retain the character of the original plan. 
However, upon review, the matrix failed to indicate any human 
factors   engineering,   health   hazards,   and   safety 
considerations. 
The PA&E review also indicated the lack of any System 
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Safety Program requirements, as stipulated in DoD Instruction 
5000.2, Part 7, Section, in the HSIP. The assessment cited 
the unknown safety risks inherent in the program as a critical 
concern. To emphasize its importance, the report explained 
the benefits of proper consideration of safety issues in the 
HSIP.  It stated: 
... a Government Human Systems Integration Plan 
that properly includes System Safety, would ensure 
that proper safety-related analyses are conducted 
and that management decisions include proper 
consideration of safety. An example is the draft 
Type A-Specification, which includes several 
safety-related requirements. The System Safety 
Plan should include a description of the safety- 
related considerations of the process that lead to 
the draft Type A-Specification. Without reviewing 
this management process, there is uncertainty about 
the quality of the safety requirements. 
The DoD Inspector General's Office reconfirmed this 
deficiency in its 1993 audit report. The report concluded 
that the AAAV Program had not adequately performed assessments 
of the effects of a hot, NBC environment on human performance. 
The report recommended that the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) review and comment to the 
AAAV DRPM on the program's HSIP. The review, it was 
recommended, should determine whether the HSIP adequately 
addresses human factors. Comments would then be provided to 
the DAB Milestone I decision. Concurring, the ASN(RDSA) 
further proposed to give other Army and Navy organizations an 
opportunity to review the HSIP. 
In June 1994, a MARCORSYSCOM Logistics Review Group 
presented the finding of its assessment of the AAAV Program 
for Milestone I decision. The LRG uncovered four level II 
(major) findings, one involving an HSI issue. The program 
documentation was found to "not indicate any efforts in the 
functional area of system safety engineering during Phase 0, 
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Concept Exploration and Definition." (Program Support, 1994, 
p. 1) Remedial action was subsequently taken by the program 
office to provide a narrative which addresses the system 
safety program, as well as the safety issues addressed to 
date. An additional LRG finding regarding the lack of a human 
engineering program was submitted and later withdrawn when 
sufficient documentation was presented by the PMO. 
In defense of their HSI efforts, the AAAV program office 
points to the considerable human assessments already 
conducted.  These include: 
... Early Operational Assessments (EOAs) of each 
contractors full scale mockup by Fleet Marine Force 
Marines, HARDMAN Analyses, vehicle accommodation 
analyses using JACK... Vision Path analyses, 
Anthropometric analyses, EDCAS analyses, 
Partitioning analyses, Control and Display analyses 
using Supercard and HyperCard... workload analyses 
using CREWCUT..., and finally numerous and 
extensive AAAV concept design user-jury analyses 
using experienced Marines. (DoD, 1993, p. 62-63) 
Based on this work and the expressed commitment of the PM to 
the needs of the system operator, the AAAV Program does not 
appear deficient in its performance of HSI analyses, but 
rather in its capability to adequately document its efforts. 
The Predator Program has produced even less documentation 
of its HSI efforts. Aware of the HSI requirements within DoD 
Directive 5000.2, the PMO did not develop a HSIP. Lacking 
Service or Acquisition Command guidance on the implementation 
of DoD acquisition management policies, the PM believed that 
HSIPs were only applicable to ACAT I or II programs. 
This understanding was prevalent throughout MARCORSYSCOM 
prior to publication of MCO 5000.22. Acquisition 
practitioners previously assumed that ACAT III and IV programs 
would have little or no effect on MPT, and did not require HFE 
or health and safety analyses. Therefore, based on the 
direction of DoD Instruction 5000.2, Part 2, Paragraph C.3, to 
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tailor the acquisition procedures and documentation for 
programs less than ACAT I, HSIPs have traditionally not been 
developed for non-major programs. However, since MCO 5000.22 
does not alter the requirements established in SECNAVINST 
5000.2A or DoD Instruction 5000.2, HSIPs are now required of 
all programs in accordance to their magnitude. Consequently, 
the Predator Program is now developing an HSIP in preparation 
for Milestone III review. 
Because the Predator is not to be aligned with any 
organizational structure, the PMO determined not to perform 
HARDMAN analyses. Yet, while at the present time the system 
is projected to be a non-dedicated weapon available for 
Service-wide use, the potential exists that the Predator will 
be utilized to supplement procurement of the Javelin system 
for infantry battalion anti-armor platoons. In describing the 
inter-organizational communications required for the 
determination of changing manpower requirements, a program 
staff member stated: 
We [PMs] do not specifically get into how many 
additional people may be needed. The system is 
hopefully designed so that there is enough 
information getting to the manpower people through 
the different channels so that they see that they 
will need additional people in that field. 
While not necessarily indicative of an ineffective system, the 
above statement illustrates the inconstant nature of the 
current HSI procedures for non-major programs. 
6.  Integration 
The HSI procedures employed within the Marine Corps are 
based primarily on the staffing of program documentation for 
review and comment by HSI practitioners. Marine Corps Order 
P3900.15, "Marine Corps Combat Development Process," makes 
continual reference to the staffing of program documentation. 
For example, under current procedures ORDs are staffed through 
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the various disciplines separately, and then compiled at PA&E 
for return to MCCDC's Requirements Division. At no time do 
the representatives of the HSI disciplines convene to 
collectively address the performance thresholds to be 
established in the ORD. Such staffing procedures negate the 
advantages gained from having MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, and MCOTEA 
collocated on the same base. 
The AAAV Program achieves limited integration through 
group discussions during IPRs. The Predator Program relies 
exclusively on staffing procedures. The PM acknowledged that 
staffing is "after-the-fact type management," whereas working 
groups present a proactive approach to programmatic decision- 
making. He concedes that "there are just so many working 
groups you can have, and you never get the right persons 
anyway." 
Tellingly, in May 1993, a Milestone II decision LAR 
identified two level II (major) findings, both involving 
staffing. The first concern was that the system laser ranger 
had not been reviewed by the Navy Laser Safety Review Board. 
The second issue was the failure of the MTP and ILST documents 
to be staffed through MCCDC, HQMC (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs), or the formal schools which are to instruct the 
Predator program. 
One LEM, knowledgeable of DoD's HSI requirements, 
admitted that integration is not being accomplished under 
current MARCORSYSCOM practices. He asserted that whatever 
integration is being conducted is performed through 
unstructured liaisons between HSI support personnel. While 
promoting the increased involvement of HSI personnel with 
procurement programs, he was reluctant to advocate the 
establishment of a HSI Branch. Like other acquisition 
practitioners interviewed, he expressed concern over the 
additional administrative burden that may be incurred by 
applying HSI and developing an HSIP for non-major programs 
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and/or programs anticipated to have minimal alterations. 
Several persons espoused the opinion that the Marine Corps' 
acquisition organization was either too 1) short of personnel, 
2) short of funding, or 3) reliant on the Army acquisition 
structure to adequately address, develop, or institute 
innovative acquisition procedural reforms. This mind-set 
could potentially impede any efforts to reform the current HSI 
procedures. 
7.  Contractor Involvement 
The Marine Corps acquisition process again demonstrated 
inconsistency in the inclusion of HSI as source selection 
criteria. Currently, the AAAV Program is incorporating HSI 
criteria into its source selection evaluations. A logistics 
representative to the Source Selection Board has included 
human factors questions drawn from the system specifications 
into the source selection criteria. Conversely, the Predator 
Program has not included any HSI criteria. 
Despite procedural differences, both programs have gained 
a high degree of contractor involvement in the HSI process. 
Contractor participation appears to be based in large part on 
the demonstrated commitment and dynamics of the Program 
Management Office for the consideration of human issues. 
Founded on the interpersonal chemistry and personal 
dynamics, the success of the AAAV Program's HSI efforts, 
according to one practitioner is based on "communications, 
communications, communications." He argues that the program's 
strength is in its ability to assemble HSI representatives, 
debate points of contention, and then establish a unified 
position. After building constituencies within the logistics 
staff, program office, and external Navy and Marine Corps 
agencies, the program then presents a forceful, unified front 
to contractors in requiring HSI consideration. The 
consequence of such visibility, according to the PMO staff 
member, is that contractors' designs have had to focus on such 
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concerns as maintenance accessibility, crew and passenger 
seating, simplification of controls and displays, visibility, 
crew workload, and ventilation. 
H.  SUMMARY 
The Marine Corps HSI program achieved an average 
compliance percentage of 49.7 percent. Earning a total of 138 
points out of a possible 2 80 points, the Marine Corps HSI 
program was rated as standard in relation to other HSI 
programs and in satisfying the HSI requirements of DoD 
Instruction 5000.2. The AAAV Program earned a total of 155 
points and a slightly-above standard compliance percentage of 
55.3 percent for its HSI efforts. With 121 total points, the 
Predator Program was slightly-below standard with a final 
compliance percentage of 44.1 percent. 
Analysis of these scores demonstrates that while 
satisfying the basic requirements contained in DoD Instruction 
5000.2, the Marine Corps is not achieving optimum integration 
of HSI disciplines. Consequently, the Marine Corps HSI 
process is not systematically identifying human issues and/or 
trade-offs so that acquisition authorities can make informed 
decisions to optimize total system performance or minimize 
life-cycle cost. 
Mirrored in these scores are also the strengths and 
deficiencies of the Marine Corps' HSI policies and procedures. 
The demonstrated strengths include the following: 
• Program Manger empowerment and autonomy in the 
application and tailoring of HSI; 
• Limited bureaucratic requirements restricting the PM's 
ability to efficiently manage his program; 
• Institutionalized culture emphasizing the consideration 
of the system operator and maintainer during the 
acquisition cycle; 
• Program Manager operational awareness to the needs of 
the end-user based on recurrent operational experience. 
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Conversely, the following deficiencies were also identified: 
• Lack of senior-level proponency for HSI; 
• Insufficient command policies or procedures 
standardizing the application, performance, or support 
of HSI; 
• Limited involvement of the system proponent in the 
acquisition decision-making process; 
• Inadequate program documentation audit trails to 
identify and track HSI issues, decisions, and trade- 
offs; 
• Prevalent misunderstanding of HSI principles and 
terminology; 
• Reliance on "stove-piped" staffing procedures, vice 
integration, to identify and address HSI issues. 
In general, the Marine Corps HSI program demonstrated a 
high degree of variability in the application, performance, 
and support of HSI. Personality-dependent, the effectiveness 
of the HSI program is based primarily on each PM' s individual 
knowledge, experience, and initiative. These characteristics 
stand in stark contrast to the more centralized and systematic 




VI.  U.S. ARMY HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION CASE ANALYSES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The current status of the Army's HSI program is best 
epitomized by the theme of the 1994 MANPRINT Practitioners 
Conference -- "MANPRINT -- The Expanding Challenge." The 
title embodies the conflicting features which characterize the 
MANPRINT program: 1) its steady expansion in scope and 
application, and 2) the persistent threats to its existence in 
an era of military down-sizing. The HSI Attributes Matrix 
contained in Appendix A and described in detail in Chapter V 
measures the MANPRINT program's success in balancing these 
opposing forces and achieving effective HSI. Table 6-1 
provides a synopsis of the Army's results. 






A. Organizational Policy 38 14.8 35 13.7 
B. Organizational Oversight 41 16.4 36 14.4 
C. Organizational Support 31 15.7 32 16.1 
D. Program Application 106 30.4 100 28.7 
TOTAL PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 216 77.3 203 72.9 
Table 6-1 Total Army HSIAM effectiveness values by HSI 
attribute category. 
This chapter analyzes the HSIAM effectiveness scores 
achieved by the Armored Gun System and Javelin programs in 
their application of MANPRINT methodology. After reviewing 
each program's current status, the chapter examines the 
information and insights that were used to assign specific 
scores.  To avoid redundancy, the chapter references, rather 
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than reiterates, relevant organizational policies and 
procedures cited previously in Chapter IV. Ultimately, based 
on aggregate mean scores, the chapter draws conclusions as to 
the overall effectiveness of the MANPRINT program for 
comparative analysis in Chapter VII. 
B.  PROGRAM OVERVIEWS 
1.  The Armored Gun System Program 
The XM8 Armored Gun System is a direct-fire, lightly 
armored, mobile gun system intended to improve tactical 
mobility, lethality, and survivability over its predecessor, 
the M551A1 Sheridan. Designed to provide fire support for 
light contingency forces and other light armor operation 
requirements, the system emphasizes rapid strategic mobility 
through air transportability. The AGS is required to be Low 
Velocity Air Drop (LVAD) capable and roll-on/roll-off air 
transportable. Basing the design on Non-developmental Item 
(NDI) components, the system is to incorporate the following 
technologies: 
• XM-35 soft recoil 105mm cannon; 
• Main gun auto-reloader; 
• Lightweight titanium hatches; 
• Dual axis stabilization turret and sight; 
• Redundant commander/gunner controls; 
• Roll-out powerpack. 
To increase survivability, the AGS will additionally possess 
three levels of armor protection which the three man crew must 
be capable of removing or installing within three hours. 
Assigned ACAT II designation, the AGS Program is managed 
by the Project Manager, AGS, Warren, MI. in May 1992, the 
program successfully completed Milestone I/II Review. 
Subsequently, in June 1992, the EMD phase contract was awarded 
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to FMC Corporation, Ground Systems Division, later renamed 
United Defense, L. P., of Santa Clara, CA. The contract 
called for a ballistic structure, six test vehicles, and 
technical data. The program completed its Critical Design 
Review in September 1993 and anticipates equipping the first 
unit by December 1977. 
2.  The Advanced Anti-tank Weapon System - Medium Program 
In 1984 the Army approved the concept of the Advanced 
Anti-tank Weapons System - Medium, also known as the Javelin, 
to replace the Dragon Anti-tank Weapon System. Employing 
"fire-and-forget" and top-down attack technology, the 
Javelin's mission is to provide Army and Marine Corps 
dismounted infantry units with increased lethality against 
conventional and reactive armor. The system is required to be 
a man-portable, shoulder-fired, medium anti-tank missile 
system capable of defeating modern and future threat armor. 
Major improvements over the Dragon system include increased 
range and lethality, increased gunner survivability, reduced 
launch signature and effects, and decreased support 
requirements. The Javelin is comprised of two major 
components: a reusable command and launch unit (CLU) and the 
missile, sealed in a lightweight, disposable launch tube 
assembly. 
The Javelin Program is managed by the AAWS-M Project 
Office, Redstone Arsenal, AL, under direction of the Program 
Executive Officer for Fire Support. Categorized as an ACAT I 
D program, the system will be procured under the Army 
Streamlined Acquisition Process (ASAP). A team comprised of 
Texas Instruments, Incorporated and Martin Marietta 
Corporation, jointly titled Joint Venture, is contracted to 
produce the system from EMD through full rate production. 
The Javelin Program completed a 54-monthly engineering 
and manufacturing development phase and entered low rate 
initial production in FY 1994.  Production deliveries are 
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projected to begin in 1995 and extend through 2 006.  Total 
program costs, to include Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation, and Procurement Appropriations, are estimated at 
$4 billion for 58,000 missiles and 5,000 CLUs. (DoD IG, 1991, 
p-l) 
C.  ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
In HSIAM category A, the MANPRINT program was judged as 
above-standard (7.1) for its organizational support of HSI, 
based on the consistently above standard scores achieved by 
the AGS and Javelin programs (7.4 and 6.8 respectively). The 
advocacy of senior officials for the MANPRINT program is 
clearly reflected in the Army's well-defined HSI policies and 
procedures and by the formal incentives instituted to mandate 
its performance. However, due to the restrictive nature of 
such organizational policies, the Service's Program Managers 
possess less autonomy in the management of their programs. 
1.  Proponency and Policy 
Since its inception under the patronage of General M. R. 
Thurman, the MANPRINT prog-ram has received the active support 
of the Army's senior leadership. Both the DCSPER and the 
civilian SES MANPRINT Director are vocal proponents for the 
program. At the 1994 MANPRINT Practitioners Conference, the 
Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (RD&A) 
and the Assistant DCSOPS also praised the program and pledged 
their continued support. Every MANPRINT practitioner 
interviewed in the course of this research reaffirmed the 
Army's strong commitment to MANPRINT. One practitioner 
stated: 
Since 1984, MANPRINT has been a buzzword throughout 
the Army. But it has also been more than that. It 
has gotten people really thinking about the soldier 
and considering him throughout the various aspects 
of design. 
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The Army demonstrated its commitment to the principles of 
HSI through its establishment and empowerment of the MANPRINT 
Directorate, and the subsequent publication or Army Regulation 
602-2. To implement DoD Directive 5000.53, the regulation 
prescribes policies and procedures, and assigns 
responsibilities for the MANPRINT program throughout the 
Department of the Army. Additionally, AR 602-2 establishes 
the requirement and format for the SMMP and outlines the 
functions of MANPRINT during each phase of the acquisition 
cycle. 
For major programs, AR 602-2 explicitly defines the 
responsibilities of those tasked with the performance, 
support, and assessment of HSI. Most practitioners 
interviewed demonstrated a strong understanding of the 
organizational roles and relationships involved in the 
MANPRINT process. One PMO staff member acknowledged that 
occasionally debate arises regarding the delineation of 
MANPRINT issues from technical program issues. Nonetheless, 
he concluded, "We have all the policy we need." 
Slight discord was apparent regarding the policies for 
non-major programs and the procedures for executing MANPRINT's 
newest domain, soldier survivability. At their annual 
conference, several MANPRINT practitioners raised the issue of 
who is responsible for the assessment of ACAT III and IV 
programs and to what degree are those assessments are to be 
performed. In response, the Army Material -Command, who is 
delegated oversight responsibility of non-major programs has 
subsequently earmarked HRED to perform the assessments. 
Presently, HRED is designating responsibilities and defining 
the methodologies to determine which systems will require 
assessment. 
Introduced in 1992, the soldier survivability domain 
continues to experience growing pains as the roles and 
responsibilities for its execution are clarified.  In 1993, 
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the AGS was one of two acquisition systems to initiate 
survivability test assessments. Nonetheless, the AGS MANPRINT 
Manager maintains that because soldier survivability issues 
were previously dispersed among the other domains, 
responsibility for its execution remains clouded by 
bureaucratic conflict. In 1994, AR 602-2 was amended to 
address the organizational responsibilities proscribed to the 
soldier survivability domain. 
To ensure the adequacy of program-level HSI efforts, the 
Army institutionalized several formal incentives. The first 
of which is the direction to Program Executive Officers in AR 
602-2 to "rate assigned PM execution of MANPRINT 
responsibilities and consider such ratings in PM performance 
appraisals." A second incentive is the MANPRINT assessment 
process that was outlined in Chapter IV. The process requires 
that major programs submit their HSI programs for evaluation 
by the MANPRINT Directorate. The findings of these 
assessments are then presented before the Army Systems 
Acquisition Review Council by the DCSPER or his 
representative. Because negative assessment findings can 
adversely affect program progress, PMs are vigilant of their 
HSI efforts. 
During the 1994 MANPRINT Practitioners Conference general 
concern was express that MANPRINT assessments were not being 
adequately performed for non-major programs.15 Several 
practitioners stated that no "hammer" existed to enforce the 
utilization of MANPRINT methodology within AMC. Instead of 
advocating the institution of further incentives, the MANPRINT 
Director encouraged the practitioners to demonstrate the cost- 
and-operational-effectiveness of the MANPRINT program to their 
respective PEOs and PMs. A senior HRED representative echoed 
15
 _ HQ, AMC, HQ, TRADOC, and other applicable MACOMs are 
responsible for assessments of non-major programs. 
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this sentiment and broadened it to address the elimination of 
restrictive military acquisition regulations occurring 
throughout DoD. He confirmed that "the hammers are going 
away." Consequently, he said the philosophy of Army MANPRINT 
regulations is to tell the PMs what to do - not how to do it. 
Therefore, he concluded, it is incumbent upon HSI 
practitioners to continuously prove the value of the MANPRINT 
program to their senior acquisition officials. 
2.  Program Manager Restraints 
The MANPRINT program received its lowest score in any 
HSIAM category in the area of PM autonomy. Rated as slightly- 
below-standard (4) , the MANPRINT policies were found to lessen 
the authority of the PM to efficiently manage their programs. 
The MANPRINT assessment process was the primary target 
for criticism. While program staff members generally praised 
the HSI support provided by the MJWG members, discontent was 
expressed concerning the ability of external agencies, 
specifically the DA MANPRINT Directorate and the OSD HSI 
Division, to negatively influence programmatic decisions. 
Several of those interview related stories of instances where 
requirements imposed by the MANPRINT Directorate adversely 
affected program cost, schedule, and/or performance. 
One acquisition practitioner characterized the assessment 
process as an organizational culture in which many senior- 
staff personnel can say "no" to program initiatives, but few 
can say "yes." He stated, "You do not need bureaucrats to 
enforce MANPRINT; enforce it through the working groups and 
through the design, and have the PM answer for his MANPRINT 
initiatives -- where he succeeded and where he failed." This 
animosity, its causes, and its effects are discussed in detail 
later in the chapter. 
While restraining PM autonomy, the Army's MANPRINT 
policies provide Program Managers with systematic and 
standardized procedures for the performance of HSI. Through 
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AR 602-2,  PM's are guided in the development of their 
programs' HSI effort, and granted flexibility in the tailoring 
of that effort to the nature and magnitude of his program. 
Thus, earning the MANPRINT program only a slightly-below- 
average effectiveness score. 
D.  ORGANIZATIONAL OVERSIGHT 
Visibility earned the MANPRINT program a well-above 
standard score (7.7) in the HSIAM category for organizational 
oversight. Respectively, the AGS and Javelin programs 
received well-above standard (8.2), and above-standard (7.2) 
scores. Two factors prevailed. First, from the outset of the 
acquisition cycle, the user proponents for both the AGS and 
Javelin systems were actively involved in the HSI decision- 
making process. Secondly, the MANPRINT program instituted a 
traceable audit trail for the identification and tracking of 
HSI concerns. Supported by this documentation, the MANPRINT 
program's assessment and enforcement process was consequently 
determined to be highly effective despite the animosity it 
fosters. 
1.  User Proponent Visibility 
The Army's acquisition procedures ensure that the 
proponent for the system operator and maintainer, the TRADOC 
System Manager (TSM), is informed and involved throughout the 
design and development process. Upon approval of the Mission 
Needs Statement, Milestone 0, the TRADOC proponent service 
school is responsible for convening the MANPRINT Joint Working 
Group and subsequently initiating the System MANPRINT 
Management Plan. Thereafter, the TSM serves as a reminder to 
the PM of the needs of the soldier who will employ or maintain 
the system.  A PM observed: 
It is up to my user [the TSM] to ensure that I do 
not forget. If I get too busy with cost, schedule, 
or performance, he remind me that he is the 
customer and does not like a certain aspect of my program. 
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The TSM is kept continuously informed of system 
developments through the PMO. One program staff member 
illustrated the extent of this process by stating that "we 
don't sneeze unless we tell the TSM what we are doing; it is 
critical that someone from the school is nodding his head on 
little decisions." Additionally, as a permanent member of the 
MJWG, the TSM or his representative attends all MANPRINT 
meetings and is a key component of the program's HSI 
decisions-making process. To comply with user's needs and 
forestall miscommunications, one practitioner said, "The user 
representative is at the contractor's plant watching every 
single wart emerge on the skin of the system; every cost 
problem, every schedule problem, and every design problem." 
The AGS Program was credited with an outstanding HSIAM 
score (9) for taking the additional step of expanding its PMO 
staff to include a Armor Master Gunner and a Armor Mechanic 
Non-Commissioned Officer. In this way, the program draws upon 
in-house expertise to obtain immediate and continuous 
information regarding the capabilities and needs of the system 
operators and maintainers. 
The Javelin Program, likewise, brought in anti-armor 
expertise to compliment its development efforts. Early- on, 
the PMO enlisted the TSM and additional trainers from the 
Anti-Armor School, Fort Benning, GA, into the MANPRINT effort. 
These representatives were tasked to construct potential 
battlefield scenarios for the proposed system to guide the 
contractor's design process. The benefit, according to a 
civilian HSI practitioner, was that both the PM and contractor 
were provided with immediate insight into the users problems 
and concerns. 
2.  HSI Audit Trail 
The second demonstrated area of excellence within the 
MANPRINT process is its HSI documentation and tracking 
procedures. From program initiation to fielding,  the MANPRINT 
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program maintains a systematic process to document, address, 
and track to resolution HSI issues identified by the user, the 
TSM, the PMO staff, HSI support agencies, or the prime and 
subcontractors. 
The cornerstone of this effort is the System MANPRINT 
Management Plan (SMMP). Comparable to DoD's HSI Plan, the 
SMMP is a living planning and management guide. It is used by- 
all activities involved in the material acquisition process to 
ensue that HSI issues are addressed throughout the system's 
life-cycle. AR 602-2 defines the mission of the SMMP as 
follows: 
The SMMP provides an audit trail. The SMMP will 
document the data sources, analyses, trade-offs, 
and decisions made throughout the acquisition 
process. The plan serves as documentation of what 
was considered and why it was or was not used. 
In addition, the SMMP is a source of HSI continuity for the 
MANPRINT effort. New personnel can review the SMMP and 
determine why and what tasks, actions, and analyses have or 
have not been scheduled and performed, what actions must be 
coordinated and scheduled, and who is involved in the effort. 
(AR 602-2, p. 11, 1990) Appendix F contains a sample format 
for a SMMP. 
As a living document, the SMMP is revised as new MANPRINT 
information or concerns are identified. But due to the swift 
pace of system design and development, SMMP revisions were 
found to lag behind the MANPRINT process. To stay abreast of 
immediate HSI issues, the AGS and Javelin programs both rely 
on the minutes of their MJWG meetings. To enhance the 
effectiveness of its HSI audit trail still further, the AGS 
program developed an additional tracking tool -- the MANPRINT 
Log. A civilian HSI consultant explained the documentation 
procedures as follows: 
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The MANPRINT Log tracks issues so they are not 
swept under the rug which is easy to do in a 
massive, complicated systems development program. 
We track each issue individually through the point 
of resolution... Once an item is on the tracking 
system it stays there until it is either closed out 
by the Government or the contractor says 'That is 
all I can do for it' and the something has to be 
resolved. 
The MANPRINT Log is contained in two documents: the Detailed 
Log and the Summary Log. The Logs delineate the aspect of the 
system in which an HSI concern exists, a description of the 
concern, its origin,16 its status,17 its influence on 
system design, and the MANPRINT domain effected. The MANPRINT 
Log is maintained and updated on a computerized data base by 
the prime contractor. 
Prior to prototyping, the AGS MANPRINT Log grew to 247 
issues ranging from Troop Commander visibility ranges to 
Driver's hatch accessibility to seat cover durability. The 
AGS MANPRINT Manager explained that the identification of so 
many HSI issues is a mixed blessing, analogous to a glass 
being viewed as half-full or as half-empty. He said, "We 
consider our glass half-full because we have identified issues 
that can then be resolved by either taking action or doing 
nothing." However, he said, some outside observers view the 
documentation of that many issues as "a crisis," as the glass 
being half-empty. "That is malarkey," he asserted, stating 
that it is preferable to be aware of the issues and deal with 
them to fail to identify them. 
16
 Origins include: 1) System Hazard Analysis, 2) 
Product Design Team, 3) User-Juries, or 4) Micro Analysis and 
Design. 
17
 Issue status may be 1) unresolved, 2) resolved, 3) 
completed by contractor, or 4) closed by the Government. 
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3.  HSI Review and Assessment Process 
MANPRINT's through documentation procedures also enhance 
the effectiveness of its assessment process by providing 
outstanding visibility into the HSI decision-making process. 
For the PMs, however, this too often proves to be a dual-edged 
sword. For major and Level I non-major programs, the DCSPER 
MANPRINT Directorate is chartered to: 
Review and monitor material objectives, 
requirements documents, System MANPRINT Management 
Plans, acquisition strategy documents, and other 
pertinent acquisition related documents in material 
development or improvement to ensure that MANPRINT 
is addressed early and continuously in the 
development of total system performance 
requirements. 
Thus, a former Assistant PM stated, the MANPRINT assessors 
armed with program documentation "smite us with our own 
arrows." A MANPRINT assessor confirmed that "we do most of 
our work off of paper; whatever documents people [PMO] give us 
is all that we get." 
The MANPRINT process was judged highly effective at 
identifying and evaluating HSI issues at both the program and 
Department of the Army levels. Yet, while those interviewed 
commended the communicative and cooperative nature of lower- 
level MANPRINT reviews, several practitioners commented 
negatively on the detachment of the DA and OSD HSI assessors. 
A former program staff member illustrated the situation as 
follows: 
It is like someone coming up to Michelangelo after 
15 years of working on a statue and pointing out a 
flaw. 'it is a really nice statue, but you have a 
chip on his elbow. Could you recut the whole thing 
out of a new block of granite?' You have spent 
$500,000,000 on the development of a new missile 
system. You have made the painful trade-offs as 
you went through. Then, on the last minute of 
development in a 54-month program, a critic walks 
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in and says, 'You have a chip on the elbow. How 
are you going to fix it?' 
The primary criticism leveled against the MANPRINT assessors 
was that, in general, they lack operational expertise with the 
systems they are tasked to judge. Asserting that the Army 
"does not need a MANPRINT police force," one acquisition 
practitioner stated: 
What we have at DA and OSD is offices staffed with 
people, who have never had to design or produce a 
system, and in most cases have never used a system 
in any type of operational environment, passing 
judgement on the technical, budgetary, and 
scheduling efforts that have been made by hundreds 
of highly qualified people from Government and 
industry. On the eve of production, they are 
standing at the gate passing critical judgement. 
These critics expressed the concern that MANPRINT assessors 
lack the experiential insight gained by employment of the 
system or direct interface with the users and design 
engineers. Further, such critics charge assessors second- 
guess the PM's decision-making process and, unlike the PM, are 
not held accountable for the consequences of their judgements. 
MANPRINT assessors counter that it is their impartiality 
that allows them to evaluate systems based on the best 
interests of the soldier and the Service. Several assessors 
expressed the opinion that the MANPRINT Directorate is often 
a stronger soldier's advocate than the user. One assessor 
stated: 
The school house is supposed to be the 
representative of the user, but in a lot of ways I 
do not think they do as good a job as they could. 
They are occupied developing training plans, and do 
not have the time to be the advocate for the 
soldiers. I see the MANPRINT practitioners as the 
advocates for the soldiers. 
Another assessor contends that PMs do not ignore HSI 
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intentionally, but rather do so from lack of HSI expertise. 
He stated, that "the vast majority of PMs want to help the 
soldier and produce a quality produce, and we just try to 
steer them in the right direction." 
Frequently, the DA-level assessor defend such HSI issues 
as heat- and combat-load limitations that the user, by 
overestimating soldier prowess, disregards as inconsequential. 
For example, in the case of the Pedestal-Mounted Stinger, the 
Directorate identified a potential problem with extreme 
climatic conditions denigrating the soldier's capability to 
operate the system. Arguing that the soldier could sustain 
the heat conditions without undue difficulty, the user 
authorized production to continue. When deployed during 
Operation Desert Shield, heat stress again became a critical 
issue. Due to the user's subsequent requests contracted 
engineers were deployed to Saudi Arabia to perform costly in- 
place system modifications. 
A similar debate centered around the weight of the 
Javelin. Initially, the Javelin Program established a system 
weight threshold of 45 pounds with a desired weight of 35 
pounds. Later it became apparent that the system could not 
meet its weight threshold without sacrificing significant 
technical capabilities desired by the user. In December 1991, 
a DoD IG Audit Report, "Acquisition of the Advanced Anti-Tank 
Weapon System-Medium," addressed the weight issue. The report 
contented that at 49.5 pounds without the inclusion of the 
replacement batteries for the Command Launch Unit (2.25 
pounds) or the Launch Tube Assembly (1.06 pounds) , the Javelin 
was too heavy to be one-man-portable.  The report determined 
that: 
The Javelin could be carried by only five percent 
of the soldiers if the system's weight was 35 to 42 
pounds, and could not be carried by a soldier 
without risk of injury to the soldier or 
degradation of  the  soldier's mission  if  the 
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system's weight exceeded 45 pounds. (DoD IG, 1991, 
p. 16) 
Finally, the DoD IG's Office questioned whether the Javelin 
would be operationally effective and suitable for use by light 
infantry and airborne forces. 
Citing that "MANPRINT tried several times over the years 
to surface the [weight] issue, but was largely unsuccessful," 
one HSI assessor stated that the "PM blew aside human 
considerations." The assessor asserted that Program Managers 
frequently get caught up in the appeal of "sexy technology," 
and in cost, schedule, and performance considerations, and 
consequently disregard human issues as too mundane. 
A former Javelin Program APM contests this observation. 
He states that the user was continually informed of and 
knowingly accepted the HSI trade-off between system weight and 
state-of-the-art technology. Following JROC review, an 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum was issued establishing a new 
weight threshold at 49.5 pounds with the provision that if the 
system exceeded this limit the program would be subject to 
termination. "When the user formally said he would accept 
49.5 pounds, that should have been the end of any argument 
from the MANPRINT people," said one PMO member. "When you have 
done the best you can, you do not need some critic walking in 
at the end and saying 'No, that is not good,' especially when 
the customer is there ready to accept the system." 
However, to preclude further confrontation with HSI 
oversight authorities, the customer, represented by the TSM, 
subsequently redefined the term "one-man-portable to refer to 
Javelin's single man operation, not to its method of 
transport. Further, reiterating his concern for the soldier, 
he pledged that he would ensure that the weapon system was 
employed properly once it was fielded. Additionally, the PMO 
redoubled its weight management efforts. "We [PMO] gave up 
things like the bipod, shaved every bit of weight we could 
145 
from the launch tube... and spent millions of dollars on the 
latest in synthetic and graphite components," a staff member 
explained. 
Both sides of the debate concede that the earlier and 
more actively MANPRINT assessors are involved in the program 
procurement cycle the better and less adversarial is the 
inter-organizational communications. This is especially true 
for non-major programs which are subject to less oversight, 
and whose MANPRINT assessment efforts are therefore more 
dependent on the PM's initiative. A PERSCOM representative 
stated: 
Category III programs are our weakest area. We try 
to assess high visibility programs, but it comes 
down to how interested the PM is in seeking our 
help. We do not have the resources to address all 
the ACAT III programs. 
The current policy of the AGS and Javelin programs is to 
maintain a periodic dialogue with the MANPRINT assessors. In 
that way, the assessors are continually aware of the program's 
status, and can make better informed judgements. 
The MANPRINT program achieved an above-standard grade 
(7.5) for its capability to effectively enforce the correction 
of HSI issues. MANPRINT's power of enforcement resides in the 
authority vested in the DCSPER as a standing member of the 
ASARC. Representing the MANPRINT domains, the DCSPER can 
present unresolved or inadequately addressed HSI issues before 
the Council, and thereby influence the AAE's decision to grant 
Milestone Approval. As one MANPRINT practitioner asserted: 
"MANPRINT has teeth. It has a three-star General that votes 
on the ASARC, and can kill a system." 
4.  Feedback Mechanisms 
User-juries, or mock-up reviews, were the key feedback 
mechanism employed by both the AGS and Javelin programs to 
evaluate the effectiveness of their HSI efforts. In 1992, the 
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AGS PM was commended by the DCSPER for "his use of 'user- 
juries' to evaluate proposed solutions during source selection 
and to provide close scrutiny during periodic design reviews." 
To date, the AGS Program has conducted two user-juries. 
The first user-jury was conducted in August 1992 before 
hardware design was finalized. The user-jury, which consisted 
of both operators and maintainers, was credited with aiding 
the contractor's understanding of the user's requirements, 
influencing system design, and creating an up-front focus on 
MANPRINT. 
During this user-jury, 74 MANPRINT issues were identified 
of which 67 were raised by soldiers from the 3-73 Armor Unit. 
Of all the issues, 61 were subsequently incorporated in to the 
system's design to include the following: 
• Dual turret control panel incorporated for ease of use; 
• User input on computer control panels to make user 
friendly; 
• Driver hatch redesigned for ease of ingress/egress for 
crew; 
• Belly plate redesign for ease of maintenance; 
• Guards  provide  for  engine  cables  for  service 
durability. 
By mutual consent, 13 remaining issues were not incorporated. 
The second user-jury was conducted from 25 April to 13 
May 1994, following prototype fabrication. The purpose of the 
user-jury was to validate all possible MANPRINT design 
requirements from the purchase description and verify the 
operator logistics package. Employing soldiers with ranks 
from Sergeant to Master Sergeant and 8 to 21 years of 
experience, the jury succeeded in validating all the Training 
Manual operator and maintenance tasks, and commenting on 361 
MANPRINT issues. 
The AGS prime contractor, United Defense, L. P., also 
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actively sought out the soldier's perspective for its AGS 
demonstrator, the Close Combat Vehicle-Light (CCVL). The CCVL 
design benefitted from a six-month user evaluation conducted 
from November 1987 to April 1988 during the Customer Test of 
the Manned Turret Demonstrator. The company claims that 
"continually refining our product, we proudly offer a soldier- 
driven AGS design." 
One criticism lodged against the Army user-jury process 
is that it may not adequately reflect the capabilities of 
regular soldiers. In a Memorandum for the Record regarding 
Javelin weight and portability issues, the OSD HSI Division 
stated that the Army's Office of the Surgeon General 
requirement for only volunteer soldiers to be used in system 
testing may inhibit a true assessment of typical soldiers. 
The Javelin TSM concurred with this critique. Additionally, 
a former Javelin staff member acknowledged an Army-wide 
practice of using specially-trained personnel from the 
Training and Doctrine Command for user-juries, instead of 
selecting soldiers from the field. The AGS Program 
compensated for this deficiency by intentionally enlisting 
standard Army units for its user-jury evaluations. 
E.  ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT 
The well-above standard effectiveness score (7.9) 
obtained by the MANPRINT program in HSIAM category C displays 
more than the Army's abundant organizational resources for the 
support of HSI. This strong score also demonstrates the 
Army's development of forums for the analysis of HSI trade-off 
early enough in the acquisition process to effectively 
influence system design. Both programs were credited with 
outstanding scores (9) for their use of MANPRINT Joint Working 
Groups to integrate human issues into the acquisition cycle. 
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1. HSI Support Resources 
Chapter IV outlined the organizational components of the 
Army's extensive HSI support infra-structure. For example, 
the AGS Program's system safety and health hazards domains are 
supported by no less than eight organizations which include 
the Armor School, the Army Medical Department Center and 
School, the Surgeon General's Office, the Tank-Automotive 
Command, the Armaments Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center, TRADOC, the Army Safety Center, and the Health 
Services Command. Another key organization for HSI support is 
the Army Research Laboratory, HRED, which manages both the 
Human Research Engineering and the Survivability/Lethality 
Analysis Directorates. 
2. HSI Forums 
In organizing its extensive support resources, the 
MANPRINT program has developed a highly effective tool for the 
deliberation of HSI issues -- the MANPRINT Joint Working Group 
(MJWG) . The majority of those interviewed praised the MJWG as 
being the core of the MANPRINT process. Through periodically 
scheduled meetings, representatives for all seven MANPRINT 
domains are provided an opportunity to voice their HSI 
concerns for the consideration of the assembled group. One 
acquisition practitioner asserted that the strength of the 
MJWG is that it brings domain specialists, attuned to 
programmatic concerns, "around the table to make sure that all 
issues are considered, to watch the design process, and to 
raise their issues." 
Both the AGS and Javelin programs espoused strong support 
for the utilization of MJWGs. The AGS MANPRINT Manager 
elaborated that "we are trying to execute what the school- 
houses require without making it a bureaucratic process; by 
assembling a conscientious meeting of key player to at least 
surface and discuss issues." With this objective, the AGS 
Program redesignated its MJWG a MANPRINT Management Team 
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(MMT). According to the MANPRINT Manager, the intent of the 
title change was to remind practitioners that the purpose of 
the AGS Program was to field a functional system rapidly 
without being entangled in bureaucratic meetings. To this 
end, the MMT is chaired by the AGS Program MANPRINT Manager 
with his industry counterpart serving as vice chairman. 
Normally lasting two days, MJWG meetings convene quarterly in 
conjunction with ILST meetings. The MMT agenda includes such 
items as MANPRINT Log reviews, SMMP revision, and domain 
status reports and assessments. 
The Javelin Program instituted a similar MJWG schedule. 
In accordance with AR 602-2, the MJWG was initially assembled 
by the Infantry School, TRADOC, prior to Milestone 0. During 
the program's recently completed 54-month EMD phase, the MJWG 
met quarterly coincident with system technical review. The 
frequency of the meetings is now projected to decrease as the 
influence of MANPRINT analysis diminishes with the 
stabilization of system design. 
The Army has traditionally emphasized and vigorously 
supported the education of its soldiers. The MANPRINT program 
is no exception. While not mandatory, the MANPRINT training 
courses listed in Chapter IV are offered to U.S. Armed Forces 
personnel, allied-Service personnel, and industry 
representatives. To date over 5000 students have attended 
MANPRINT training. The Army Logistics Management School also 
makes available to MANPRINT practitioners a wide array of HSI 
references and publications. Through the persistent efforts 
of the MANPRINT Directorate, the Army continues to actively 
expand the sources and curriculum of its MANPRINT training. 
F.  PROGRAM APPLICATION 
1.  Overview 
"Hell," said one acquisition practitioner, "everyone 
likes MANPRINT and everyone wants MANPRINT, but to what degree 
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can you obtain MANPRINT?" Category D, Program Application, 
answers that question for the AGS and Javelin programs. The 
average HSIAM effectiveness score (7.4) exhibits the Army's 
capability to consistently achieve above-standard levels of 
HSI. Both acquisition programs demonstrated proficiency in 
the understanding and application of HSI techniques. In 
endeavoring to fulfill the user's needs, the AGS and Javelin 
programs excelled in their ability to communicate, secure, and 
ultimately integrate their human systems requirements. 
2.  Program Management Commitment 
Despite a profusion of MANPRINT slogans encouraging 
Program Management Offices to "equip the man, not man the 
equipment," the true well-spring of program-level commitment 
to HSI appears to be the operational awareness of the military 
staff. As one practitioner explained: "We have our civilians 
who provide the institutional knowledge on how to do MANPRINT- 
specific procedures, and then we have our military personnel 
who bring in the nuts-and-bolts issues." Another practitioner 
echoed this opinion citing that civilians maintain the 
institutional memory, while military personnel maintain the 
operational flavor and perspective." 
Based on prior experience, military staff members provide 
their programs with knowledge of the operational capabilities 
and needs of the system operator and maintainer. Confirming 
the criticality of such operational insight, one HSI 
practitioner stated: 
... military personnel are probably more sensitive 
to the soldier than anyone. They share a kinship 
with the soldiers and want to look out for their 
welfare. 
Although the Army has established a separate career track for 
its acquisition professionals, those interviewed were adamant 
that they had not and would not lose their operational 
awareness.  Reaffirming his alliance to the armor field, the 
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AGS MANPRINT Manager asserted, "I am still deep down a tanker. 
I can remember be ugly, cold, and muddy." 
The AGS and Javelin programs offices both expressed their 
firm commitment to the needs of user through their aggressive 
MANPRINT programs. A Javelin HSI practitioner said that he 
"could not remember an instance where the PM was hesitant to 
support or fund any MANPRINT effort." Despite funding and 
manpower constraints, he continued, the PM never hesitated to 
ensure that MANPRINT practitioners could attend critical 
program events. In March 1994, the DCSPER extolled the PM on 
"his willingness to incorporate design improvements to enhance 
MANPRINT features." The AGS PM has received similar 
commendation from external HSI practitioners. A MANPRINT 
Directorate staff member characterized the situation by 
stating: 
Our Program Managers know MANPRINT is important. 
They may not like to do it all the time, but they 
know it is important. That is why most of them 
have an Assistant PM specifically for MANPRINT. 
In fact, the AGS Program does maintain a military officer 
in the billet of MANPRINT Manager.  According to a MANPRINT 
assessor, this action was taken because the program initially 
failed to  consider MANPRINT,  and subsequently required 
additional expertise to fix resultant problems.  Like the 
Javelin's civilian MANPRINT Manager, the AGS MANPRINT Manager 
works within the program's ILS Division.   Surprisingly, 
neither program's MANPRINT Manager has  formal MANPRINT 
training.  A graduate of the Material Acquisition Management 
Course, the AGS MANPRINT Manager derives his HSI expertise 
from on-the-job training and prior military experience.  The 
recently appointed Javelin MANPRINT Manager possesses previous 
acquisition experienced as a Logistical Management Specialist. 
She is currently scheduled to attend the MANPRINT Action 
Officer Course.  So, while both programs maintain managers 
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specially tasked with HSI management, neither manager is 
formally trained despite the Army's extensive MANPRINT 
training program. 
3.  Program Documentation 
The "MANPRINT Quarterly" in its winter 1995 edition 
stressed that no major conflicts exist between HSI and 
MANPRINT. Both programs, it states, require management plans; 
the Army's is the SMMP and DoD's is the HSIP. Consequently, 
in developing their respective SMMPs in accordance with the 
requirements of AR 602-2, both the AGS and Javelin programs 
produced above-standard HSIPs. The SMMPs include analysis of 
an additional domain, soldier survivability, which is not 
required in the HSIP and will not be evaluated in this thesis. 
Reflecting MANPRINT's historical foundation, the AGS 
Program's HSI documentation was strongest its analyses of 
human factors engineering (7.5), system safety (7.5), and 
health hazards (7.5), and weaker in manpower (6.5) and 
personnel (6.5). The AGS MANPRINT Manager recognized the 
competition inherent the HSI arena and acknowledged the 
dominance of human factors engineering.  He stated: 
Human factors has always been a big piece of 
MANPRINT because Human Factors Engineers have been 
doing this for years. Every thing else below that 
became secondary... Human factors considerations 
overwhelm other domains... Because we have been 
doing human factors, safety, and heal hazards for 
so many years, those systems exist and are 
efficient. Where we [the Army] get loose is in 
manpower and personnel.... 
This fact is evident throughout the AGS procurement cycle 
by the PMO's aggressive efforts to address human factors 
issues. A 1991 MANPRINT Review by the Human Engineering 
Laboratory identified a number of deficiencies related to the 
AGS predecessor system, the M551A1 Sheridan. These issues 
ranged from inadequate seating, and ingress/egress problems, 
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to the need for a micro-climatic cooling system. The PMO was 
later commended by the DCSPER for articulating many of these 
issues as MANPRINT requirements in the RFP. The program's 
extensive MANPRINT Log program is further evidence of PMO's 
continued dedication to surfacing potential human issues. The 
program's second user-jury alone generated over 360 MANPRINT 
Log entries. 
Interestingly, despite this vigorous effort and the 
current DoD-wide concern for the heat-load of combat vehicles 
operating in extreme climatic conditions, the AGS Program did 
not include a cooling system in its system design. In 
defending the decision, the MANPRINT Manager stated the system 
ORE) was developed prior to the publication of lessons learned 
from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and therefore 
cooling requirements were not initially included. The ORD was 
not subsequently amended because, based on the urgency of need 
for the system and its size and weight constraints to achieve 
LVAD capability, "the Armor School decided it was not a big 
requirement." While a cooling system was desired in the RFP, 
it was not required whereas the LVAD capability "was not to be 
sacrificed." 
The Army Research Laboratory continues to argue for the 
inclusion of a cooling system requirement. "ARL beats us 
[PMO] up on it," the MANPRINT Manager said, "and our answer is 
that it is not a requirement. Make it a requirement, give us 
some money, and accept a year or so delay in the program and 
we will provide it." 
One AGS staff member displayed dismay at the program's 
manpower and personnel achievements. He stated that the 
contractor's MPT analyses provided little information beyond 
what could have been done derived intuitively. He stated that 
despite employing the services of three consultants at a cost 
of over $10,000, the results of HARDMAN III analysis were 
negligible. 
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The Javelin Program has similarly focused the majority of 
its MANPRINT effort into the domain of human factors 
engineering, specifically in its search to reduce system 
weight. Each program staff member interview stressed the 
priority placed on weight reduction. One practitioner said 
that "MANPRINT" s success was in looking at the system and then 
shaving weight." Weight reduction efforts went as far as 
decreasing the system's protective foam padding, redesigning 
the carrying bag's clips and fasteners, and eliminating a 
prone-firing bipod. Ultimately, though, one practitioner 
conceded that "no MANPRINT effort, no matter how outstanding, 
could have overcome the demand for new technologies. To kill 
a modern battle tank, you have to accept a certain amount of 
system mass." 
In January 1994, the Javelin Program was the subject of 
an integrated MANPRINT assessment in preparation for a 
Milestone IIIA ASARC Review. Despite the PMO's best weight 
management efforts and the Army's and OSD's acceptance of a 
49.5 pound weight limit, MANPRINT assessors, nonetheless, 
rated system weight as an amber (major) human factors 
engineering issue. The weight issue was also reflected in the 
manpower domain's amber rating due to the potential 
requirement for two personnel to carry the system over 
extended distances. 
Reaffirming the domain strengths demonstrated by the AGS 
Program, no issues were identified in the system safety or 
health hazards disciplines. The Independent Safety Assessment 
stated that the PM had an effective system safety program. 
Further, the Health Hazards Report provided recommendations to 
adequately control potential health risks. A former APM joked 
that within the MANPRINT process the health hazards posed by 
lead toxicity - - equivalent to smoking approximately one 
cigarette -- was a major concern while lead bullets fired by 
the enemy were not. 
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Due to "the synergistic effect of multiple manpower, 
personnel, and training concerns," the MPT assessment team 
coded the Javelin Program as red (critical). This rating was 
based primarily on training deficiencies. Whereas the 
personnel domain was coded as amber (major) for one concern, 
its failure to create an Additional Skill Identifier for the 
Javelin gunners, training was cited in one critical issue and 
five concerns. The critical issue challenged the adequacy of 
the System Training Plan (STRAP). The plan failed to fully 
quantify the training support, personnel, and resources 
required to upgrade current Dragon facilities to support 
Javelin training. The Infantry School subsequently projected 
a $3,000,000 system cost increase. The assessment's five 
additional training concerns include: 
• Weapon back-blast must be identified for training 
safety as a potential danger for personnel; 
• Training to positively identify targets with the 
CLU/sight at extended ranges (greater than 1000 meters) 
has not been addressed; 
• Javelin will require soldier proficiency in acquiring 
targets via thermal images, however, there is currently 
no thermal image training base available; 
• The Javelin Manpower Estimate Report (MER) states that 
the current authorized procurement quantities for each 
of the Javelin training devices is significantly 
greater that the Dragon training device quantities; 
• The MER and the STRAP have conflicting data about which 
MOS will maintain the Javelin system. 
While noting these criticisms, the MANPRINT Directorate 
reported to the ASARC in March 1994 that there were no issues 
that would prevent the Javelin Program from proceeding to low 
rate initial production. 
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4. Integration 
Examination of the MANPRINT procedures employed by the 
AGS and Javelin programs reveals that human considerations 
were effectively integrated between and among the HSI 
disciplines. Integration was achieved at the program-level 
through the MANPRINT Joint Working Group and at the Major 
Command- and Service-level through the MANPRINT review and 
assessment process. These procedures were found to support 
both horizontal and vertical integration of human issues. A 
civilian HSI practitioner summarized this institutionalized 
exchange and integration of information when he asserted that 
"MANPRINT is communications." 
5. Contractor Involvement 
To effectively communicate their MANPRINT requirements to 
industry, the AGS and Javelin programs relied on the source 
selection process. The MANPRINT philosophy maintains that the 
single most reliable indicator to industry that the Army is 
serious about its expressed commitment to human factors is the 
degree to which human factors can make a difference whether a 
contract is won or lost. A civilian HSI consultant 
reconfirmed the need for contractual documentation of HSI 
requirements by stating: 
If the Program Management Office emphasize it [HSI] 
it will get support. If it is strongly stated in 
the RFP, so that the contractor's proposal strongly 
emphasizes it, it will get support. If it does 
not, most of the human factors areas are hard-put 
to generate support in an engineering environment. 
For this reason, the AGS program established the following 
source selection criteria, listed in descending order of 
precedence:  1)  technical, 2)  logistics,  3) MANPRINT, 4) 
contractor's past performance, 5) cost, 6) management and 
production expertise, and 7) schedule. 
The Javelin Program, likewise, required contractors to 
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address MANPRINT issues and efforts in their contract 
proposals. The Javelin prime contractor, Joint Venture, 
subsequently restated the Army's HSI requirements to the 
subcontractor through statements of work. According to Joint 
Ventures, subcontractors in their proposals were required to 
provide a MANPRINT Program Plan that "outlined how MANPRINT 
issues were to be addressed and demonstrated their ability and 
intent to implement MANPRINT into their system design/ 
product." Hence, as a consequence of including MANPRINT 
criteria in the source selection process, not only were the 
Army's HSI requirements contractually formalized, but the 
contractors were also afforded an opportunity to demonstrate 
their HSI proficiency. 
Joint Venture was praised by members of the Javelin 
Program staff for its up-front presentation of a conscientious 
MANPRINT effort. From the outset, Joint Venture offered 
proposals which explicitly delineated its MANPRINT objectives. 
Due to this proactive approach, Joint Venture entered the 
program not only with an effective MANPRINT strategy, but also 
with the necessary personnel and resources in-place to execute 
it. 
Joint Venture's MANPRINT organization includes dedicated 
MANPRINT coordinators within Martin Marietta and Texas 
Instruments.  The MANPRINT coordinators are responsible for: 
• Overseeing and conducting daily MANPRINT activities; 
• Identifying required MANPRINT analyses; 
• Coordinating with technical activities to ensure the 
integration of all six domains; 
• Tracking critical MANPRINT issues; 
• Ensuring MANPRINT issues are identified, tracked, and 
resolved in a timely manner; 
• Initiating changes in the MANPRINT Management Plan; 
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• Monitoring the MANPRINT efforts of subcontractors and 
implementing the MANPRINT subcontract plan; 
• Ensuring personnel are properly trained in MANPRINT; 
• Ensuring that all engineering change proposals are 
reviewed from a MANPRINT perspective. 
The coordinators are supported by a MANPRINT Working Group 
(MWG) consisting of technical representatives from each 
domain. The MWG was responsible for considering the MANPRINT 
implications of design alternatives and formulating 
recommendations for enhancing the MANPRINT characteristics of 
the system design. MWG meetings were initially scheduled 
monthly for the first year of development and then occurred 
informally on a weekly basis there after. 
United Defense, L. P., entered program negotiations 
similarly armed with an aggressive HSI program, which it 
boasts predated the formal emergence of the MANPRINT program. 
At the start of the solicitation process, the contractor 
introduced a formal MANPRINT action plan founded on the 
integration techniques it developed during previous armored 
vehicle programs. Claiming that its commitment to the AGS 
MANPRINT program is second-to-none, United Defense, L. P., 
asserts that its MANPRINT program: 
• Optimizes the AGS design; 
• Integrates all six MANPRINT domains with AGS concurrent 
engineering; 
• Builds on FMC's (United Defense, L. P.) extensive and 
relevant experience; 
• Uses the right organizations and personnel resources 
effectively; 
• Ensures subcontractor/vendor compliance; 
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• Manages AGS program data efficiently; 
• Provides timely design inputs with full compliance to 
master schedules. 
To achieve these objectives, United Defense, L. P., 
grants MANPRINT organizational stature equal to the other 
major program areas. Reporting directly to the system PM, the 
MANPRINT Manager is likewise equal in status to the other 
members of the AGS management team. In conjunction with the 
PM, the MANPRINT Manager is also responsible for monitor the 
subcontractors HSI efforts. 
The firm's MANPRINT philosophy it to promote 
"communications both between specialists in the six domains 
and with other members of the concurrent engineering team. 
Thus, the MANPRINT specialists are collocated with the 
principal concurrent engineering team. The specialists are 
further empowered with sign-off authority on all engineering 
drawings. Integration is facilitated through weekly meetings 
of the Contractors MANPRINT Working Group. Comparable to the 
Army's MJWG, the purpose of the CMWG is to surface, address, 
and ultimately generate a consensus on each domain's MANPRINT 
concerns. Issues and alternatives are then collectively 
presented to the design engineers for action. "The key to 
success is this unified approach," concluded an HSI 
consultant. 
G.  SUMMARY 
Overall, the Army's MANPRINT program averaged 210 points 
out of a possible 280 points. Achieving a compliance 
percentage of 75.1 percent, the MANPRINT program was graded as 
well-above-standard in its capability to support and execute 
HSI in accordance with the requirements of DoD Instruction 
5000.2. This outcome was based on the consistently strong 
scores posted by both acquisition programs in each category. 
The AGS Program with 216 total points earned a well-above- 
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Standard compliance percentage of 77.3 percent. With 203 
total points, the Javelin Program was judged as above-standard 
by virtue of its final compliance percentage of 72.9 percent. 
Through analysis of the HSIAM effectiveness scores 
meaningful insights can be drawn as to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the MANPRINT program. The major strengths 
exhibited by the MANPRINT program in its application within 
the AGS and Javelin programs include the following: 
• Senior-level proponency for HSI; 
• Systematic procedures, clearly defined through 
organizational policies, for the application, 
performance and support of HSI; 
• Continuous and active involvement of the proponent for 
the system operator and maintainer in the HSI decision- 
making process; 
• Traceable audit trail which documents HSI issues from 
identification through resolution; 
• Aggressive HSI review and assessment procedures for the 
evaluation and enforcement of adequate HSI procedures; 
• Structured forums for the identification and 
integration of HSI issues, and the subsequent 
formulation of design initiatives to accommodate human 
capabilities and limitations; 
• Inclusion of HSI requirements in the source selection 
process to formalize and contractually document 
contractor commitment to HSI requirements. 
Additionally, the MANPRINT program exhibited the following 
deficiencies: 
• Limited latitude granted to the Program Manager in the 
application and execution of HSI; 
• Organizational animosity produced by bureaucratic 
oversight procedures hindering efficient program 
management; 
• Persistent organizational and budgetary threats to HSI 
resources, funding, and personnel. 
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Through centralized HSI policy management, multi-tiered 
assessments, institutional incentives, and standardized 
procedures, the MANPRINT program achieves consistent and 
effective integration of human issues into the acquisition 
process. Minimal variance and optimal integration are the 
hallmarks of the MANPRINT process. The next chapter will 
contrast these characteristics against those demonstrated by 
the Marine Corps' HSI program. 
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VII.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A.  OVERVIEW 
In complying with DoD's mandates, the Army and Marine 
Corps have developed distinctive HSI programs. Each program 
possesses unique strengths and weaknesses and hence achieves 
varying levels of effectiveness as illustrated in Table 7-1. 
PROGRAM SCORE COMPLIANCE 
PERCENTAGE 
Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV) 
155 55.3 
Short-Range Anti-tank Weapon 
System (SRAW/Predator) 
121 44.1 
Marine Corps HSI Program Average 138 49.7 
Armored Gun System (AGS) 216 77.3 
Advanced Anti-tank Weapon 
System (AAWS-M/Javelin) 
203 72.9 
Army MANPRINT Program Average 210 75.1 
Table 7-1 Total HSIAM effectiveness values by acquisition 
program and Service. 
Through comparative analysis, this chapter identifies 
those Service-unique organizational policies, procedures, and 
practices which have benefitted or hindered the effective 
performance of HSI. 
B.  FINDINGS 
The Army and Marine Corps HSI programs reflect the 
disparate philosophical tenets, institutional cultures, and 
organizational resources of the Services they are designed to 
serve.   While both programs comply with the specific 
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requirements of DoD Instruction 5000.2, their HSI 
methodologies vary according to the operational requirements 
and constraints imposed by their respective organizational 
environments. The fundamental characteristics of each 































Table 7-2  Comparative analysis of the Army MANPRINT 
program and the Marine Corps HSI program. 
1.  Proponency 
The first and most important area of contrast between the 
Services is the organizational proponency for HSI and its 
consequences. The MANPRINT program was conceived and 
institutionalized under the patronage 
of senior Army officials, specifically the DCSPER. 
Recognizing the economic and operational need to improve the 
consideration of "the soldier in the acquisition loop," senior 
Army officials centralized the control of the HSI within the 
MANPRINT Directorate. The Directorate was charted to 
implement and monitor Service-wide HSI policies.  Protected 
164 
and sustained by the continued patronage of the Army's senior 
leaders, the MANPRINT Directorate subsequently established 
formal, standardized procedures for the application, 
execution, and support of HSI within the Army. By regulating 
and incentivizing HSI performance in AR 602-2, the Army 
consequently lessened the authority and autonomy of its PMs to 
efficiently manage their programs. 
No senior Marine Corps leader, however, has yet 
championed the cause of HSI. As a consequence, HSI has 
received only limited organizational attention or support. In 
response to the publication of DoD and Department of the Navy 
acquisition policies, the Marine Corps is now beginning to 
formalize its policies. Lacking senior-level guidance, the 
Marine Corps acquisition community has not standardized its 
HSI procedures. Instead, the Corps relies on the 
institutional knowledge of its civilian work-force and the 
conscientiousness of its military program staff to perform and 
support HSI. 
The decentralized nature of the Marine Corps HSI program 
is sustained by the institutional philosophy that because each 
procurement is unique, the PM should be given unrestricted 
authority to efficiently manage his program. Thus, 
decentralization provides the PM not only with flexibility in 
tailoring his HSI effort, but also with a diversity of options 
in its execution. However, because decentralization relies on 
individual knowledge, understanding, and interpretation of 
DoD's HSI policies by program and support staff members, it 
results in the inconsistent application, execution, and 
support of HSI. 
The HSIAM scores demonstrate the extent to which each 
Service achieved consistency in the performance of HSI. Total 
effectiveness scores for Marine Corps acquisition programs 
varied by 34 points, whereas the Army scores deviated by only 
13 points.  For individual questions, Marine Corps scores 
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displayed up to 5 points of variance, yet Army scores differed 
by only 3 points. Therefore, by standardizing and regulating 
the MANPRINT process, the Army achieved greater consistency in 
the performance of HSI throughout the Service. Conversely, 
because it is personality-dependent, the Marine Corps HSI 
program's effectiveness is ultimately based on the initiative 
and expertise of the PM and his staff. 
2.  Visibility 
Visibility is the second major area of contrast between 
the Services. The Army MANPRINT program affords outstanding 
visibility into the HSI decision-making process in two ways: 
first, through the active participation of the user proponent, 
the TSM, in the acquisition process, and second, through the 
development of an effective audit trail to track HSI issues. 
As a member of the MANPRINT Joint Working Group, the 
proponent for the system operator and maintainer is 
continually informed of HSI issues as they arise, and 
subsequently involved in the formulation and selection of 
alternative design solutions. Control and communication of 
HSI issues is maintained through the SMMP and the MANPRINT 
Log. These living documents track HSI issues from 
identification through resolution, ensuring that each issue is 
considered during the design and development process. This 
traceable audit trail not only provides structure and 
continuity to the MANPRINT effort, but also provides senior 
acquisition and review authorities with insight into the 
program's HSI issues and actions. 
The Marine Corps HSI program offers significantly less 
visibility into the HSI decision-making process. Due to 
personnel constraints and current organizational practices, 
the user proponent, the MCCDC Requirements Officer, is not 
actively involved in the acquisition process. The PM is only 
required to inform the user proponent of program decisions 
during Milestone Reviews or if an ORD threshold will be 
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breached. External visibility into HSI decision-making is 
further clouded by the lack of traceable audit trails. Given 
greater autonomy in the management of their programs, Marine 
Corps PMs are not required to document HSI issues beyond those 
HSI requirements established in DoD Instruction 5000.2. Not 
until August 1994, however, did the Marine Corps formally 
apply the HSIP requirement to non-major programs. Instead, 
the Marine Corps left both the control and communication of 
HSI issues to the discretion of its Program Managers. 
3.  Oversight 
Organizational oversight is the third major area of 
contrast. The Army maintains a centralized bureaucracy for 
the review and assessment of MANPRINT procedures. The extent 
of this oversight is illustrated in what one PM called his 
first ignominious principle of program management: "While 
there is a limited number of people in the program, there is 
no limit to the number of people who review and audit it." 
Although both the Army and Marine Corps rely on the visibility 
provided by program documentation to assess HSI performance, 
the Army's comprehensive documentation procedures affords a 
much broader view into program-level decision-making. 
However, such visibility is -a dual-edged sword. While 
providing insight, it also provokes animosity among some 
program personnel who feel that their efforts are subjected to 
excessive scrutiny and/or unreasonable restrictions by 
external assessors. Resentment was especially vehement 
against those oversight authorities with little or no 
operational experience or accountability for the consequences 
of their assessments. Tellingly, one PM states that his 
second ignominious principle of program management is that 
"while the PM is chartered as the sole responsible program 
official, there is virtually no accountability for anyone else 
who sees fit to challenge his program anywhere, at any time." 
Marine Corps HSI oversight capabilities, on the other 
167 
hand, are hindered by the narrow window of visibility provided 
by program documentation.  Unless actively involved in the 
acquisition  process  by  the  PMO,  the  Program  Support 
Directorate cannot fully evaluate a program's HSI effort, but 
rather is limited to reviewing HSI documentation for proper 
form and content.  Marine Corps procedures currently do not 
evaluate the six HSI disciplines as an integrated entity. 
Instead, these disciplines are evaluated within various forums 
and at separate organizational levels.  Even the performance 
of HSI analyses remain divided between two support agencies: 
the Training Systems Program Management Office retains 
cognizance over MPT analyses, while human factors engineering, 
system safety, and health hazards analysis are controlled by 
the Program Support 
Directorate. 
4.  Forums 
HSI forums are a fourth area in which the Army and Marine 
Corps differ. The Army addresses all six HSI disciplines in 
one forum, the MANPRINT Joint Working Groups. Organized at 
program initiation and meeting periodically thereafter, the 
MJWG provides an open forum specifically convened to identify, 
evaluate, and resolve human issues. The MJWGs were praised 
for their ability to communicate and integrate HSI issues 
between the PMO, the user proponent, HSI discipline 
representatives, system engineers, and the prime contractor. 
The Marine Corps does not possess a standardized forum to 
address the integration of HSI issues. According to 
procedures established by the PMO, HSI concerns may be 
surfaced by discipline representatives attending either In- 
Process -Reviews or Integrated Logistics Support Management 
Team meetings. While both forums examine one or several of 
the HSI disciplines, neither specifically addresses all six 
disciplines in a consolidated manner. 
By virtue of the Services' organizational size and 
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budgetary differences, the Army retains an elaborate HSI 
infra-structure compared to the Marine Corps' modest HSI 
support structure. However, both Services share their 
organizational resources through cooperative and contractual 
agreements. Thus, to varying degrees, the Army and Marine 
Corps can avail themselves to the same HSI support agencies. 
This includes the Army's extensive MANPRINT training program 
to which the Marine Corps is afforded access. 
5.  Commitment 
The strength of the Marine Corps HSI program was 
demonstrated in the next area of contrast; commitment to the 
needs of the system operator and maintainer. The Marine Corps 
acquisition community possesses a strong organizational 
culture dedicated to satisfying the needs of the system 
operator and maintainer. This perspective appears to be based 
on the cyclical rotation of military acquisition practitioners 
between operational and acquisition tours of duty. The Army 
program offices displayed a similar, but less aggressive 
commitment to satisfying the users needs. However, the active 
participation of the user proponent, the TSM, and the 
assignment of MANPRINT Managers more than compensated for this 
imbalance. 
While dedicated to the users needs, the Marine Corps 
exhibited less understanding and appreciation of HSI 
principles. Within the acquisition community confusion exists 
regarding HSI terminology and methodology. Because the HSI 
program was built on the foundation of the Navy's HARDMAN 
program, misunderstanding persists as to the roles and 
relationships of HSI, HARDMAN, and MANPRINT. Because of its 
historical bias, the HSI program continues to emphasize MPT 
issues with descending priority applied to human factors 
engineering, system safety, and health hazards. 
Because of the institutionalization of the MANPRINT 
program, Army acquisition practitioners exhibited a sound 
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understanding and appreciation of HSI principles. Although 
less evident, some confusion does linger regarding the 
correlation between HSI and MANPRINT. Also a product of its 
historical foundations, the MANPRINT process demonstrated 
greater emphasis and proficiency in the disciplines of human 
factors engineering, system safety, and health hazards, and 
less in the MPT disciplines. 
The Army and Marine Corps also diverged in the manner in 
which they achieved contractor commitment to HSI. The Marine 
Corps communicated its concern for the users needs through the 
personal dynamics of its PMO staff personnel. In the course 
of informal routine discussions, acquisition practitioners 
expressed their commitment to human issues and their 
expectations of the same from the contractors. In contrast, 
the Army formally required contractors to address human 
issues. Through the inclusion of MANPRINT as a separate major 
area in the source selection process and the delineation of 
program HSI deliverables, the Army contractually mandates 
contractor performance of HSI. Industry responded to both 
Services' HSI methodologies in a positive manner, adapting 
their practices to accommodate the Services' unique HSI 
requirements. 
C.  SUMMARY 
In final analysis, the Army through its MANPRINT program 
successfully achieved the integration of human considerations 
into the acquisition process in accordance with the intent of 
DoD Instruction 5000.2. This objective was achieved through 
the systematic application of the following features of the 
MANPRINT program: 
• The MANPRINT Joint Working Group comprised of HSI 
discipline representatives periodically assembled to 
surface, discuss, and formulate solutions to HSI 
concerns. 
• A traceable audit trail to document and track HSI 
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issues from identification to resolution. 
• The MANPRINT review and assessment process which 
evaluates the adequacy of HSI efforts and vertically 
integrates HSI issues within the Acquisition Command 
and Service. 
• The inclusion of MANPRINT in the source selection 
process to contractually require contractor 
consideration of HSI issues throughout the design and 
development process. 
Conversely, because of its current HSI practices, the 
Marine Corps has yet to fully integrate human considerations 
into the acquisition process. Although each program's HSI 
effort is unique and ultimately directed by the knowledge and 
initiative of the PMO staff, in general, Marine Corps 
programs, especially non-major programs, rely on "stove-piped" 
staffing of program documentation, rather than interactive 
forums, to accomplish HSI. Further, although human issues may 
be addressed within other forums, such as IPRs and ILSMT 
meetings, at no point in the acquisition process are 
representatives for all six of the HSI disciplines assembled 
to identify, debate, and synergistically formulate solutions 
to HSI trade-offs. Consequently, the Marine Corps, by 
acknowledging each discipline separately and not integrating 
their input to produce optimal system design solutions, may be 
inadvertently decreasing total system performance. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Based on the conclusions derived from the comparative 
analysis performed in Chapter VII, this chapter addresses 
potential areas for organizational change within the Marine 
Corps Systems Command and proposes alternative solutions to 
enhance overall HSI effectiveness. The chapter will conclude 
with recommendations for areas of further study in the field 
of human systems integration. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Although in compliance with the requirements of DoD 
Instruction 5000.2, the Marine Corps HSI program does not 
possess policies or procedures to systematically integrate 
human issues into the material acquisition process. To date 
the Marine Corps has not established adequate Service or 
Acquisition Command policies or procedures for the systematic 
application, execution, or support of HSI. To achieve 
information exchange between HSI disciplines, the Marine Corps 
relies on "stove-piped" staffing of program documentation 
rather than standardized HSI forums. 
Current practices fail to achieve the synergistic 
benefits incurred by an integrated approach to the evaluation 
of human issues during systems design. Consequently, the 
Marine Corps may be failing to optimize total system 
performance and/or minimize the cost of ownership of its 
acquisition programs. This situation is compounded for non- 
major programs which have commonly dedicated less effort to 
HSI despite significant levels of man-machine interface. 
2. The effectiveness of the Marine Corps' HSI program 
is personality-dependent and driven by the operational 
expertise, acquisition experience, and personal initiative 
resident in the Program Management Office. Without 
standardized HSI policies or procedures, the Marine Corps 
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relies on the knowledge and initiative of its program 
management personnel to establish and execute HSI efforts. 
This practice results in the inconsistent application, 
performance, and support of HSI among the Marine Corps' 
acquisition programs. HSI variability exists not only between 
major and non-major programs, but between programs within the 
same acquisition category. 
The consequences of such variability are lessened by the 
Marine Corps acquisition community's organizational culture 
which emphasizes the consideration of the system operator and 
maintainer during the acquisition cycle. Conscious of this 
institutional commitment, MARCORSYSCOM empowers its PMs to 
manage their HSI efforts with minimal bureaucratic direction 
or restraint. This commitment is nourished by the operational 
awareness brought to the acquisition process by military 
personnel rotating between operational and acquisition tours 
of duty. Further, it is communicated to industry on a routine 
basis through the personal dynamics of the PMO staff. 
3
- Current Marine Corps HSI practices and 
organizational relationships do not adequately involve the 
proponent of the system operator and maintainer in the HSI 
decision-making process. The user proponent, the MCCDC 
Requirements Officer, is granted limited visibility into the 
acquisition process. He is afforded visibility in three 
instances: 1) Milestone Reviews, 2) when a ORD threshold is to 
be breached, and 3) at the discretion of the PMO. Hence, the 
user proponent can only effectively influence system design 
through the requirements established within the ORD. Yet, 
under current procedures, human systems requirements are 
consolidated, rather than integrated, by staffing the ORD 
through the HSI disciplines for comment. 
Lacking an involved or accountable advocate for the needs 
of the Marine end-user, other acquisition agencies have 
attempted to fill this role, specifically the Program Support 
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Directorate and the individual Program and Project Management 
Offices. While commendable, these initiates have further 
clouded the organizational understanding of the HSI roles and 
responsibilities within MARCORSYSCOM. 
4. The Army MANPRINT program effectively fulfills the 
requirements of DoD Instruction 5000.2 through the 
establishment of an integrated and systematic approach to HSI. 
Army programs employing the MANPRINT process demonstrated 
consistently high levels of effectiveness in the application, 
performance, and support of HSI. Through the systematic 
implementation and integration of HSI analyses, these programs 
complied with both the requirements and intent of DoD's HSI 
policies. 
By standardizing its MANPRINT policies and procedures, 
the Army successfully institutionalized a systematic approach 
to HSI, and thereby reduced HSI variability between 
acquisition programs. Army Regulation 602-2 clearly defines 
the roles and responsibilities of those organizations involve 
in the support, execution, or review of HSI. Although such 
polices lessen the autonomy of PMs to manage their programs, 
they provide effective Service-wide guidelines for the 
execution of HSI. 
To ensure the effective integration of human issues 
into the material acquisition process, the MANPRINT program 
has implemented the following procedures: 
• The organization of a structured forum, the MJWG, for 
the identification, discussion, and resolution of HSI 
issues; 
• The establishment and maintenance of a traceable audit 
trail to document and track HSI issues throughout the 
acquisition cycle; 
• The performance of an extensive HSI review and 
assessment process. 
Through these practices, the MANPRINT program unifies and 
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strengthens the voice of the HSI disciplines within the system 
design and development process. Additionally, it capitalizes 
on the synergistic benefits incurred from the integrated 
evaluation of HSI issues, thereby optimizing total system 
performance and minimizing cost of ownership. 
5.   The strength  of  the MANPRINT program is  the 
visibility it provides  to human issues  throughout  thp 
acquisition process, thereby allowing acquisition officials to 
make informed decisions regarding the needs of system users. 
The MANPRINT program provides senior acquisition officials 
excellent visibility into the program-level HSI decision- 
making process. Human issues are raised by the MJWG, 
documented and tracked by a traceable audit trail, reviewed 
and assessed by external HSI specialists, and then presented 
for consideration before Milestone Decision Authority. This 
methodology ensures that all human issues have at least been 
surfaced and considered during the acquisition cycle. Senior 
acquisition officials can subsequently review the HSI 
decision-making process and make informed decisions regarding 
the program's status. 
6
-   The successful  implementation of  the MANPRINT 
program was founded on the ardent proponencv of senior Army 
officials. The successful implementation of the MANPRINT 
program demonstrated that in order to institute and sustain an 
effective HSI program, the Service's senior military leaders 
must be steadfast in their commitment to its goals. To 
achieve Service-wide implementation, the MANPRINT program 
relied on a top-down management approach and the patronage of 
the Army's senior officials, specifically the DCSPER. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
To improve the effective application, support, and 
performance of HSI throughout all Marine Corps acquisition 
programs, the following actions are recommended: 
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1. That the Marine Corps embrace the MANPRINT 
philosophy and tailor the MANPRINT program to the unique 
organizational environment of the Marine Corps acquisition 
process. As early as 19 89, a British Army report foresaw the 
eventuality of this recommendation. In assessing the state of 
HS I with in the Department of Defense, the report stated: 
The other Services have human factors management 
programs which are less mature and perhaps less 
wide-ranging. It is possible that the USN and USAF 
will have to upgrade HARDMAN and IMPACTS, 
respectively to be more like MANPRINT. (Wolverson, 
1989, p.3) 
The effectiveness of the Marine Corps acquisition process 
in satisfying user needs could be significantly enhanced by 
the adoption of the MANPRINT philosophy. Such a philosophy 
would not only demonstrate the Service's commitment to the 
needs of the system operator and maintainer, but would improve 
its response to those needs by unify and strengthen the voice 
of the HSI disciplines in the acquisition process. The 
findings of this research indicate that while incurring short- 
term costs, the adoption of the MANPRINT philosophy would 
result in the optimization of total system performance and the 
minimization of system life-cycle costs. 
To be effectively institutionalized, the MANPRINT 
philosophy would require the patronage of one or several 
senior Marine Corps acquisition officials, and the development 
of a top-down management plan. Subsequently, from this 
philosophical foundation, the Marine Corps can build a more 
effective HSI program. The Marine Corps should refrain from 
arbitrarily modeling its HSI program after the MANPRINT 
program. Instead, it should only select those MANPRINT 
policies, procedures, and practices deemed effective and 




-   That MARCORSYSCOM develop  formal  policies  and 
standardized procedures for the application, performance, and 
support of HSI for all acquisition programs. To consistently 
execute HSI effectively, MARCORSYSCOM should first expand its 
policies to more explicitly delineate the roles and 
responsibilities of those agencies involved in the 
performance, support, and oversight of HSI. Such policies 
should include formalize incentives to ensure the adequacy of 
program HSI efforts, and should promote the HSI training and 
education for all acquisition practitioners. 
Secondly, the Command should establish systematic and 
standardized procedures for the application, execution, and 
support of HSI. Such procedures should guide the PM in the 
management of his HSI effort, and should be tailored to the 
unique aspects of each program. 
3
-  Eiat an HSI Section  be  established  within 
MARCORSYSCOM to support Program Managers in the development. 
execution, and review of program-level HSI efforts. Through 
the consolidation and collocation of its HSI discipline 
representatives within one organization, MARCORSYSCOM could 
improve its ability to support and review HSI within its 
acquisition programs. An HSI Section, comprised of 
representatives of all six HSI disciplines, should be 
established within the Program Support Directorate. 
The function of an HSI section would be twofold. The 
section's primary function would be to advise Program Managers 
and Project Officers. In this capacity, the section would 
assist in the development and execution of program HSI 
efforts, and evaluate the adequacy and accuracy of contracted 
HSI support. This function is increasingly important as 
schedule and budgetary constraints compel PMs to contract 
civilian contractors for more HSI analyses. 
The HSI Section's secondary function would be to advise 
the PEO, through the Program Support Directorate, of the 
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Status and adequacy of program HSI efforts. In this way, the 
HSI Section could share accountability for the efficient and 
effective performance of HSI. This recommendation would 
necessitate the transfer of the MPT LEMs from the Training 
Systems PMO to the Program Support Directorate. It would also 
eliminate the need for a MANPRINT Specialist billet within the 
Ground Weapons PMO staff. 
4. That MARCORSYSCOM revise its oversight practices to 
increase visibility into the HSI decision-making process by: 
1) requiring programs to maintain a traceable HSI audit trail, 
and 2) empowering HSI personnel, specifically represented by 
the Program Support Director, to more effectively evaluate 
program HSI efforts. To effectively manage its programs' HSI 
efforts, MARCORSYSCOM should increase visibility into the HSI 
decision-making process. To do so, MARCORSYSCOM should 
mandate and monitor program-level documentation of HSI 
considerations. Through the development and maintenance of 
the HSIP and other HSI documentation initiatives, such as an 
HSI Log, programs should be required to identify and 
subsequently track HSI issues, trade-offs, and decisions 
throughout the acquisition process. Improved HSI 
documentation procedures would: 
• Establish a systematic method for acquisition programs 
to accurately track HSI issues from identification to 
resolution during the design and development process; 
• Assure the PEO that human considerations have been 
raised and examined prior to granting Milestone 
Approval; 
• Maintain communications with the user proponent as to 
the human issues involved with the system and the plans 
to address those concerns; 
• Provide a source of HSI continuity to lessen the impact 
of personnel changes within the program or support 
offices; 
• Reduce conflict with external oversight agencies by 
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providing evidence as to the extent and rationale of 
the HSI decision-making process; 
• Improve the capability of internal oversight agencies 
to review and assess the status and adequacy of HSI 
efforts. 
Further, MARCORSYSCOM should establish formal procedures 
for HSI reviews and assessments. As noted earlier, the 
purpose of HSI reviews would be to advise PMs in the 
development and direction of their HSI efforts. The purpose 
of the HSI assessments would be to advise the PEO as to the 
status and adequacy of the HSI efforts of the programs coming 
before Milestone Review. Such oversight should be performed 
by a consolidated HSI Section within the Program Support 
Directorate. To ensure consistency and increase 
effectiveness, the application and performance of HSI 
assessments should be proscribed by formal directive. 
Assessment procedures should stipulate that, from the outset 
of the acquisition cycle, PMs maintain a dialogue with HSI 
assessors regarding the program's significant human issues, 
trade-offs, and decisions. 
5. That MARCORSYSCOM should establish an HSI working 
group specific to each program to identify HSI issues and 
trade-offs throughout acquisition cycle. At Milestone 0, a 
MCCDC Requirements Officer, in coordination with MARCORSYSCOM, 
should convene and chair an HSI Working Group (HSIWG) to 
address, support, and review the HSI concerns of designated 
acquisition programs. Upon appointment of a PM, MARCORSYSCOM 
would assume management responsibilities for HSI and chair the 
HSIWG. To inform and involve the user proponent in the HSI 
decision-making process, the Requirements Officer would remain 
a member of the HSIWG throughout the acquisition cycle. The 
membership of the HSIWG should be tailored to based on the 
human performance issues of the system. A standard HSIWG 
should be comprised of the following members: 
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• PMO Representative - Chairman 
• Contractor HSI Manager - Vice Chairman 
• MCCDC Program Action Officer 
• Manpower, Personnel, and Training Representative 
• Human Factors Engineer 
• System Safety/Health Hazards Engineer 
• Other HSI Support Agency Representatives 
Meeting on a periodic basis throughout the acquisition 
process, the HSIWG, using its collective expertise, would be 
responsible for developing and maintaining the HSIP. The 
HSIWG would determine the level of HSI involvement for each 
system. Finally and most importantly, the HSIWG would ensure 
that identified issues are communicated to other acquisition 
organizations and are included in the requirement, program, 
and solicitation documentation. Through the HSIWG, the Marine 
Corps would achieve the effective integration of human issues 
into the material acquisition process, in accordance with the 
intent of DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
6. That through the inclusion of HSI as a separate 
major area in the source selection process. MARCORSYSCOM 
require Contractors to address HSI issues throughout system 
design and development. HSI should be included as a separate 
major area of the same visibility as technical, management and 
cost in the source selection process. By doing so, the Marine 
Corps can communicate to industry the value it places on the 
consideration of human issues in the acquisition cycle. 
Through the establishment of contractual obligations and 
program deliverables, the Marine Corps can lessen its reliance 
on the personal dynamics of the PMO staff, and thereby reduce 
HSI performance variability between acquisition programs. 
7. That in its on-going acquisition reform efforts, the 
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Office of the Secretary of Defense should better articulate 
the purpose and procedures of human systems integration. In 
future publications, OSD should clarify the intent of its HSI 
policies to ensure that integration is being achieved. To 
eliminate confusion, OSD should also endeavor to establish 
throughout the Department of Defense commonality of HSI 
terminology. 
D.  AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
During the course of this research, other areas which 
appear to merit additional study were identified. These 
topics were beyond the scope of this thesis, but are presented 
here for further consideration and potential research. 
!• Comparative analysis of current human systems 
integration methodologies in the acquisition of automated 
information systems (AIS). Whereas this thesis focused 
exclusively on the material acquisition process, limited 
research has been conducted on the application of HSI 
methodologies in automated information systems (AIS) 
acquisition. In recent years, the Army MANPRINT program has 
expanded to include the analysis of human issues in the 
development of AIS. Future research should address the 
effectiveness of MANPRINT AIS procedures and their 
applicability to the Marine Corps systems acquisition process. 
2
- Analysis of the effects of current Naval human 
system integration policies and procedures on the procurement 
of Marine Corps aviation systems and equipment. Since Marine 
Corps aviation systems and equipment are procured under the 
guidance of the Naval Air Warfare Systems Command, future 
research should evaluate the effectiveness of NAVAIR's HSI 
policies and procedures. Such research should examine the use 
of NAVAIR models and simulation techniques to address Marine 
Corps unique HSI issues. 
3
- Comparative cost and operational  effectiveness 
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analysis (COEA) of Marine Corps human systems integration 
support sources. Further investigation is required into the 
cost effectiveness of alternative approaches for sourcing of 
HSI support within MARCORSYSCOM. The research should examine 
the cost effectiveness of both in-house and contracted HSI 
support services, as well as various combinations thereof. 
4
 • Reverse engineering analysis of fielded Marine Corps 
material systems to quantify the life-cycle cost ramifications 
incurred by the inclusion of human systems integration in the 
acquisition cycle. To justify further investment of Marine 
Corps resources, research should be conducted to quantify the 
system life-cycle costs incurred by the performance or absence 
of HSI. Following the Army's example, the investigation 
should identify the manpower, personnel, training, safety, and 
health hazard costs incurred by systems fielded with limited 
or no HSI. 
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APPENDIX  A.      HUMAN  SYSTEMS   INTEGRATION AT 
HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ATTRIBUTES M 
TRIBUTES  MATRIX 
ATRIX (HSIAM) 
Points Awarded By 
Attribute 
Percentage of Total By 
Attribute 
Marine Corps         Army Marine Corps Army 
HSI Attributes #1     * i -2i IP flip! * ^ <? 
wmmmmnotiM. POLICY f-bM'3-k:ls:iPl::t ':?:0-:'x0:jrh 
1.   Does the Service or Acquisition Command 
support the performance of HSI? 5% 6 5 9 8 3.0 2.5 4.5 4.0 
2.  Do Service or Acquisition Command 
policies clearly designate HSI roles and 
responsibilities? 
4% 4 3 8 8 1.6 1.2 3.2 3.2 
3.   Do systematic procedures exist within the 
Service or Acquisition Command to 
perform/support HSI? 
3% 4 3 9 8 1.2 0.9 2.7 2.4 
4.  Do incentives exist within the Service or 
Acquisition Command to promote HSI? 3% 5 4 8 7 1.5 1.2 2.4 2.1 
5.   Do Service or Acquisition Command HSI 
policies strengthen the authority of the Program 
Manager to efficiently mange his program? 
5% 8 9 4 4 4.0 4.5 2.0 2.0 
CATEGORY TOTAL mam wmm mm l§3is§! ggftfss sf$m mm 'WWB: mam. 
EÄissznssMZEissssiga ■ZiiZV: ■:■:":■. 28HII3S- '^0^0^ 
6.  Is the proponent for the system operator 
and maintainer effectively involved (visible) in 
the acquisition decision-making process? 
4% 4 3 9 8 1.6 1.2 3.6 3.2 
7. Are HSI trade-offs made during the 
acquisition process documented by a traceable 
audit trail? 
4% 4 2 9 8 1.6 0.8 3.6 3.2 
8.   How effective is the Service or Acquisition 
Command's HSI review (assessment) process 
in identifying and evaluafinq HSI issues? 
4% 6 5 8 7 2.4 2.0 3.2 2.8 
9.  Do adequate procedures exist to enforce 
the correction of HSI concerns? 4% 5 5 8 7 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.8 
10. Are adequate feedback mechanisms 
employed to evaluate the effectiveness of HSI 
efforts durina the acauisifjon cvcle? 
4% 6 5 7 6 2.4 2.0 2.8 2.4 
CATEGORY TOTAL isasasisii 10M&MM saflfeae 41 S36SS liflefeteifcfe •mms «mmt 
C.   ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT 
~~s~s äüi Ü£Ü r*W#i j:i;;::-i-j::^:S;j;~a~ müi 
SSBSiSS 
11. Does the Service or Acquisition Command 
possess agencies capable of supporting HSI 
analyses? 
6% 4 5 8 8 2.4 3.0 4.8 4.8 
12. Do effective forums exist to allow for 
system trade-offs between HSI disciplines to be 
identified? 
5% 5 3 9 9 2.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 
13. Are HSI support organizations involved 
early enough in the acquisition cycle to 
effectively influence system design? 
5% 4 3 8 8 2.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 
14. Does the Service or Acquisition Command 
educate Program Management personnel on 
HSI policies or procedures? 
4% 4 4 6 7 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.8 




HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION ATTRIBUTES MATRIX (HS1AM) 
HSI Attributes vfi) 
** 
m~ TimmNmsmmmim 
16. Did the Program Management Office 
demonstrate understanding of HSI principles? 
18. To what extent was the HSI Manager 
trained or educated in the performance of HSI? 
15. To what degree did the Program 
Management Office display commitment to 
satisfying the needs of the system operators 
and maintainers? 
17. Was a member(s) of the Program 
Management Office specifically tasked with 
management of HSI?  
19. Was a Human Systems Integration Plan 
developed for the program in accordance with 




Points Awarded By 
Attribute 





20. Did Program documentation, to include the 





2Q.d. Human Factors Engineering 
20,e. System Safety 
20.f.  Health Hazards 
21. Were human considerations effectively 
integrated between and among HSI discipline 
support agencies? 
22. Were HSI considerations included as 
evaluation criteria during source selection? 
23.  To what degree did the Contractors) 
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APPENDIX B.  ORGANIZATIONS VISITED OR CONTACTED 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) , 
Human Systems Integration Division, Washington, D.C. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
Chief of Naval Operations, Training Requirements, 
Acquisition, and Technical Policy Branch (N71D), 
Washington, D.C. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
Operations Research Department 
Systems Management Department 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA 
Requirements Division 
Training and Education Division 
Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, VA 
Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate 
Program Support Directorate 
Program Management Office, Ground Weapons 
Assistant Program Management Office, Anti- 
Armor Weapons 
Program Management Office, Training Systems 
Manpower and Training Branch 
Direct Reporting Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle, Clarendon, VA 
4.  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. 
MANPRINT Directorate 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 
Washington D.C. 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Force Integration, and 
Analysis, Total Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA 
MANPRINT Division 
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Program Executive Officer for Fire Support 
Project Office, Advanced Anti-tank Weapons System - 
Medium, Redstone Arsenal, AL 
Program Management Office, Armored Gun System, Warren, MI 
NON-DOD ORGANIZATIONS 
United Defense, Limited Partnership, Santa Clara, CA 
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APPENDIX C.  TERMINOLOGY 
HUMAN SYSTEM INTEGRATION TERMINOLOGY 
A. HUMAN FACTORS 
1.  Definition: 
A body of scientific information about human 
characteristics. The term covers all biomedical and 
psychosocial considerations; it includes but is not 
limited to, principles and applications in the areas of 
human engineering, personnel selection, training, life 
support, job performance aids, and human performance 
evaluation.  (DODDIR 5000.2; 23 FEB 91, P. 15-7) 
B. HUMAN ENGINEERING 
1. Definition: 
The application of available knowledge which defines 
the nature and limits of human capabilities as they 
relate to the check-out, operation, maintenance or 
control of systems or equipment, and which may be applied 
during engineering design to achieve optimum 
compatibility between equipment and human performance. 
(MIL-STD-1472C; p. 8) 
2. Topical Areas: 
• Human physical and mental capabilities and limitations. 
(a) Abilities, skills, knowledge, and aptitudes 
(b) Skill acquisition 
(c) Skill perishability 
• Human-machine interface. 
• Anthropometric and biomedical criteria 
• Mission function and human requirements analysis 
• Performance under stress 
• Performance Assessment 
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C.  MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL 
1. Definition: 
The identification and acquisition of military and 
civilian personnel with the skills and grades required to 
operate and support a material system over its lifetime 
at peacetime and wartime rates. (DODDIR 5000.2; p. 15-7) 
2. Topical Areas: 
• Personnel selection and classification 
• Demographics 
• Rates 
(a) Accession rates 
(b) Attrition rates 
(c) Retention rates 
(d) Training rates 
• Force structure 
• Manning concepts 
(a) Automation 
(b) Robotics 
D.  TRAINING AND TRAINING SUPPORT 
1-  Definition: 
The processes, procedures, techniques, training 
devices, and equipment used to train civilian and active 
duty and reserve military personnel to operate and 
support a material system. This include individual and 
crew training; new equipment training; initial formal, 
and on-the-job training; and logistic support planning 
for training equipment and training device acquisitions 
and installations. (DODDIR 5000.2; p. 15-8) 
2.  Topical Areas: 
• Training concepts and strategy 
• Task analysis methods 
• Media/equipment selection 
• Simulation 
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• Training system evaluation 
• Training development plan 
E.  SYSTEM SAFETY 
1.  Definition: 
The application of engineering and management 
principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety 
within the constraints of operational effectiveness, 
time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life- 
cycle. (DODDIR 5000.2; p. 15-16) 
2.  Topical Areas: 
• Lessons learned 
• Human error 
• Environmental considerations 
• Protective equipment 
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Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Army Acquisition Executive 
Advanced Anti-tank Weapon System (Javelin) 
Acquisition Category 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
Armored Gun System 
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Army Material Command 
Army Research Institute 
Army Research Laboratory 
Army Streamlined Acquisition Process 
Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, 
Development, and Acquisition 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, 
Development and Acquisition 
Close Combat Vehicle-Light 
Combat Development Process 
Concept Exploration and Development 
Commanding General 
Coordinated Human Resource Technology 
Command Launch Unit 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
Defense Acquisition Board 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
Data Item Description 
Department of Defense 
DOD Directive 
DOD Instruction 
Defense Systems Management College 
Demonstration and Validation 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Early Operational Assessments 
Fleet Marine Force 
General Accounting Office 
Hardware Procurement and Military Manpower 
Human Engineering Laboratory 
Howitzer Improvement Plan 
Headquarters 
Headquarters, Department of the Army 
Headquarters, Marine Corps 
Human Research Engineering Directorate 
Human Systems Integration 
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HSIP Human Systems Integration Plan 
IG Inspector General 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support 
ILSM ILS Manager 
ILSMT ILS Management Team 
IMPACTS Improved Manpower, Personnel, and Comprehensive 
Training and Safety 
I PR In Process Review 
LAR Logistics Assessment Review 
LCC Life-cycle cost 
LEM Logistical Engineering Manager 
LHX Light Helicopter Experimental 
LRG Logistics Review Group 
LVAD Low Velocity Air Drop 
MAA Mission Area Analysis 
MACOM Major Army Command 
MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration 
MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command 
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Center 
MCPDM Marine Corps Program Decision Memorandum 
MCRDAC Marine  Corps  Research,  Development  and 
Acquisition Command 
MCO Marine Corps Order 
MCRDAC Marine  Corps  Research,  Development  and 
Acquisition Command 
MCTSSA Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
MER Manpower Estimate Report 
MJWG MANPRINT Joint Working Group 
MMT MANPRINT Management Team 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 
MPTS Manpower, Personnel, Training and Safety 
MTT Mobile Training Team 
MTTR Mean-Time-To-Repair 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NAWCTSD Naval Air Warfare Center 
NDI Non-Developmental Item 
O&S Operations and Support 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OTH Over-the-Höri zon 
PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 
P&D Production and Development 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PM Program/Project/Product Manager 
PMO Program Management Office 
PMS Pedestal Mounted Stinger (Avenger) 






















Program of Action and Milestones 
Program Support Directorate 
Research and Development 
Request For Proposal 
Required Operational Capability 
Secretary of Defense 
Secretary of the Navy 
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
Senior Executive Service 
Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon 
System MANPRINT Management Plan 
Naval Space Command 
Short-Range Anti-Tank Weapon (Predator) 
System Training Plan 
Test Integration Working Group 
Training and Doctrine Command 
Training Planning Process Methodology 
TRADOC System Manager 
United States Marine Corps 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Process 
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APPENDIX E.  HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION PLAN FORMAT 
HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION PLAN 
FOR 
(PROGRAM TITLE) 
1. Executive Summary. 
Provide in the executive summary an overview of the 
Human Systems Integration (HSI) strategy.  Present a 
description Of the highlights of the Human Systems 
Integration Plan (HSIP).  Describe how HSI objectives and 
requirements contribute to readiness, force structure, 
affordability, performance effectiveness, and achievement of 
wartime operational objectives.  Describe the scope and 
purpose of the HSIP.  Summarize HSI constraints and results 
of HSI analyses and trade-offs. 
2. Introduction. 
Provide the objectives and scope of the HSIP. 
Introduce the HSIP briefly, describing what is contained in 
the body of the plan. Address the requirements for tailoring 
HSIP requirements. 
3. System Description. 
Provide general descriptions of the system itself; 
major system components including form, fit and function; 
missions to be performed; operational and maintenance 
environments; alternative concepts or designs; and essential 
total system (human-in-the-loop) performance characteristics 
and techniques for integrating humans into the system. 
Describe the performance goals and thresholds which require 
HSI-related design interface and support analysis. Describe 
the stage of system development at the time of HSIP 
publication. The level of detail should be consistent with 
the maturity of the system development. 
A. Acquisition strategy Summary:  Summarize the 
proposed or approved strategy including the 
determination that the acquisition is a new 
development. Mil-Spec procurement, NonDevelopment 
Item (NDI), or a Product Improvement (PI). 
B. Activities involved.  Identify the lead acquisition 
agent, sponsor and all other major commands 
involved.  Provide a complete list of all commands 
and activities concerned with HSI in Annex A. 
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c
-  System acquisition milestones and schedule.  List 
dates for key events linked to the HSI Milestone 
Schedule contained in Annex B. 
D
-  Guidance.  Describe prior decisions, general DON 
guidance, assumptions, mandated constraints, and 
information pertaining to personnel characteristics 
and force structure» 
4.  HSI Issues and Constraints. 
Identify key issues that have HSI implications, 
including constraints established in the Mission Need 
Statement (MNS). Include major design, readiness, test and 
evaluation, and affordability issues. 
A
-  Manpower issues and constraints.  Provide end 
strength limitations; budget limitations; 
demographic limitations; requirements for reduced 
manning; constraints on crew size and mix. 
B
-  Manpower Availability.  Provide personnel 
availability estimates by skill level and source. 
C  Human capability/training issues and constraints. 
Provide minimum skill level projection; constraints 
on personnel progression; constraints on training 
equipment and facilities; requirements for special 
skills and cross training, embedded training, 
training devices and training media. 
D
-  Human performance issues and constraints.  Identify 
critical error types, establish performance 
standards and determine effects of automation on 
human skills and performance, team performance 
requirements; human performance limitations and 
capabilities as a function of proposed human-system 
interfaces (e.g., the effects and interaction of 
human fatigue and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
(NBC) protective equipment on human performance, 
system design and manpower). 
E
-  System safety, health, and environmental issues and 
constraints.  Identify system safety, health, and 
environmental issues, limits to be placed on 
environmental factors, biomedical and habitability 
constraints, and planning for human mishap 
prevention. 
198 
5.  HSI Program 
A. HSI Objectives.  Identify HSI objectives to be 
achieved during the acquisition process, including 
specifics for each domain . 
Examples are: 
(1) Reductions in manpower positions or 
requirements resulting from automation, design improvements, 
or cross-training with numbers of required billets expressed 
either in absolute quantitative/qualitative terms or as 
compared with the predecessor system. 
(2) No increase in the characteristics and skills 
of operators, maintainers, or supporters; quantitative goals 
for personnel capabilities. 
(3) No increase in training hours from the 
predecessor system; use of advanced training technology or 
techniques (e.g., embedded training, intelligent tutoring, 
or interactive courseware training systems). 
(4) Establishment of a Human Factors Engineering 
(HFE) program. 
(5) Establishment of system safety and health 
hazard control programs. 
B. HSI Strategy.  Present the HSI strategy reflecting 
the system acquisition strategy and addressing HSI 
risk assessment and reduction, application of 
advanced technology in the achievement of HSI 
objectives, reliance on commercial standards and 
data (e.g., American Society for Testing Materials 
(ASTM) or American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI)), establishment of HSI priorities, and a 
description of the process to be implemented to 
ensure that HSI objectives are met.  Describe the 
approach for addressing HSI issues throughout the 
acquisition process. 
C. HSI Analyses.  Identify analyses to be conducted, 
and their effects on managing HSI risks. Refer to 
Annex C for data sources.  Analyses will include 
HARDMAN methodology, including analysis of 
predecessor systems, and development of human 
factors engineering analysis (MIL-H-46855), system 
safety programs, and could involve a task analysis. 
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D
-  HSI Analyses Results: Impacts on Design and Risks. 
For each alternative concept or design, provide a 
summary of the results of Manpower, Personnel and 
Training (MPT), Human Factors Engineering (HFE), 
Systems Safety (SS), Health Hazards (HH) and other 
analyses such as those accomplished for the Cost 
and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), 
Program Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) Estimate, etc. 
(1) Critical Human System Factors. 
(2) Manpower Impact.  Also, identify net manpower 
requirements by quantity and quality. 
(3) Personnel Impact.  Also, identify new 
occupational specialties requirements by 
Rank/Rating/Naval Officer Billet 
Classification (NOBC)/Military Occupation 
Specialty (MOS). 
(4) Human Factors Engineering. 
(5) Safety and Health Hazards. Also, include LCC 
estimates such as the cost of acquiring, 
handling, using and disposing of hazardous 
materials. 
(6) Training Requirements.  Also, describe the 
training concept including types of training 
required and potential locations; identify the 
cost of high driver training resource 
requirements such as technical training 
equipment, training devices, military 
construction and lengthy course development. 
(7) Unit Readiness. 
(8) Trade-off Analysis. 
E.  HSI Test and Evaluation.  Describe how the system 
Test and Evaluation (T&E)  program will assess HSI 
domains in each phase of the acquisition process. 
F
-  HSI Relationships.  Define how HSI is organized 
within the acquisition program and how HSI will 
interact with the ILS and system engineering design 
programs.  Address specific program relationships 
among the HSI domains (i.e., HFE, MPT, SS and HH). 
6-  HSI Activities. 
Develop a tailored listing of all HSI activities. 
Describe in this paragraph the HSI activities by acquisition 
phase in terms of task, required resources, time to 
complete, responsible organization, support organizations 
and activity dependencies. 
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Index of Annexes to the HSI Plan 
Annex A. HSI Points of Contact 
Annex B. HSI Milestone Schedule 
Annex C. References and Data Sources 
Annex D. HSI Issues 
Annex E. HSI History- 
Annex A. HSI Points of Contact 
List of organizational activities needed for HSI 
information and assistance.  Include the organizational 
activities identified in paragraph 3b and those activities 
responsible for the tasks included in the HSI Milestone 
Schedule, Annex B, of the HSIP. 
Annex B.  HSI Milestone Schedule 
Display HSI tasks with schedule relationships to the 
acquisition, budgeting, and funding processes. 
Annex C.  References and Data Sources 
Provide references and data sources used for the HSI 
effort.  Examples include acquisition documents (Mission 
Need Statement (MNS), Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD), Integrated Program Summary (IPS)), T&E documentation, 
HSI data, predecessor and comparable system analyses and new 
technology descriptions. 
Annex D.  HSI Issues 
Provide a list of issues that will influence HSI 
decisions.  Describe issue, responsible activity, proposed 
resolution date, and status. 
Annex E.  HSI History 




APPENDIX F.  SYSTEM MANPRINT MANAGEMENT PLAN FORMAT 
SYSTEM MANPRINT MANAGEMENT PLAN 
FOR 
(PROGRAM TITLE) 
1. Executive summary 
Provides an overview of the MANPRINT strategy to be employed 
and the highlights of the SMMP. 
2. System description 
A. Description of the proposed material system. 
Provide an overview including, but not limited to, the 
material deficiency being addressed, missions, operational 
environments, design versions or alternatives, and essential 
total system (soldier-in-the-loop) performance 
characteristics. 
B. Acquisition strategy. Briefly discuss the life- 
cycle system management model strategy to be employed and 
how it will impact the MANPRINT effort. 
C. Agencies.  List the lead agency and all agencies 
expected to be involved in supporting the system 
acquisition. 
D. Guidance. 
(1) Decisions.  List all decisions that will have 
a direct impact on the design and/or MANPRINT issues. 
(2) General Department of the Army and Material 
Command guidance.  List all available guidance provided for 
MANPRINT issues. 
(3) Assumptions.  List all assumptions, not 
provided in guidance, that will have a direct impact on the 
design and/or MANPRINT issues. 
3. MANPRINT strategy 
A. Goals.  Identify the MANPRINT goals to be achieved 
during the acquisition process. 
B. Data sources and availability. 
(1) Predecessor system.  Determine the 
predecessor or reference systems and components, if any. 
Consider predecessors for each component of the material 
system, training devices, and repair and support equipment. 
(2) Early availability of data and risk analysis. 
Discuss the types and importance of data and when it is to 
be available for inclusion in analyses.  Determine its 
impact on the MANPRINT strategy to be employed and the 
associated level of risk incurred.  Provide the rationale 
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r 
and background employed in deciding how to address MANPRINT 
issues throughout the acquisition life-cycle. 
(3) Planned level of MANPRINT analysis effort. 
Identify what and when analyses are to be conducted based on 
the availability of data and resources.  Include how they 
will affect the risk incurred by the MANPRINT strategy 
employed. 
(4) Baseline MOS description.  Describe the 
quantity, quality, and performance of soldiers and civilians 
who operate, maintain, and support the predecessor system. 
Indicate how these characteristics relate to performance of 
operational, maintenance, and support tasks associated with 
the predecessor system. 
4. Critical issues 
List and discuss the major risk areas that, if 
unresolved, will cause the program to be modified.  Each 
challenge will have at least one associated MANPRINT concern 
(see Tab D). 
5. Tabs 
2L Tab A - Data Sourr.Rs.  List all potential data 
sources, the MANPRINT areas (manpower, personnel, training, 
human factors, system safety, and health hazards) addressed 
and the data item's relative importance to the system's 
development.  This will form the cornerstone for all 
analyses and planning. 
&* Tab B - System and MANPRINT Milestone Seherin!P. 
Using theGantt Chart format, display all significant 
problem milestones (Milestone Decision Reviews, design 
reviews, etc.)  and MANPRINT tasks to be accomplished from 
research and exploratory development through first unit 
equipped. 
C-= Tab C - Task Description.  For each task to be 
performed list the following information (necessary for Tab 
B preparation): 
(1) Task description (narrative). 
(2) Rationale ( why is it necessary). 
(3) Resources (personnel and dollars). 
(4) Time to complete (optimistic, normal, 
pessimistic). 
(5) Responsible agency (lead agency). 
(6) Support agencies. 
(7) Dependencies (tasks that must be completed 
prior to this one or required data during the 
execution of this task). 
(8) Feeds (tasks that cannot start until this one 
has been completed or use data from this task 
while they are in process). 
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D. Tab D - MANPRINT Major Issues/Concerns.  Use a 
separate sheet for each issue or concern.  Record the 
background, planned solution, and current status of each 
issue, concern, or tracking list item.  Update each sheet 
periodically.  When the issue or concern is resolved, update 
the sheet to show that the item is closed, and record the 
necessary entry in Tab F - Audit Trail. 
E. Tab E - Coordination.  List all commands, agencies, 
and activities with whom the SMMP must be coordinated. 
F. Tab F - Audit Trail.  Document significant MANPRINT 
related decisions made during the entire system's life. 
G. Tab G - Target Audience Description.  Identify 
likely characteristics of personnel for whom the new 
material or equipment is being developed or acquired. 
Describe the range of individual qualifications and relevant 
dimensions of the proposed operators and maintainers. 
H.  Tab H - Lessons Learned and Deficiencies of 
Predecessor System.  Identify, by domain, major lessons 
learned and deficiencies which have been identified from all 
applicable predecessor systems. 
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